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Abstract
Emerging from the ashes of the old electoral system of the First Republic, an ideological
populism built on regional identity, most significantly espoused by the Lega Nord
political party, became a dominant force in Italian politics. This populism initially
attacked a corrupt state, but evolved to confront perceived threats to its homeland region,
such as globalization and immigration. Despite these developments, this populism
continues to create a discourse which pits a virtuous, homogenous people against a set of
self-serving poteri forti (powers that be). What self-serving powers gave rise to this
populism? This anti-state, xenophobic populism exists as a response to a “negative
aggregation” of political, social, and economic conjunctures systemic to Italian politics
since its formation as a republic in 1861. It is clear that specific elements of
contemporary Italian state formation and political economy gave rise to this populism and
sustained its particular ideological construction. Thus this investigation traces these
forces that have allowed Lega and the populism it embodies to emerge politically at the
end of Italy’s First Republic.
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Introduction
The year is 1992 and the Italian Chamber of Deputies is trying to elect a new president of
the Republic. Not normally civil, the halls of Palazzo Madama and Palazzo Montecitorio
are filled with outbursts of ladri (thieves) and other insults. The more populist leaders are
in rare form. Rallies denouncing the state are common; slogans decry Roma Ladrona
(Thieving Rome). Everyone seems to hate Italian politics—save for their own faction. It
is a tumultuous time; everyone seems restless. This is to be expected. They don't know it,
but the Italian First Republic is about to come to an end.
Why is everyone so angry? And how did it get this way? Answering these
questions requires investigating the widespread populism that spread all across the
country. These questions also reveal that analyzing the rise of Italian populism requires
an analysis of the particularity of the case. These particularities arise from the case’s
history. Many accounts of populism do not investigate these particularities beyond the
immediate context surrounding rise of the populist phenomenon. Although the immediate
conditions feeding populism are certainly important, the historical continuities of its rise,
which cumulated in the immediate crisis, provide a deeper analytic story. A deeper
analytic story is necessary because “populism” as a concept in political science is
difficult to define. It is typically a descriptive category. Populism typically is understood
as some sort of variation on a social or political mobilization or discourse that references
a “people” as a homogenous entity with exclusive positive and permanent values.
However, analytically, this formulation means that populism is an appeal to the people.
Populism, then, is open to numerous formulizations because it is not limited by things
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like state structure, political organization, or ideological program. Due to this openness,
populism is often grounded in a theory of personality. Thus, analysis in this scheme
focuses on populist actors. But since populism’s openness to numerous formulizations is
preserved in this theory, “populist” can, and has been used to describe such a diverse
group of actors from Peron to Perot, Castro and Chavez to Reagan and Thatcher. Even
within Italy numerous manifestations that can be described as populist have occurred.
The concept of populism must be limited if it is to be analytically useful.
The study of populism has spawned a sprawling field of scholarship, often with
many studies attempting to limit the concept. There are a few ways in which this limiting
often occurs. One way is to look at the populist’s rhetoric. In other words, how is the
populist constructing an idea of the people? Another tactic is to make it a historical
phenomenon. Populism responds to a set of social and political conditions usually by
advocating for a set of idealized relations. But even this limitation can vary significantly.
Is the populist project forward or rearward looking? Emancipatory or reactionary? Then
there is a structural approach. This structural approach is not a general theory of
populism. Rather, it is an analysis of how the movement situates itself within the various
political and social contexts to which it responds. The openness of the “people” is
maintained while allowing for the intense variation to which populist movements
respond. Both the referents, those exclusive positive and permanent values, and the
“problems” they are pitted against are historical in nature. But the populist is responding
to a specific moment in time often to show how far some “ideal” has gone astray. The
people are under threat from outside forces. Structurally, populism takes the form of an
us/them binary. But even this formulation seems lacking of analytical content. In order to
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avoid the same problems of analysis presented above, the structural approach must treat
populism as a conjunctural phenomenon. The historical focus necessary to make
populism a conjunctural phenomenon grounds its more elusive conceptual elements, the
us and the them, in the concrete historical tendencies of the case. In doing so, populism
becomes a socio-political phenomenon of the environment within which it operates.
Specifically, this focus helps explain why the populism that emerged in the early Italian
Second Republic was both regionalist and anti-establishment.
A way of illustrating populism as a conjunctural phenomenon is to look to one of
its most powerful practitioners, the Lega Nord. The Lombard League, or Lega
Autonomista Lombardia was formed on April 12, 1984. Intensely regionalist, the
Lombard League espoused a passion for the Lombard dialect and culture. Although the
league started with this cultural focus, by the early 1990s this cultural passion gave way
to a critique of the political structures of the Italian state coupled with demands for
federalism or outright autonomy. Lombardy was not the only region to see the formation
of an “autonomous” league. Throughout northern Italy, cultural and quasi-political
organizations took root. And on December 4, 1990, six of these leagues—Lega Veneta,
Piemonte Autonomista, Lega Emiliana- Romagnola, Alleanza Toscana, Unione Ligure,
and Lega Autonomista Lombardia—signed a pact in Bergamo, which was formalized in
Milan on February 10, 1991 giving birth to Lega Nord. Lega is a populist and regionalist
group focused on issues important for the localities it represents. But Lega is more than a
regional, tax revolt group; it has become one of the more successful parties on the right. It
is a major political party today and considering it stems back to the 1980s before the fall
of the First Republic, it is one of the oldest formal parties.
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The Lega Nord formulates its ideology through a fusion of regionalism and
populism. Regionalism must inform the populism of the Lega Nord because Lega arose
in a specific political and socio-economic environment in which it could develop its
themes with reference to the territorial context of its heartland areas. Furthermore, it was
created as a fusion of regional groups and thus has an institutional history built on
regional features. The regionalism and populism allows them to create a narrowly defined
“people” based on their specific self-conception bounded by conceptions of what they are
consciously not. This formulation is significant because, as Marco Tarchi has argued,
Lega represents the fusion of populism into a mass party on the right.1 Because these
masses are constituted through a regional space, Lega can frame issues in terms of a
“people” vs an “outsider.” To put it generally, their politics is defined by a fluid us/them
binary in which they can use shared characteristics to form the “us” and render
everything else as “them.” Lega is particularly interesting because it extends this binary
to the state when it is advantageous to do so. Specifically, Lega formulates a discourse
that pits a virtuous, homogenous people against self-serving “poteri forti” (powers-thatbe) and which provide the basis for this paper’s analysis.
The famed historian of Fascism Renzo de Felice described the political project of
Fascism as a “negative aggregation” of forces that developed in the Liberal Italy that
preceded the regime. The negative aggregation took full force when the regime was
brought down by a crisis of legitimacy in the early Twentieth century. Considering Lega,
as a mass party, also emerged in a time of crisis, it is advantageous to also look at Lega as
a negative aggregation. This is not to suggest that the Lega Nord is a Fascist party or
1

Tarchi, Marco,. 2015. Italia Populista : Dal Qualunquismo a Beppe Grillo. Bologna: Il mulino. All
translations from Italian, unless otherwise noted, are mine.
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even displays Fascist tendencies. It is to suggest that the radical alternatives, hypernationalism on one hand and federalism on the other, emerge as alternatives as legitimacy
crises played out. And considering these were both precipitated by rather similar crises in
the apparatuses of government, the comparison is even more applicable. Thus I argue that
Lega’s emergence, and that of populism in general at the time, is a negative aggregation
of the problems of centralized government and its practices in Italy and the political,
social, and economic problems that arise out of this particular mode of organization.
I focus on the centralized state because it is one of the few entities that remain
constant across Italian political history following the country’s establishment as a
republic in 1861. The drive for centralization won out then, saw a hyper-intensification
during the Fascist period, and was reconstructed during the post-World War II period.
Throughout all of these periods, the state forged its institutional practices in an effort to
promote unity. These relationships, best characterized by a desire to rule from the center
whilst creating a modern Italian nation, can help explain problems like a lack of
transparency between large firms and state actors, a semi-representative democratic
government that insulates the parties in power, and a reliance on patronage politics and
clientelism among other problems that come to characterize the Italian nation from the
Risorgimento into modern day. The practices of this governmental model, particularly in
the areas of clientelism and what Arend Lijphart called the “politics of
accommodation”—the Italians call it trasformismo—remain steady and are typically
intensified or expanded into new areas over time.2 In a way, this investigation traces this

2

Lijphart, Arend. 1968. The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands.
Berkeley: University of California Press.
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continuity and its effects on Italian society not just in Lega’s populist moment. These
developments provide the backdrop for Lega’s populism’s fluid us/them binary.
The following chapter outline summarizes the structure of this argument. Chapter
1, “Il Risorgimento and the Central State,” explores the establishment of the Republic of
Italy. I start here because governmental systems and the logic employed in the exercise of
power are historical in nature. We can trace the Italian government’s penchant for
centralization to its unification moment, il Risorgimento. I trace the historical factors and
political attitudes that produced Italy’s centralized government. The political
consequences of this choice are also historical in that they led to the governmental crises
that precipitated Fascism. Chapter 1 thus focuses on both the formation and crisis of
Italian liberalism. But despite the crises, Italian liberalism set in motion a political modus
vivendi whose legacy would stretch far beyond the context of 19th and early 20th century
Italy. Specifically, the architects of the Risorgimento chose to focus on creating a
national Italian identity, the consequences of which was that, over time, all local
particularities and regional differences became subsumed in an abstract notion of
nationalism. It is precisely this abstraction which regional populism seeks to undo.
Chapter 2, “The State Reasserts Itself,” explores how that state was reconstructed
after the fall of Fascism. I trace the re-establishment of the Italian political system in the
aftermath of the war. By investigating the political constraints and post-war necessities of
this period, this chapter reveals a continuity of the Italian state that maintained many
elements of pre-Fascist politics. Rather than simply reasserting itself in Italian society,
the political system it expanded its influence. By investigating developments in
bureaucratic political institutions, this chapter reveals how the central state expanded its
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influence into society in its attempt to develop political hegemony. Here again, the
abstraction of the citizen continues but it clear that the state exists not for the sake of the
citizen but for itself. The major political entities pursue reforms in such a way as to
strengthen their own claims to hegemony over the Italian peninsula. These massive
projects also give credence to the populists accusations that state of wasted resources for
political ends, especially in the service of party politics. The centralized state becomes
ubiquitous and in doing so becomes synonymous with party politicking.
The expansion explored in the second chapter did not limit itself to the political
sphere. The state looked to the public and private spheres much in the same way it
viewed the administration system. Chapter 3, “the State Expands,” sketches the expansion
of the public sphere in the domain of economic development. It also traces the
development of power linkages in the private sector during the expansion of Italian
capitalism from the economic boom between the end of the Second World War and late
1960s onward. The state, through its provision of resources and economic decisions,
intertwines itself in the economy in such a way to increase its overall centralization. In
addition to showing a further expansion of state power, this chapter begins to reveal
major consequences of this peculiar form of mediated modernization. Dualisms in
development across space are maintained rather than managed or eliminated. These
dualisms are only reduced by dynamism in the economy outside of the state and internal
migration. Over time, it becomes clear that the uneven allocation of resources and poor
public services are due to the influence of the parties in the bureaucracy. This problem
becomes amplified by the fact these agencies are dominated by Southern Italians, the
same class of people immigrating northward and putting strain on local northern
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economies. Not only does the Southernized bureaucracy drain resources from the North
in order to redistribute them to the South, the scheme does not create widespread
Southern prosperity, hence the proliferation of Southerners in the North. In short, State
expansion built imbalances in the economy and social relations, all of which extend into
the conjunctural moment of widespread populism.
Chapter 4, “the State in Crisis” brings the analysis to the fall of the post-war
republic and the eruption of political discontents. It traces developments in the central
state that brings all political actors into the state system, with the exception of the
Communist left. It then explores the withering the Communist left following the tension
of the late sixties and seventies. After continuing to fend off challenges or absorb them,
the state continues its modus vivendi of increased centralization and distance from the
people it governs. This governance style only ends with the legitimacy crisis brought on
by widespread judicial investigations and corruption scandals that revealed the system of
clientelist linkages building for decades. It is within this crisis that populism saw its
strongest resurgence. It becomes clear to the populists that, despite the state’s constant
focus on modernization, it does not embody the principles of a modern society. Rather it
is a parasitic entity in which all actors, the ladri (thieves), are guilty of perpetuating
bureaucratic irrationality and clientelism. When coupled with the other issues that
resulted from Italy’s political development, this populism found a situation ripe for its
widespread growth.
Chapter 5, “Populism Emerges and Responds,” concludes the project by
connecting these tendencies to produce an image of contemporary right-wing populism in
Italy. By examining/analyzing the calls for federalism, both politically and economically,
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we see the importance of the developments in the centralized state for the populist
message. The fluid us/them binary can easily become a centralized/federalized binary.
The populists responded to the corruption scandals by demanding federal representation,
if not outright secession, because the particular form the growth of the Italian state
took—and not just in its own political sphere— penetrated and bureaucratized social and
economic institutions to such a degree that it eroded the very basis of political legitimacy,
autonomous citizens. Politics in Italy took place at a level over and above the abstract
Italian not to mention the Lombardian, or Varesian.3 I also investigate the area where the
binary is typically identified: xenophobia. Much of this xenophobia was expressed in
economic terms, revealing how the social and economic issues that arose from the state’s
development model fueled these messages. These messages gained traction for a reason.
And that reason was a cultural xenophobia that was much more than biological racism.
Lega capitalized on the confusion of Italian politics wrought by the rapid changes
precipitated by the legitimacy crisis experienced by the Italian political system. But
simply positing that populism was regionalist and anti-establishment fails to explain the
force behind the discontent expressed. This radical populism requires a historical
analysis that explores the continuities which allow for its emergence and success. For
that, the analysis must explore not only the legitimation crisis that opens space for the
populism but also the very modus vivendi of the Italian state that the populism criticizes.
Only by doing so, can this populism be understood as embodying a radical “negative
aggregation” which brought the state itself into question.

3

Varese is a commune of Lombardy and a major center of Lega support as Umberto Bossi, the founder of
Lega Nord hails from here and frequently held party congresses in the commune’s hinterland.

10

11

Chapter 1: Il Risorgimento and the Central State
The formation of the unified Italian state is a historical anomaly. First, in terms of
Western democracies it is recent. Italy was proclaimed a nation on March 17, 1861.
Italy’s unification marked the country’s first lurching step toward securing a place in
modern Europe. This modernization context shaped the unification period profoundly.
The arguments driving unification and the form it would take reflected both geopolitical
constraints and attitudes toward liberal governance. Stepping toward modernity also had
consequences for the young nation. This particular mode of the rise of the Italian state—
particularly its rise over unchanging social, political, and economic conditions—set in
motion a host of challenges that would shape Italian politics into the modern day. These
challenges become clear in the role this form of modernization would play in
precipitating the crisis that swept in Fascism. These crises often laid bare the internal
contradictions of the Italian state that created so much animosity amongst movements and
citizens alike. These crises provide an opportunity to investigate the internal logic of the
Italian state as a unified entity because internal logic, rather than external intervention,
often precipitates its moments of crisis. A recurring theme is a failure of Italian liberalism
to bridge a divide between the people of Italy and the national government. Throughout
this complex history, efforts at instilling a thoroughgoing nationalism failed due to
international politics and internal state-society relations. In investigating these moments
and the logic that gives rise to them, it becomes clear these efforts exist as a continuity in
Italian history rather than a series of isolated events.
These continuities set the stage for the challenges of post-WWII developments in
party politics, administration, and political economy in general. Many of the
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contradictions within the liberal state find their roots in the inability of a liberal model
and a political class to adapt to a modernizing country. The contradictions of Italian
liberal governance and the crisis they advance not only give rise to two decades of Fascist
rule, but help shape the reconstruction period following the fall of Fascism. The logic and
problems of centralized government emerged in this time period but are not relegated to
the period itself. In fact, they provide the material upon which a continuity of the state,
post-Fascism is established.
Despite this gloomy picture, unification of Italy was a well-intentioned goal and
project of immense proportions. It involved questions of internal governance and
international relations; modernization and conservatism; Italian identity and local
particularity, but above all else, the unification moment is best understood as a moment
about Italy. What do we mean by a national moment? The historian Denis Hays writing
on composing a history of Italy wrote: “we mean the way the country has acquired selfconsciousness, and the play of interests, political, social, cultural, within the perimeter
established by language, by geography and by relations, acquisitive or concessive, with
its neighbors.”4 As we will see, all of these elements would have profound effects on the
form Italian unification would take. But the common denominator is that the unification
of Italy was seen by a wide swath of people as a reawakening of Italian greatness. In fact,
the name unification took—Il Risorgimento—can be translated in a slightly different
ways, but the sentiment of the time is best encapsulated by the rising again. In order to
understand what Italy was rising above and towards a few words about pre-unified Italy
are necessary.

4

Hays, Denys, 1961. The Italian Renaissance in Its Historical Background. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. pg. 26

13

The Context of the Risorgimento
In the centuries following the fall of the Roman Empire, the Italian peninsula was made
up of city-states. These city-states served an important purpose, which Charles Tilly
coined as containers of coercion and capital.5 Capital represents resources that the state
could exploit for growth and preservation. Capital could be the monetary resources, labor
power resources, and infrastructure needed to sustain the state. The apparatus of coercion
represents what this capital sustained. The city-state relied on force to control its subjects
and expand or defend its territory. These city-state needed both to survive and in their
efforts to obtain them established a monopoly of capital and coercion in their given
territories. Even from Roman times these territorial units contained a mixture of
functions, powers, and social classes. This mixture did not oppose Italian cities to the
surrounding countryside but rather created a symbiotic relationship. The largest of the
cities, areas like Milan, Florence, and Bologna formed large urban districts, almost
always exceeding 350 square miles, with clearly defined municipal institutions.6 These
cities exerted influence over these districts, or contadi, in a way to establish the city as
the head of a unitary body. Cities and the contadi they controlled strove for and quite
often achieved sovereignty over the territories that they controlled.
Governance varied across city-states, yet they shared a common trait due to this
territorial sovereignty: autonomy. Trade routes and specialized industries insured power
and wealth for these city-states. Italian city-states fulfilled these characteristics, but as far

5

Tilly, Charles, Willem Pieter. Blockmans, 1994. Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to
1800. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press
6
Chittolini, Giorgio., Cities, City-States , and Regional States in Italy in Tilly, Charles., Willem Pieter.
Blockmans, 1994. Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to 1800. Boulder, Colo.: Westview
Press. pg. 24
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as an Italian nation was concerned the city-states remained isolated containers of wealth,
power, and identity. Furthermore, as these city-states captured wealth and power, heated
rivalries erupted. Despite the multiple invasions by the Saracens, Normans, Germans, and
others the city-states, for the most part, did not form common fronts of mutual aid. Rather
local rulers tended to side with invaders for the sake of private advantage.7 As the
Renaissance began to come to a close, some of the more powerful tyrants began to unite
the dispersed city powers into about a dozen regional states. One city did not necessarily
equal one state though Italian city-states guarded their sovereignty and remained loyal to
their territorial interests.
By and large, these cities lacked an interest in territorial expansion. This began to
change at the end of the Renaissance in the fourteenth century, intensifying at the
beginning of the fifteenth century with the rise of aggressive princely states. This began
when Milan and its North-central territories, under the leadership of the Visconti family,
led a campaign to establish hegemony of his monarchy over the scattered northern cities.
Previously, city-states and their rulers tended to pursue a policy of maintaining the status
quo. Maintenance of the borders of the communities under their dominion was the
primary goal. This rise of territorial expansion subjected the city-state system to a great
deal of tension. The new princes sought military conquest and monarchal centralization;
the cities and their urban leagues resisted to defend a system based on the federal order of
towns, republicanism, and their ideals of civic life.8 A consequence of this struggle was
the expansion of larger commercial centers, already large by virtue of the contadi they

7

Mack Smith, Denis 1997. Italy; a modern history. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. pg. 7
See Baron, Hans, 1966, The Crisis of the Early Italian Renaissance: Civic Humanism and Republican
Liberty in the Age of Classicism and Tyranny, Princeton: Princeton University Press
8
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oversaw, into territorial states.9 These territorial states took the same form of the smaller
city-states that predated them. The territorial states often maintained control over the
historical contado and expanded their power outward in the establishment of
protectorates and principalities.
This system was not to last. Italy’s cultural and political power saw a sharp
decline as a result of shifting power on the European continent. Tilly argues that two
major forces brought down European city-state systems: “First, commercialization and
capital accumulation in the larger states reduced the advantage enjoyed by small
mercantile city-states, which had previously been able to borrow extensively, tax
efficiently, and rely on their own sea power to hold off large, land-bound states. Second,
war eventually changed in a direction that made their small scale and fragmented
sovereignty a clear disadvantage.”10 The mercantilist Italian city- states and territories
simply could not compete with the larger powers. This contrast in type of state
arrangement occurred because Italy never achieved unity during the Renaissance. By
comparison with other parts of Europe, power was concentrated in powerful city-states
usually under the dominion of powerful families.11 As the capacity for both capital and
coercion declined for the Italian city-states, they remained isolated yet had diminished
power even in the areas of their historical domain.
As other European powers began to centralize, Italy remained fragmented. When
the Italian cities were confronted by these larger powers a new era was ushered in to
9

Chittolini, Giorgio ibid pg 34
Tilly, Charles., Willem Pieter. Blockmans, 1994. Cities and the Rise of States in Europe, A.D. 1000 to
1800. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press. pg. 24
11
This can be illustrated in the familiar image of Machiavelli’s prince. The prince was less of an
authoritarian despot seeking the expansion of privilege and more of a personality capable of holding
together the diverse interests under the territorial units of their dominion
See: Landon, William, Politics, patriotism, and language : Niccolò Machiavelli's "secular patria" and the
creation of an Italian national identity, New York : Peter Lang,.
10
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Italy: the period of “foreign preponderance.” After about four centuries of autonomous
rule, the territorial powers of Italy found themselves subjugated to the influence, and in
many cases outright dominion, of the great European powers most notably the AustroHungarians, French and the Spanish. Many great Italian urban centers became absorbed
into the administrative systems of these empires. The cities still enjoyed relatively wide
areas of social and political autonomy but the monopoly of capital and coercion had
slipped from their grasp. These cities declined as they became increasingly inert and
secondary in the new world economic system especially as they were unable to adapt
their political and economic arrangements that were legacies of the previous four
centuries of domination.12
Rivalries continued but now contained a greater foreign presence. These
geopolitical rivalries would bring the chapter of Italian city-states, and the Renaissance,
to a close. As a contrast to Milan and the Visconti’s attempt to establish monarchal
hegemony over the scattered northern cities, when Venice tried to expand territorial
hegemony, she was crushed by France and a confederation of other provinces. When
Spain began to make claims on central Italy, Florence was left alone to resist them.
Furthermore, the Medici, Florence’s leading family at the time, chose to support the
Spanish emperor against their native city in an effort to expand personal privilege.
Foreign solders flooded the peninsula, particularly the major centers of Rome and
Florence, and shocked the civilization of the Renaissance to a standstill. By the end of

12

Chipolla, Carlo, 1970 “The Economic Decline of Italy” in Chipolla, Carlo ed. The Economic Decline of
Empires. London: Methuen
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the seventeenth century the position that the cities continued to hold depended on past
achievements or a rentier role derived from territorial and agrarian advantages.13
A consequence of this parochialism, especially following the decline of power
after the Renaissance and the domination that accompanied it, was the concept of Italy as
a territorial unit. Italy was a peninsula before it was a nation. At the peak of their
domination, power was concentrated in cities and the contadi that they dominated rather
than in the geographical space that was referred to as Italy. Despite the fact that the
national frontiers of Italy are well-defined—three sides bounded by water and the fourth
bounded by the Alps—a common denominator of both identity and power rarely was
inscribed by these frontiers. Claims to provinces were often based on geographic
boundaries within Italy but more often were grounded in ethnographic and historical
terms. These claims were often intensified during disputes, particularly disputes
concerning other countries. Corsica and Nice have been claimed from France, Canton
Ticino from Switzerland, Tyrol and Trieste from Austria-Hungary to name a few
prominent examples. But with the decline in power of the Italian cities during the two
centuries preceding the unification period, territorial claims were made by outsiders
rather than Italians.
These claims drastically changed the arrangement of power on the Italian
peninsula. Most of northern Italy fell to the Austrian Hapsburg Empire. Southern Italy
was dominated by a Bourbon dynasty from Spain. Between the two, the Catholic Church
retained its traditional seat of power in the Papal States. As subordinated lands, these
areas lost much of their original power. Some regions like Venice and Genoa retained
some political independence due to the geographic sheltering of Venitian lagoons and
13
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Maritime Alps respectively.14 But for the most part Italy existed as a regional entity
subject to international domination.
Change would come to the peninsula through another invasion from the outside,
this time from France. With the invasion of Napoleon in 1796, Italy was forced out of
stagnation and would experience new modes of governance that would change the
politics on the peninsula forever. Historian Denis Mack Smith reveals a contrast between
the shifting political parochialism of the previous centuries:
Napoleonic armies [1796 – 1814] brought with them the germs of liberalism
fostered by the French Revolution of 1789, and introduced a minor industrial
revolution sufficient at least to provide some of the war equipment required by
this foreign emperor. Experience of Napoleonic rule convinced some people how
much Italy stood to gain from strong centralized government, for the French
brought more efficient methods of administration and a far more enlightened code
of law.15
This French presence profoundly and irreversibly shaped Italy’s political and cultural
contexts of modernization. Although relatively peaceful, the years of foreign
preponderance prior to the rise of revolutionary France were years of political and
cultural stagnation in Italy, especially compared to the years of the Renaissance they
followed. This stagnation was partly caused by the control over which the ancien regime
held Italy. Power, both economic and coercive, was held by a small number of influential
families. Under the Napoleonic administration, numerous reforms, implemented with
varying degrees of success depending on the region, served to change this arrangement of
power. One way in which the Napoleonic reforms went about this task was by changing
the arrangement of government itself. Ancien regime principalities were transformed into
centralized and bureaucratic autocracies. Feudalism and all other forms of independent
jurisdiction were abolished in order to assert the absolute sovereignty of the state, at least
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in the North. The satellite Kingdom of Naples would resist these changes leading to
remnants of feudal arrangement being preserved or only slightly altered in form.
Throughout the country however, administration was centralized and rationalized.
Energetic interventions occurred to privatize of land, to modernize agricultural practices,
and to encourage the development of new industries.16
Ideas also spread quickly during this time, especially during the years prior to full
Napoleonic domination. Picking up on many of the radical ideas of the French revolution,
political dissent took on a character of popular sovereignty and democratic
representation. These ideas contradicted earlier reformers who insisted that change be
entrusted to enlightened rulers. Although Napoleon’s authoritarian regime silenced this
type of dissent, the character of the ideas would not be lost on Italian politics and culture
and would play a powerful role as the populace subjected to foreign rule grew weary of
French domination. French rational modernization attracted considerable support at first
particularly as it shrunk the personal privilege of the ancien regime. However, as the
autocratic tendencies of Napoleonic rule became more pronounced with his increasing
demands for tax revenue, solders, and materiél, dissatisfaction spread across all social
classes. Because social classes were united in their political discontent and because ideas
of enlightenment equality had begun to creep into the peninsula, political discontent, for
the first time, would focus around the issue of constitutional government. Noted political
historian John A. Davis encapsulated this paradigm shift when he wrote, “the call for
political representation voiced the heterogeneous discontents of the aristocrats resentful at

16

Mack Smith ibid pg. 10

20

the loss of former privileges, as well as the aspirations of the emergent propertied and
professional classes to acquire a public voice of their own.”17
Subordination to the French was instrumental in creating a political nationalism
that transcended the parochialism that defined the peninsula prior to the era of foreign
preponderance. Nationalism, of course was not born during this time period. There was a
developing sense of shared cultural and historical identities. These shared identities
however, more closely aligned with the regions and their city-state legacies rather than a
conceptualization of Italy as a country. With the spread of French ideas about liberté,
égalité, and fraternité coupled with new ideas about rationalized state administration,
numerous Italian patriots began to advocate for a unified Italy on this model.
The centralized model would be implemented by Napoleon as he moved
throughout the peninsula. Despite variances in implementation, by 1810 Napoleon
dominated the entire peninsula. Only Sicily and Sardinia remained under their old
monarchs. But Napoleon’s aims were not the establishment of a unified Italy.
Consolidation meant French domination in order to exploit resources and eventually use
this domination as a lever in negotiations with Austria. Italy served as a reservoir of men
and materiel for Napoleon’s other European conquests. As his exploits struggled,
demands became more severe leading to hostility towards his regime. In fact, by the time
Napoleon’s Russian campaign began to fail, Italy was full of secret societies advocating
for independence and a liberal constitution. These secret organizations posed no real
threat to the Napoleonic order, however, nor were they in a position to establish Italian
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unification.18 Napoleonic rule would come to an end in October 1813 when Austria
invaded the kingdom of Italy. The Austrians entered Milan and restored their domination
over northern Italy. They also reestablished the old dynasties in central and northern
Italy. The centralized administrative order under Napoleonic rule was at its end.
The experience of two decades of French dominance left significant political
legacies. First, the experience consolidated the ten pre-Napoleonic regional states into
three. Within each of these areas there were tremendous differences in language,
economic production, politics, and social characteristics but for the first time, they all
came under a unified code of law, a uniform system of conscription and taxation, and one
system of administration. Because this system required educated workers, it resulted in an
amalgamation of old landed nobility and a new wealthy bourgeoisie that would serve as
Italy’s ruling elite throughout the nineteenth century. The experience also inspired new
political activism in which fresh ideas and plans for unity and independence emerged
based on a strong central state.
However, following Napoleon’s domination, The Restoration years also
represented an attempt to turn back the clock to the models of political life done in by his
occupation. Everywhere the aristocracy regained their power and privilege. The Viennese
returned to northern Italy, Lombardy in particular. Venice was taken back by Austria as a
province while Austria reestablished its dominance over Tuscany. The Bourbons
recaptured the Kingdom of Naples. The three political entities created by Napoleonic rule
were broken into eight kingdoms in the process of re-establishing the aristocratic class.
The only one which was independent, and even that independence was not wholly
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confined to an Italian power, was Piedmont. Politically, it seemed as if the progress made
a few years earlier had vanished.

The Risorgimento and the Idea of Unification
Even if power arrangements reverted to pre-Napoleonic forms, the changes of the
previous decades had a profound impact on the other forms of social life. Ideas of liberty
and justice did not disappear. In fact they found new footing in revolutionary individuals
and statesmen advocating political deliverance from the reestablished political order.
These ideas, rather than situated locally, were expressed in nationalistic terms. Italy was
becoming conceived of politically as concept of a nation rather than solely a geographical
entity. Nowhere was this more clear than in culture. Alessandro Manzoni, between 1825
and 1827, published I Promessi Sposi (The Betrothed) arguably the most influential novel
ever written in Italian. In depicting life in Northern Italy in 1628 when the Spanish
oppressively controlled the region, Manzoni’s masterpiece is seen as a thinly veiled
attack on the Austrian rule presiding over the same region during the years of the book’s
publication. Other famous works were not quite so veiled. The poems of Giacomo
Leopardi were confiscated by Austrian and Piedmontese censorship authorities because
they feared the patriotic messages would incite the populace into revolt.19 Culture became
imbued with a sense of Italianità, fanning the growing flames of Italian nationalism.
Even if this literature preferred historical legends of past greatness to the contemporary
events occurring around them, these works helped shape the consciousness of Italy’s past,
present, and future during this period of history. As Mack Smith put it, “National
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consciousness would never have become practically effective without visionaries and
evangelists to implant it by degrees in the minds of the few people who had the strength,
the skill, and the courage to act.”20
If culture can account for elements of the political consciousness of the times,
economic changes had a structural impact on Italian efforts of national unification.
Centralization had profound economic effects, many of which the reestablishment of the
old order was not commensurate. Centralization, with its unified code of law, a uniform
system of taxation, standard currency, and uniform weights and measures, helped give
rise to a new commercial middle class. These bourgeois individuals saw increased
prosperity as the primacy of Mediterranean trade routes was reestablished over the span
of these decades. These new economic actors would provide a social base for consistently
intensifying push towards unification. For them, centralization under Napoleon was good
for business. When this period concluded and political centralization diminished, patterns
of business also changed. Each of the separate states saw tariff barriers reintroduced
along with the reestablishment of individual systems of coinage and measurement. Calls
for centralization thus signaled a return to a system of administration that allowed for less
burdensome transactions.
As these ideas gained traction, the cause for unification needed someone or a
group of people to translate these ideas into action. Undoubtedly, the greatest influence
on revolutionary action was Giuseppe Mazzini. Mazzini, born in Genoa in 1805 and by
age 26 he was exiled from Genoa, Switzerland, and France in quick succession. He made
his way to London where he formed numerous underground societies and publications
aimed at convincing people that Italy could be united through the efforts of the common
20
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people. His nationalistic writings based on an egalitarian view of human nature proved
impossibly utopian but that did not stop many Italians, feeling disillusionment under
restrictive norms, from taking his messages to heart. Even if they were not directly
influenced by Mazzini’s calls—he would become much more well known in Italy
posthumously—numerous Italians participated, often at the cost of their lives, in
insurrections across the peninsula.21
These revolts peaked in January 1848 when revolts broke out in Palermo, Sicily.
These revolts forced the Bourbon King Ferdinand to relinquish elements of his absolutist
rule and to grant representative institutions to both Sicily and Naples. When similar
revolts erupted in Paris that February, King Leopold reduced absolute rule of Tuscany.
Pope Pius IX did the same for the Papal States. Perhaps the most significant effect of the
revolts combined with liberal activism throughout Italy during the rapidly approaching
years of the Risorgimento was to convince King Charles Albert of Piedmont to grant
liberal constitutional rights with the Statuto of March 4th, 1848. The Statuto would form
the basis of the liberal constitution that emerged out of the Risorgimento when the new
constitution literally started where the Statuto left off. This hybrid would remain the basic
law of Italy until it was replaced with the reconstruction constitution in 1946.22
This period of social unrest had a major effect on the constitutional design that
would emerge after the Risorgimento in that the period closed off many of the alternate
forms of constitutional arrangement available to proponents of unification. The increased
Italianità sweeping the nation as well as institutional memory of central administration
stemming from the Napoleonic period certainly made centralization an attractive and
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popular choice. But centralization was far from the only model available to proponents of
Italian unification. Numerous federal models as well as monarchial arrangements found
expression in popular commentary as well as the revolts themselves. The years leading up
to national unification were flush with ideas and models for Italy’s constitutional
arrangements.
The revolts proved short lived and by 1849 the uprisings had collapsed or been
crushed by the monarchy. The lack of a coherent vision for unification further undercut
these efforts. After the failure of Italy’s “first war for independence,” absolute rule was
reestablished in many areas. This collapse lent support to the idea that liberation would
come only through a national effort. The collapse of these scattered revolts “ended neoGuelph programs for Italian federation under the Papacy and greatly weakened any
claims for federalism.”23 The one area that survived this rapid collapse was Piedmont.
Piedmont maintained its status as a parliamentary monarchy. Piedmont had kept its
independence because of the rivalries of France, Spain, and Austria.24 Because Piedmont
maintained its status, it “carried with it an implicit acceptance of its system of centralized
government and administration as the model of government for all of Italy.”25 Due to its
relative independence, Piedmont was able to participate in international affairs. In 1855,
Count Camillo Benso di Cavour, the most effective politician of the Risorgimento, sent
the Piedmontese army to Crimea to fight the Russians but since Russia remained a
powerful check against the Austrians who controlled Lombardy, the region neighboring
Piedmont, Cavour offered an alliance. At the Paris peace conference in 1856, Cavour
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publically asserted that Piedmont had as much right to interfere in the other regions of
Italy as did foreign powers.26 These events set the stage for the beginnings of Italian
unification that would occur in the following years.
Cavour’s move grabbed the attention of other foreign powers that continuously
made claims on Italian regions. Until 1848, the Austrian presence in Italy had maintained
a fragile peace within the peninsula but by the end of 1849 it had become a threat to that
peace.27 France had regained its strength with the rise of Louis Napoleon and with this
newfound strength sought to regain its influence in Italy. Cavour’s statements at the Paris
peace conference opened the opportunity to pursue this plan. 1859 saw the outbreak of
the Franco-Piedmontese war against Austria. This war led to the annexation of the longcoveted Lombardy to Piedmont. Meanwhile, uprisings in central Italy removed the old
aristocracy which made the acquisition of the central regions by Piedmont more
achievable. Using the same diplomatic strategy of exploiting international rivalries,
Cavour folded these regions under Piedmontese authority shortly after.
This left out the South, which continued to be a land of revolts against
authoritarianism. But because the regions of the south, the Kingdoms of Naples and
Sicily, had been artificially fused together under Bourbon rule into the Kingdom of the
Two Sicilies, internal rivalries boiled underneath the surface of Bourbon rule. Sicilian
liberals wished to end absolutist rule and to free Sicily from the “Yoke of Naples” a
historical seat of Bourbon power. Neapolitan liberals wished to end absolutist rule
without breaking the territorial unity of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies.28 For this
reason, Southern liberals, often large landowners, had little involvement in pan-Italian
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unification. The south became part of unified Italy through force. In April 1860,
Giuseppe Garibaldi precipitated a popular revolt against the Bourbon regime. This revolt
was condensed into an offensive when in May Garibaldi landed a “thousand men” at the
Sicilian town of Marsala.
Cavour was hesitant to support the insurrection for fear of undermining the
predominance of Piedmont and its French support. He had recently ceded the
Northeastern provinces of Piedmont—Savoy and Nice—to France in exchange for
autonomy to pursue the annexations of central Italy. In order to avoid a spiraling out of
control at the hands of the revolutionaries, Cavour orchestrated uprisings in the Papal
regions of the Marches and Umbria as a pretext for invasions. He later justified this
invasion into Papal lands as a way of preventing the anticlerical Garibaldi from seizing
control of Rome.29 By controlling these lands, Cavour was also able to force Garibaldi to
hand over Naples and Sicily at the threat of civil war. Meanwhile, Cavour held plebiscites
to regularize these acquisitions and by the time parliament met in the 1861, the Italian
kingdom could be officially declared. Only Rome, still controlled by the French, and
Venice, Trentino, and Trieste, controlled by Austria, remained outside of unified Italy.
The nationalist Italian government made acquiring these areas a key priority.
Republican revolutionaries in the spirit of Garibaldi and Mazzini continued their
nationalistic, and often intense anti-clerical calls for a “march on Rome” to complete the
unification process. Although these radicals would have preferred a glorious seizure of
these lands, both Rome and Venice would become part of Italy through geopolitical
developments rather than nationalistic conquest. North of Italy, Prussia was gaining
strength and by 1866 was at war with Austria. Italy was put in the difficult position
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because she formed an Alliance with Otto von Bismark in Prussia with the agreement that
the Venetia would be ceded to Italy. The King, Vittorio Emanuale II, still very much in
the mindset of pre-liberal aristocratic geopolitical negation, not to mention married to an
Austrian archduchess, insisted that Italy negotiate with Austria rather than participate in
the Germanic expansion. Austria complicated the situation hopelessly when she offered
the Venetia in exchange for Italian non-intervention. Italy had already formed an alliance
with Prussia at this point, and the Prime Minister, General Alfonso Lamarmora insisted
that Italy remain faithful to the agreement—a decision that was supported by the
Republican radicals uneasy of royal power. Bartering failed and war broke out. Italy
performed poorly in the conflict that ensued, but Prussia won several key battles in the
summer. Recognizing their success, the Prussians were ready to end the conflict as their
expansionist goals were met and Bismarck recognized the value of a friendship with
Austria and the hegemonic control it created in much of central Europe. During the peace
talks it was agreed that Austria should surrender the Venetia but to France because
Austria agreed to cede Venetia to Napoleon III in exchange for non-intervention in the
War after that plan had failed with Italy. This decision horrified the Italians but because
of Austria’s strengthened position they were forced to agree. France ceded the Venetia to
Italy that October in recognition of their earlier annexation of Nice and Savoy.30
Italy’s poor performance in the 1866 Austrio-Prussian conflict and Venice’s
acquisition-by-gift ran counter to nationalist visions of Italian strength and agency; the
acquisition of Rome would represent another failed incorporation of conquest. Rome was
an ideal for radical nationalists like Garibaldi and Mazzini. Not only was it the historical
seat of the classical empire but seizing Rome from the pope would represent a major
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victory for revolutionary anti-clericalism. Many of the new Italian politicians, even if
they did not follow the anti-clerisism of Garibaldi and Mazzini to its core, supported
ending Catholicism’s temporal power because it clashed with the new secular laws
established under unification.31 Since it was the last area outside of unified Italy and
maintained a revolutionary presence, many Italian politicians hoped that Rome would rise
on its own accord and annex itself to Italy formalized with a plebiscite. This approach
would also help avoid tricky geopolitical concerns about the Italian state moving into the
temporal realm of the Catholic Church, especially since it was technically still under the
control of the French garrison. This stagnation did not placate the revolutionaries still
smacking of Venice’s illustrious acquisition. In the summer of 1867, Garibaldi gathered a
band of revolutionary volunteers and assembled on the papal frontier. It would seem if
the glorious march on Rome was going to finally occur. Hesitant of provoking a conflict
especially since the liberal presence in Rome did not make an emphatic statement in
support or in opposition to these developments, the government had Garibaldi arrested
and sent home. He was not put under strict control and by September had returned and
was commanding his band of volunteers to advance. Meanwhile Napoleon III, cognizant
of French Catholic public opinion sent troops back to Rome to stop the impending
invasion. Vittorio Emanuele sided with Napoleon and marched Italian troops against
Garibaldi as well. Garibaldi’s volunteers were defeated and Rome remained in French
hands. It wasn’t until 1870 with the outbreak of the Franco-Prussian War that Rome’s
control would change hands. Needing troops for his Northern conquests, Napoleon III
removed the French troops from the garrison in Rome. Many radicals urged taking the
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opportunity to seize Rome without a major conflict. Such a seizure would have bolstered
nationalism. Vittorio Emanuele still supported the French and thought, by backing them,
Italy could be victorious in yet another European war. However when Napoleon suffered
crippling defeats at the hands of the Prussians in September 1870, Italy was forced to
change her stance—not that it was difficult as many liberal politicians supported the
ousting of both French and non-Secular authority within the peninsula. The radicals
hinted at revolution if the opportunity was not seized and the leftists threatened to leave
parliament altogether. Vittorio Emanuele acquiesced and attacked the Eternal City on
September 20th, 1870.32
The form in which Italy’s unification occurred left a specific set of political
legacies. Historian Christopher Duggan looking northward to the German unification
which occurred around the same time asks: “the completion of Italian unity occurred
against the backdrop of the dramatic unification of Germany: why could Italy not have
affirmed itself in such emphatic style?”33 Although both had staunch adherents to a
nationalistic form of unification, the Prussian monarchy remained firm in its commitment
to nationalistic principles whereas in the Italian case centralized national rule was one of
a handful of competing visions for the country’s future. And when Italy pursued its plans
for national autonomy it had to rely on the successes of both French and Prussian
expansionist plans, most notably in 1859, 1866, and 1870. Geopolitical developments
aided Italian efforts for unification as the country tended to fare poorly on its own. A
major consequence of this impotence was a diminished sense of nationalism.
Revolutionary patriots and their spokesmen like Mazzini and Garibaldi continuously
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championed Italy’s potentiality of breaking through first foreign domination and then
geopolitical second-class status but Italians remained less convinced. In fact, Garibaldi
looking back on his experiences leading a multitude of patriotic uprisings lamented that
Italians failed to back a united Italian nationalism and when they were stirred into
revolutionary activity it was motivated by social and regional concerns.34
This failed nationalism was exacerbated by the differences in interests motivating
the wars of the Risorgimento. Italy’s focus on international politics as a tool to be used
for unification goals left the vast majority of the population outside of the concern of the
government. Preoccupied by regional concerns and grievances, the majority of the
population had little in common with the governing upper classes that pushed for
independence from Austria, France, and Spain. It is true that these powers were
responsible for many of the problems suffered by the populations but the degree of
separation between the governing class and the governed precluded a consciousness of
this fact. The vast majority of the population saw the roots of their principle problems as
the landowners and a distant hostile government regardless of the form that government
took. These populations, because they were rooted in regional differences even to the
point of linguistic differences, had even less in common with the patriotic intellectuals
that championed the patriotic myths as a justification for national liberation. Even when
the Italian state was trying to forge itself it created a separation between itself and the
population of citizens that it was supposed to encapsulate. In fact, the early years of the
republic, as the unification conquests show, were dedicated to forming a nation-state that
would hold together a group of nationalistic, abstract citizens. Local particularities were
precisely the nemisis, produced by centuries of autonomy, which the new liberal
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nationalism sought to overcome. Through international conflict and centralized
administration practices, Risorgimento patriots sought to form a liberal nation composed
of patriotic citizens. And in so doing set the foundations for the divide between the
population and those who were to govern them in addition to setting in motion a process
of abstracting local particularities in favor of a unity of nationalism.

Liberal Italy and the Crisis of Legitimacy
This separation between the governors and governed found explicit representation in
domestic politics in the years following the Risorgimento. On March 23, 1865 the
legislature passed the Law of Administrative Unification in which the central government
was established as the sole locus of authority to use of force in the organization of
society. All aspects of public goods and services were to be folded into a centralized and
overarching public administration. Locally elected officials and professional government
workers were to be hierarchically ordered under the direction of the department heads at
the center. Fillipo Sabetti sheds a little light on the motivation for this law. He writes:
the creators of the Italian state anticipated that the forced creation of unity through
administrative measures under common parliament, backed by a national army,
would produce both good policies and good individuals by forging the diverse
communities of peoples into one strong and great self-governing nation, insuring
a uniform provision of public services, and removing once and for all the spectre
of foreign intervention in Italian affairs.35
The state itself became a mechanism for producing the ideal liberal Italian society.
Foreign domination proved a hindrance to this plan which led to the desire to foster
nationalism. The Pope’s temporal power was also a deterrent to the secular element of
this liberal ideal. But once these obstacles were tackled, the liberal state was left only
with internal problems but a lack of a common enemy. Lawmakers tackled this problem
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by attempting to forge the diverse communities occupying the peninsula into a common
Italian identity. Hence Massimo D’Azeglio’s oft quoted joke: “We have made Italy; now
we must make Italians.”36 Much of the governing activity that was accomplished in the
decades following unification would take “making Italians” as its primary goal.
Although this sentiment was applied to the whole peninsula, the South was the
region that most concerned governing elites and provides a lens through which this form
of governance can be starkly illustrated. Even pre-Risorgimento, political elites worried
about the inclusion of the primarily agrarian and undeveloped south. The differences in
development between the regions were thought to be a threat to the revolutionary
patriot’s plan for a bourgeois and liberal Italy. In short, they were a threat to the idea of
unity that had propelled the Risorgimento. One prominent example is Carlo Cattaneo,
who in light of these regional differences, advocated for a more federal arrangement of
power. Cattaneo, as Nelson Moe tells us through a close reading of a few of his early
texts, turns his attention to the South to show the South lacked characteristic features of
bourgeois civilization that existed in the North. Moe quotes a passage from a review of a
work Cattaneo completed on the economic situation of Naples:
The effects of the lottery in the kingdom are more pernicious than any other
country, because those peoples have for centuries been under the yoke of an
arbitrary and prohibitive system, enemy of all industry and are extremely inclined
to trust in fortune more than in their own assiduous labors and savings.37
Here Cattaneo invokes two of the principle elements of what would become known as La
Questione Meridionale or the Southern Question, namely that Southerners, as a result of
living under exploitive and arbitrary rule, lack the industrious and frugal habits of the
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bourgeois North. The South is portrayed here as the opposite of the liberal philosophy
that would come to dominate Risorgimento idealism over the next decades.
This view would be further developed as unification approached and
bourgeoisification of Italian society developed. Cattaneo addressed the Southern question
in the prominent journal Rivista Europa (Journal of Europe). Rivista Europa, sought to
promote Italian civilization in the context of contemporary Europe. It became a bastion of
progressive liberal thinking and served as an outlet for views on a changing Italy.
Cattaneo’s essay in Rivista is a summery and analysis of geographical reports on the
regions of Italy in 1845. His attention is directed mainly toward the reports on the
Northern regions—this in and of itself is evidence of the marginal position of the South
in the thinking of Northern elites—but he does analyze Neapolitan Matteo De
Augustinis’s report on the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. In this summary Cattaneo
lambasts the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies for being an area of “immense poverty and
rudeness.” They “lack local industries” and must migrate to find work. They return
“tattered, exhausted, infected with fatal diseases” These masses “go barefoot and half
naked, sleep outdoors or in filthy, fetid shelters. Because of the poor state of roads, many
loads that could be carted are carried on their backs or heads: the head of a woman or
man equal to the back of a donkey… these miseries are unfortunately a disgrace to Italian
agriculture.”38 Portrayed as the opposite of bourgeois civilization The South is seen as a
disgrace to a nation trying to define and distinguish itself as modern and fit itself into a
cosmopolitan Europe. The South is seen as locked in the agrarian systems of the past,
lacking signs of modernity like infrastructure and localized commerce.
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This sentiment would continue because not only did the south exist in a state of
relative poverty, it also contained deep-seated patterns of violence that northern
lawmakers viewed as a threat to the new state. Organized crime and banditry alike were
constant issues as were organized peasant revolts against landholders. The government
responded to all of these issues with the attempt to provide security in the form of a
military clampdown. Hesitant to spend state resources on constructing infrastructure
necessary for modernization because of a desire to balance Italy’s finances after the
accumulation of debts during the military campaigns of the Risorgimento, the liberals in
power opted to instill order rather than let it build on its own. They instituted martial law
through the passage of the Pica Act in 1863 as an attempt to control the rampant highway
banditry sweeping the South.39 Forces mobilized to impose order and shortly after the
passage of the act, historians estimate that nearly 120,000 soldiers—half the national
army—gathered in the south.40 These forces crushed uprisings and banditry, but at
enormous cost. Not only did the use of force accentuate regional differences as
southerners saw themselves as conquered, but national forces also suffered deep losses.
In fact, more Italian soldiers died from malaria and conflicts with bandits and peasants in
the pacification of the south than in all of the wars of the Risorgimento. Thus, the
pacification of the South presents a stark picture of the Italian state’s effort to forge a
unified structure of administration based on a liberal model at the expense of local
particularities.
Liberal preoccupation with the finances of the country also profoundly shaped
the state-society relations at this time. After unification, the desire to cement national
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unity had obscured efforts toward tight fiscal control. But as the 1870s set in, these
efforts became a priority. Banditry and uprisings had been repressed and many church
lands had been seized and redistributed by this time. Taxation became a primary issue.
These taxes tended to focus on production thus they hit the agrarian areas of Italy
particularly hard. And because these funds were funneled into the central administration,
local government agencies, the agencies responsible for collection, began to go bankrupt.
The government responded by attempting to redistribute land taxes which served to
infuriate the larger landowners. These developments led to a wave of opposition deputies
being elected in 1874 reducing the right’s majority to about 40 deputies. 41 And in 1876,
the right lost their majority entirely which led to the resignation of the prime minister and
the institution of a new one, Agostino Depretis.
Depretis and the left also championed the vision of a unified, liberal nation of
Italy but for them the efforts of the right did not live up to liberal principles. The left
sought decentralization and an expansion of the franchise. These goals however were
stifled by tensions in society during this time period. The economic situation was
worsening yet taxation practices remained unchanged. The left wanted to bring more
social groups into the government though most politicians on both the left and the right
feared the rising numbers of both reactionaries and radicals, particularly as the state was
still fragile. The fragility of the state became even more pronounced as the liberal ideal
towards which Italy aspired lost degrees of legitimacy due to the state’s governance
practices. The taming of the south, high taxation, unbalanced budgets, a limited
electorate, and other transgressions on individual rights did not bode well for Italian
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liberalism. Furthermore, these problems, as many reformers like Sydney Sonnino argued,
were actually decreasing the national political education of the populace.42
In light of these contradictions, the central government began to solidify itself as a
system and not just an abstract idea of unified nationhood. Achieving stability would
require the forging of governing blocs—trasformismo—which produced centrist
coalitions to strengthen state institutions through ideological moderation. Rather than
legitimating power through traditional democratic means like the consent of the
governed, trasformismo politics use power to obtain or augment consent.43 The logic
went that if the governing institutions at the top remained stable, stability would be easier
to maintain throughout the country. But because the expansion of this practice was
occurring at the same time a debate about the representativeness of the government was
raging, trasformismo became synonymous with political opportunism and corruption. As
Christopher Duggan wrote, “trasformismo seemed a further nail in the coffin of
parliament’s credibility: principles and programs sacrificed on the altar of expediency.”44
These developments eroded the patriotism that the revolutionaries of unified Italy
championed. Recognizing this attrition, the state attempted to re-bolster nationalism. The
Risorgimento was glorified as a grand unification moment, its patriots turned into
national icons. During the late 1880s and early 1890s, foreign policy became a means of
generating patriotism. Francesco Crispi, the man who followed Depretis after his death in
July 1887, linked war and patriotism, military service and citizenship but inserted Italy
into disastrous colonial exploits culminating in the humiliating defeat in which 5000
Italian troops were massacred outside of Adua, Ethiopia in 1896.
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These developments inched Italy toward a massive legitimacy crisis that called
the governmental structures themselves into question. Centralized governance and a lack
of political nationalism left the government without civic traditions to draw on and a
political liberalism that was based more on the practice of government rather than an
ideological base. A nationalized liberalism was the force behind the Risorgimento and
following that unification up until the birth of Fascism was essentially synonymous with
national politics. Despite its popularity, Liberalism eventually failed because of the lack
of a thoroughgoing bourgeois revolution. Rather than strong and hegemonic, the
bourgeois revolution was weak and lacking mass legitimation. The substantive failure of
Liberalism is best understood as an accumulation of crises brought on by this nonhegemonic system of contradictions, defined by competing interests scrambling to a
transformist compromise, operating within the Italian political and social structure. The
accumulation of crises led to collapse because the Liberal State could not summon the
necessary acumen to deal with the new societal problems; the old Liberal order was an
antiquated structure operating over an unevenly modernizing nation. This contradiction
and subsequent inability to adapt led to a state ripe for mobilization by any new order
promising peace and stability.
The lack of a thoroughgoing bourgeois revolution caused this main structural
failure in pre-fascist Liberal government. Here Barrington Moore’s conception of a lack
of a thoroughgoing bourgeois revolution—“revolution from above”—is key. Moore
claimed that the lack of popular revolutionary upheaval, such as in France, or the
application of significant popular pressure put on the ruling aristocracy, as in England,
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lent itself to the eventual takeover by authoritarian regimes.45 Furthermore, in the absence
of popular pressure, revolutionary or otherwise, the aristocracy was free to consolidate
power over the masses. The aristocracy exercised its influence and was able to rule in the
face of Liberal and democratic forces. Operating as a controlling force over many sectors
of society, especially the major economic spheres like agriculture and industry, Moore’s
guiding aristocracy is defined by a reactionary and powerful elite that hijacked
modernization and society for its own ends. Moore claimed: “the landed upper class will
use a variety of political and social levers to hold down a labor force on the land and
make a transition into commercial farming (post feudal capitalism) in this fashion.
Combined with a substantial amount of industrial growth, the result is likely to be what
we recognize as Fascism.”46 The masses cannot exist as a revolutionary force and are
subjugated within this system as social change is imposed from above.
Here, it is essential to qualify Moore’s formulation of “revolution from above”
because Italy does not completely conform to this model. For Italy, the lack of a
thoroughgoing revolution must be viewed as a form of bourgeois insufficiency rather
than an authoritarian control of social adaptation. The Italian bourgeoisie was not forced
to become revolutionary. The main source of bourgeois revolutionary strength is the call
to end feudalism and enter a modern capitalist and Liberal system. Feudalism did not
have to be overturned by the bourgeoisie in Italy. Decades earlier, Napoleon had
eliminated that structure with his Kingdom of Italy which established a system of
codified laws and social relations. Also, the bourgeoisie had no interest in upsetting the
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social order. Significant portions of the bourgeoisie were landowners themselves and
often faced no real political threats. In Italy, feudalism was done in by an outside force
rather than a politically powerful bourgeois revolution and the bourgeoisie was content
with the existing semi-modern social order.
Two significant problems arise from this bourgeois insufficiency. First, the
bourgeois class is unable to mobilize and impose a social program on the country.
Second, a conservative social structure incapable of dealing with a modern industrial
society is established. Lack of a significant bourgeois Liberal revolution created a weak
Liberal State with more of its concerns placed on preservation and a state without the
political resources to exert ideological control. These two problems would underlie the
major challenges the Italian state faced during the lead up to Fascism.
Although the principles of governance reflected the liberal ideal of equal
representation and responsive government, late ninetieth and early twentieth century Italy
can be described not by who was included but who was excluded despite its insistence on
creating a national identity that held together a homogenized swath of abstract citizens.
To complicate this picture, it is important to keep in mind that Italy began to experience
rapid economic growth beginning in the mid-1890s with the uptick of industrialization. In
fact, before the economic crisis of 1907, industrial production grew about 7 percent
annually. In the early 1900s, Italy, particularly the industrializing North was not
suffering. This positive change did not come on its own; it was encouraged by state
through channeling funds to industry. Adrian Lyttelton points out that the difficulties of
organizing private capital and the need to modernize infrastructures made the increased
intervention of the state indispensable for sustaining growth and growing a modern,
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diversified industrial economy.47 This intervention helped build some of Italy’s largest
firms, many still visible today. Workers also benefited in that national growth made it
more and more difficult to justify keeping a lid on social conflict. Giovanni Giolitti, a
political veteran and Italy’s prime minister at this time, allowed the labor movements
important advances. The effects were drastic. Real wages of industrial workers rose by
nearly 40 percent between 1900 and 1913.48 The liquid funds often channeled through the
state fueled growth in the short term but were to bring unexpected problems in the future
particularly as the growth in Italy slowed due to the introduction of foreign goods.
Despite their advances, unemployment and poverty remained major issues
especially in the rural areas. Many landless laborers still experienced brutal poverty and
domination from landholding elites. Internal immigration helped alleviate some of this
pressure but by and large the problems of the rural areas remained unsolved. When the
situation became unbearable, many of the landless labors responded in the same way they
had always done, by rioting. Some on the left began to organize these landless laborers
even though the left gave most of its attention to industrial workers. An example, the Po
valley, which stretches through Emilia Romagna, was a major area of leftwing activity in
which the socialists organized peasants to make claims on land rights. Following these
organizations, land holders and employers in agriculture began to pushback, questioning
whether or not the liberal state could adequately control this social tension. In fact, many
landholders supported the oftentimes draconian state response in which the authorities,
usually the carabinieri, would shoot rioters in order to restore order. This authoritarian
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mentality only increased with the rise of agrarian fascism as a response to increasing
peasant riots.49
At the same time, industrialists and the emerging capitalist classes were also
concerned about labor’s increasing gains and wondered if social conflict could be
contained by democratic state structures. Italian industrialists, experiencing rapid growth
in new Italian industries, developed a productivist and liberal yet technocratic ideology
that they would remain committed to throughout the prewar growth period, including
through the social instability of the immediate pre and post-World War I moments,
fascism, and the post-fascist reconstruction period.50 Even industrialists from aristocratic
lines exhibited little reactionary tendencies to Italy’s modernization because they had
integrated themselves into capitalistic market relations.51
Governance was also changing. The liberal state failed to establish a mass base,
let alone establish a national political organization. Liberalism’s advocates came from
landholders and an expanding bourgeoisie, yet these classes did not represent the
primarily agrarian country. But other entities were developing mass bases of consensus
with important political effects. As the socialists became stronger politically and the
Catholics formed their party, Partito Populare, to assert themselves into the debate, the
liberals became increasingly dependent on securing parliamentary support. To find it,
they looked to Southern politicians and their local clientele networks. By employing a
mix of patronage and intervention through the police and prefects, the liberals were able
to build political support. Antonio Gramsci and other intellectuals became critical of this
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process because it papered over real problems in southern society and privileged both the
northern bourgeois order and the southern landowners. Gramsci even coined a term to
describe this alliance, bloco storico (historic bloc). This bloc was defined as the alliance
of large landowners and northern industry. This bloc was often expressed in public policy
addressing Italy’s changing economy.
Nadia Urbanti provides a brief historical sketch of the public policy occurring at
the time of these writings. She reports that the Italian government legislated tariff policies
protecting Northern industries, primarily steel and textile production, and Southern wheat
from foreign competition.52 Both Northern industrialists and Southern landowners
supported the policy because it instituted a degree of economic protection previously
lacking across these large and rapidly growing industries. These policy decisions targeted
the benefits to elites and their patronage networks. They did not address the crippling
poverty and brutal working conditions of the landless peasants. These people and their
grievances would prove to be an explosive problem when conditions worsened because
of the First World War and the importation of cheaper American and Russian grain
throughout Europe and Italy.53
These problems were never addressed because they lay beyond the scope of the
Italian government’s mode of operation. This patronage politics was a defining feature of
Italy’s politics during this time period. Unified Italy was a product of elites and the
system that they constructed was placed over all of the social, economic, and political
problems occupying the country. Rather than deal with these problems directly because
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that often meant compromising one’s interests like the ones discussed above, elite
governance characterized Italy’s liberal government. For example, post Risorgimento, the
makeup of the Parliament began to shift but it did not shift in a more democratic
direction. As noted, initially it was dominated by strong regional interests. These interests
often had strong ties to agriculture or land ownership and gave support to Gramsci’s
Bloco Storico. Early Parliament was defined by a homogenous constellation of Liberal,
often noble, landowners. This began to change with the development of the Sinistra
Storica, or historical left, and industrialization. Landowners were eased out by a younger
crowd, which as Paolo Farneti points out, was composed mostly of lawyers and other
professionals.54 Society was changing; parliament was not. These demographic
characteristics of Italy’s government meant that Italian Parliament was composed of who
were not representative of the Italian people as a whole and operated through political
brokering.
This political brokering was the principle contradiction of democracy in the
Liberal State. Known as trasformismo, this system operates as an alternative to the
formation of traditional political entities like parties and interest groups. Political actors,
most often the prime minister, would use local prefects and discretionary means to doctor
political activity by “making elections” and “manufacturing majorities.” Trasformismo
worked because the Liberal system was not propped up on major ideologies claimed by
self-contained political entities like mass parties of diverse interests. In the initial stages
of Liberal government, members came from similar backgrounds and shared similar
interests. In fact, trasformismo proved quite effective at managing regional differences
because favors and small concessions could be granted. Even when the composition of
54

Farneti, Paolo, 1971, Sistema politica e societa civile. Turin. Giappichelli.

45

Parliament began to shift, Parliament relied on transformist politics. The lawyers and
other professionals found themselves with a great deal of political autonomy and
insulation. Also, the southern intellectuals and politicians that did not come from the
traditional “liberal” classes participated in trasformismo for patronage reasons. Gaetano
Salvemini, expressed the harshest criticism of Giolitti, particularly around the issue of
Southern development, when he labeled him as Il Ministro della Malavita (the minister of
the underworld) accusing him of using political backwardness and force for his own
short-term political goals.55 The vote was limited and Liberal proclivities still maintained
a dominant presence amongst the politically enfranchised. Due to this autonomy, these
professional politicians were separated from the political wishes of the masses and other
forces and interests. Majorities could be brokered based on concessions and favors just as
had occurred under the rule of the nobility. The Italian State was ruled through
combinazioni (combinations) designed to produce unity rather than democratic ideals.
A major reason for the success of trasformismo is the historical lack of a
hegemonic Liberal order; nothing forced the political system to adapt. The Italian Liberal
State emerged in a time that was both pre-industrial and post-feudal. First, Napoleon had
eliminated much of the formal feudal structure with his kingdom of Italy. Second, for
decades following unification, industry and labor relations had yet to exist as a major
oppositional force. The Italian Liberal state had no real organized enemies. Socialism had
yet to develop a major following. That would come with Italy’s industrial modernization
which would speed up toward the end of the 19th century. The only real ideological
challenger to liberal rule was the Catholic Church, who in protest of the Cavour’s seizure
of the Papal states, cut themselves out of the political system with Pius IX’s Non Expedit
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which stated that all practicing Catholics were to refrain from participation in political
activity.56
Despite the focus on creating a liberal democracy, masses did not have a voice in
the system because of strict electoral laws and major social questions like labor relations
had yet to develop. These questions would develop as Italy modernized toward the end of
the 19th century but were managed for a time by the state intervention into the economy.
These questions, however, would prove explosive as the situation in economy worsened
in the years leading up to the First World War. Save for a few examples, the peasants
lacked a major organizational body thus their activity remained relegated to spontaneous
violence. The Liberal State existed in an oppositional vacuum and was not forced to
develop a dominant ideology. As long as trasformismo could mitigate differences and
disputes between these relatively similar interests, the state was not forced to adapt.
For all of its uses, trasformismo could not solve political problems forever. Italy
began to suffer under international and internal political pressure. As Italy modernized,
contradictions within the Liberal state appeared, illuminated by old practices incapable of
managing new demands and challenges. The first time these contradictions exploded was
during the 1890s. Before, strife could be contained by placating the interests of ruling
elites and the relative elites they represented. By this time, however, industrialization had
ensured the creation of new social needs. Unable to have their demands met peacefully,
worker and peasant organizations began to institute major programs of unrest. The
government often responded with declarations of martial law, dissolutions of “subversive
organizations,” arbitrary arrests, and assertions of exceptional powers, particularly in the
South.
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In addition to this social unrest, Italy was engaged in imperialistic activities at the
urgings of the Nationalist party. A strong, united Italy had yet to be created and military
conquest would provide the final push needed to achieve this goal. These expeditions
often proved disastrous for Italy and resulted in frequent humiliation on part of the
government. This humiliation reached its peak in the humiliating defeat at the hands of
poorly armed indigenous Ethiopians at the Battle of Adwa in 1896. When this strain
brought on by imperialist ambitions was combined with the onset of a severe economic
downturn caused by cheap grain from Russia and America, Italy saw the overall value of
its exports decline sharply.57 This addition of economic strain added a sense of urgency to
the rapidly escalating political crises occurring during this time period.
These crises were largely internal to Italy’s political system. The Liberals in the
years following unification failed to establish a widespread national political culture or
national organization. Meanwhile, Catholics and Socialists began to gain a stronger
footing in the government. For ideological reasons, these two parties rarely worked with
each other. Because trasformismo operated through the forging of deals, it could not
encapsulate the political conflict of these groups. This conflict and lack of compromise
also spilled over into other disputes like labor rights as workers began to be socialized.
Giolitti was willing to grant small concessions—his government preferred a policy of
non-intervention in these struggles—in order to diffuse social conflict but as
industrialization picked up and firms swelled, these demands began to strain the system
of trasformismo. Trasformismo worked best with narrow interests and isolated political
actors. It, as Antonio Gramsci noted, functioned on “molecular absorption” of individual
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preferences.58 Because these changes meant integrating the masses, Giolitti was trying to
absorb entire oppositional groups like labor syndicates, nationalist organizations, and
later, the Vatican. Trasformismo was extremely effective up until the point where those
contradictions were too great to maintain compromise. As Gramsci put it, trasformismo
worked up until the point its elasticity ended. And when that elasticity snapped, so did
Liberal rule.59
Giolitti stretched trasformismo to its limits as he tried to build consensus for
policies. He wanted to replace the exclusive and repressive status quo by incorporating
new social groups into the framework of the state. He had hoped that this inclusion would
render the state more stable and less prone to disorder.60 Giolitti appeased the Socialists
through offering universal manhood suffrage and national health insurance. At the same
time he tried to appease the Nationalist right by declaring war on Turkey. At this point
the socialists went into strict opposition to Giolitti. Left with a barely appeased
Nationalist right, Giolitti approached the Catholics by offering to drop support for the
legalization of divorce. Despite his delicate position, he was able to emerge victorious
after the 1913 election. Despite victory, Giolitti was left with a weak Conservative
majority which was further eroded with the loss in support of his own laic party
following the news of his involvement with the Catholics. Alberto Aquarone described
this Giolittian experiment as an attempt to “govern from the center, with slight and
always well controlled oscillations, now in the conservative direction, then in a
progressive one, with the preoccupation of enlarging as much as possible, both in
parliament and in the country, on the right and left, the consensus behind the institutions
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and the existing social order.”61 Indeed the logic of trasformismo would, as Giovanni
Sabbatucci suggests, marginalize extremism while simultaneously blocking alternative
policies let alone systems of organization.62
This conservative majority also expressed hostility towards granting more
concessions to labor leaving northern industrial workers the only group Giolitti was able
to bring in. And that was temporary; he quickly lost support from the socialists with the
pursuit of imperialist policies. Furthermore, agrarian peasants saw minimal gains as most
distributive reforms were quickly defeated by the landholding interests that dominated
the conservative majority. Giolitti’s grand idea of a conservative mass base of consensus
not only failed ideologically, but because universal manhood suffrage was instituted as
the last piece of his plan, virtually assured the lack of workable majorities and effective
policies during tumultuous and divided times. Thus, Giolitti’s program, despite its
intentions, accentuated the worst aspects of Italian Liberal politics. The entrenched
interests coupled with a failure to institute basic reforms only added to what Paul Corner
called the “division between ‘real Italy’ and ‘legal Italy’,” the division between the
people and those who governed them.63
Throughout the history of the Italian First Republic, the theme of a government
attempting to solidify itself at the center meanwhile creating a national identity of a
modern Italianità leads to a specific set of governance practices that when combined with
the lack of a thoroughgoing bourgeois ideology behind the dominant liberalism
precipitates a crisis of legitimacy in the Italian state. This crisis is precipitated because
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the liberal state responded to new issues that accompanied modernization with its
particular modus vivendi of politics, trasformismo. This modus vivendi set in motion a
process of ever increasing abstractions to produce modern and nationalist Italianità. The
lack of bourgeois revolution during the Risorgimento and the establishment of
Conservative political order ensured Liberalism never had to develop this hegemonic
presence. In the early stages, the Liberal State had no enemies to defeat and no masses to
persuade. The abstracted citizen did not have to confer legitimacy to liberal Italy because
trasformismo as a system sustained itself over and above the particular communities it
governed.
What issues the government did have to face came from competing interests
within the government, interests easily absorbed by trasformismo. When these needs did
develop as a result of Italy’s long modernization, the State used force or turned to
international solutions to enforce or engender consensus. Furthermore, the principle tool
of Liberal political activity, trasformismo, thrived on contradictions. Trasformiso never
solved problems because it fused contradictions for political gain. Coalitions were formed
to produce the highest amount of agreement and to ensure the extremes, groups on both
the left and the right who wanted to change the system of politics itself, remained on the
edges of influence. The results of this coalition building were large alliances that
contained within them many competing interests that would become enflamed the
moment these social pressures demanded attention to the issues represented by the
competing interests. Interests would fracture leaving politicians or small groups to pursue
their atomized interests.
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A consequence of this particular form of political modernization defined by a
stunted nationalism, interest accommodation, and eventual scapegoating was Italian
politics lacked institutional durability. The politicians often remained the same, or at least
came from the same social class, but the ruling bodies they occupied did not last. This put
even more pressure on party leaders like Depretis and Giolitti to use trasformismo which
further accentuated the problem of an instable government distinct from its subjects. By
the time Fascism emerged as a major contender, it represented a force of social unity and
institutional stability in politics rather than a radically new ideology. This is evident in
the fact Fascism adopted many of the same goals of liberalism such as fostering a sense
of Italianità and pursuing labor reform.
Throughout these developments, it remained clear that governance in Italy
operated on a level above the people. This was factually evident in the debates over the
expansion of the franchise that reached its peak under Giolitti. But it is also evident in the
logic of government itself. Legitimacy under this model flows from above; nationalism is
to be instilled or at least fostered by the institutions the government forms and in so doing
homogenizes the population especially at the level of political debates. Trasformismo has
little interest in the needs of the people. The only possible exception to that would be if
the people’s interests were condensed and represented by a party or some other elite
representative. The Italian left attempted to do this but were highly fractured themselves
as they would continue to be after World War II. And even if interests could be
condensed, competing interests in the catch-all coalitions would bring the government to
a standstill before real reform could be instituted. It is this transformist model that
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comprised governance during Italy’s first liberal government; it now must be investigated
if it is the model that comprises its second.
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Chapter 2: The State Reasserts Itself
Like the Italian republic before it, Fascism too would suffer a crisis of legitimacy leading
to its downfall. Mussolini’s relentless revolutionary push to make a modern, industrial,
and imperial Italy faced serious setbacks in his disastrous handling of the Italian war
effort, internal failures to live up to the promises of a “corporate” Italy between
capitalism and communism, and most importantly sustained Allied aerial bombardment,
rampant food shortages, and rapidly rising prices for consumer goods. But Fascism did
not come down with popular revolt, a fact that would have powerful effects on the
country’s government over the following years. This chapter traces the political
developments at end of the war and in the years following it. It investigates the
Resistance effort and its role in the political culture of the new republic. Related to the
politics of the Resistance, this chapter investigates the reestablishment of the party
system and political practices embodied in that process that would become ingrained in
modern Italian political life. It then explores the mechanisms through which consensus
emerged: power and patronage. The chapter discusses the agrarian reform of southern
Italy as an instrumental step in the formation of a voting bloc for the most dominant
political party at the time: Democrazia Christiana. It also looks at the reestablishment of
the central bureaucracy, something that came to be known as la continuità dello stato,
and the systems of power and patronage present there. By the end of the chapter, it will
be evident that this continuity maintained many of the same abstracting discontents of the
central state that plagued Liberal Italy and contributed to its downfall.
The nationalism of the unification years found resurgence during the Fascist
years. Fascism was a major era for Italian politics. Initially seen as something that would
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only last temporarily in so far as it was a means to establish order in the political and
economic climate of the early 1920’s, Fascism instead maintained a grip on the Italian
government for over two decades. The drive toward centralized power was accentuated
by the Fascist desire to “remake” Italy in the image of the strong nationalism embodied
by the idea of italianità present within Italy since thinkers began to conceptualize Italy as
a nation rather than a territorial entity.64 In fact, this hypernationalism helped perpetuate
the regime’s downfall. Many high-ranking fascists, particularly those involved in the war
effort, had grown critical of Mussolini and demanded that he should share power with
them and King Victor Emanuel. The fascists had little power to challenge Mussolini but
the king did have a margin of power. On July 25, 1943, Mussolini went for his weekly
meeting with the king at which Victor Emanuel asked for his resignation and informed
him that he had already made plans for Marshal Badoglio to take his place. A stunned
Mussolini acquiesced and was escorted away in an ambulance later to be placed under
arrest. Twenty-one years after he came to power in the march on Rome, Mussolini was
brought down by the same king who brought him to power.

From the Resistance to Governance
This section details a basic history of the re-establishment of democracy in Italy. The
reason for doing this in light of the sustained argument about discontents of the nationstate is that the continuity of state practices appeared immediately with the final days of
the Fascist regime. Political constraints severely limited the possibilities for democratic
modes of organization and despite the alternatives put forth by Resistance
64
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revolutionaries, many of them leftists, centralization and the representation problems it
entailed reemerged across the Italian peninsula. For many, the anti-Fascism and
commitment to democratic principles that were born during the Resistance served as a
new national myth upon which a new nation could be formed. But history suggests that
these principles represent a rivoluzione mancata, (missed revolution) for representative
government in Italy. Nowhere is this clearer than with the albeit necessary attendismo of
the Communist party—the policy of more limited resistance while waiting for liberation
at the hands of the Allies—that developed into a conciliatory attitude, based on an
abstract notion of “progressive democracy,” toward more conservative Italian political
entities as the state was reconstructed. The limited political opportunities for the left and
the organizations they dominated meant that revolutionary activity and reformism
became condensed into the abstract category of anti-fascism. Anti-fascism became the
backbone of democracy and due to more conservative interests, both internationally and
domestically, the reestablishment of democracy came to mean the reestablishment of
centralization.
The period following Mussolini’s fall from power, a period that has gone down in
history as the Forty-Five Days, conditioned the balance of power in the country during
the crucial few years following the end of fascism. Paul Ginsborg argues that this coup
from above preserved the control and freedom of action of the traditional ruling elites in
Italian society.65 The king’s choice of Marshal Badoglio is significant because he decided
not to pick an anti-fascist but someone who consistently held increasingly lucrative and
powerful posts in the Fascist administration. Furthermore, Badoglio was not a liberal and
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tended to favor the monarchy. Thus fascism was immediately replaced with what Dennis
Mack Smith termed a “monarchical autocracy” founded on the army, police, and exfascist civil service.66 Democracy would have to come later, held onto by citizens through
the promise of free elections once the war was over.
Badoglio and the new government sought to maintain a military dictatorship.
They wished to maintain peace throughout the country. The Forty-five days began with
enormous and destructive demonstrations celebrating the end of fascism. Badoglio and
the government feared an insurrection brought on by the fraternization of solders and
civilians and were augmented by a fear of Germany and the Allies. The German army
began to pour troops into Italy in anticipation of the Allies assault through the country.
Meanwhile, the Fascist party was declared illegal, but political censorship continued,
most Fascist officials kept their jobs, and Badoglio maintained the Fascist militia. In
addition, the new government had yet to sign an armistice with the Allies. This
ambiguous policy meant the Italians were effectively put between the two great warring
powers as both had reasonable cause to treat the Italians as a potential enemy. The
government played for time. While secret armistice talks were occurring, demonstrations
were met with violence often with the army opening fire on demonstrators. A severe
armistice between Italy and the Allies meant unconditional surrender, with the added
humiliation of the refusal of the Allies to allow the Italians to join them. Instead Italy was
termed “co-belligerent”.67
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Tension in Italy rapidly gained pace as the Germans continued to flood into the
north. The Allies wanted to move into Rome through performing an airborne landing
north of the city with the help of the Italian army thus gaining ground and mopping up
residual Fascists around the capital. Badoglio, still unsure about the looming German
threat was evasive about this plan leading General Eisenhower and Allied command to
abandon the northern landing in favor of a southern landing at Salerno. Eisenhower was
outraged at the Italian procrastination and on September 8 made public the armistice, far
too early for the Italian authorities still managing the delicate German issue.68
The announcement of the armistice greatly accentuated the situation in Italy. The
same day, Badoglio was forced to announce the armistice to the Italians. The king and his
family promptly abandoned the capital and sailed south without knowing whether or not
Brindisi, the city where they eventually decided to land, was still occupied by Nazi
troops. Luckily, the Nazi’s had withdrawn from the city by the time they landed on
September 10th. This flight had been hasty and ill prepared but had the benefit for the
creation of the “Kingdom of the South” which the Allies would control. With this setting
up of the Kingdom of the South, Italy was cut in two once again. The Allies and the
Italian king controlled the territory south of Naples. The Germans solidly controlled the
northern regions. They freed Mussolini and set him up as the head of a puppet
government based in the town of Salo’ on Lake Garda. Even though he was given control
over all of the northern regions, the Germans exercised most of the authority.
As Nazi rule was established over the north, the Resistance was born. The
Resistance provided many with a new political culture and purpose. Through its modes of
68
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organization, commitment to anti-Fascism, and progressive politics, the resistance was a
vital step in reforming democratic government in Italy. Much of the organizational
backbone of the resistance, as Guido Quazza shows, was made up of the traditional
organized anti-Fascism that always opposed Mussolini and who’s groups and parties
were declared illegal by the regime.69 Quazza makes this distinction in order to draw
attention to the fact that this organized resistance was dominated by the communists and
more specifically the communists that historically and continuously fought against
Fascism. It was not just older communists who composed the resistance effort. For young
workers who wished to oppose the regime in the thirties and forties, the Italian
communist party was the most obvious point of reference despite the fact the party had
been forced mostly underground by the regime. Communist formations, which went by
the name Garibaldi Brigades, composed over 70 percent of the resistance partisans.70
Because of this large role played by communist party members, Italian communism took
on anti-Fascism as its defining characteristic in these early years. In fact, as we will see in
more detail later, communist strategy became one of establishing a relationship with
other emerging political entities to reestablish democracy and solidify themselves as a
mass-based and legitimate political party. Revolution was put off to not only establish
communism as a legitimate project but give it the patriotic veneer of anti-Fascism.
Other political entities formed during this time to combat fascism. The liberals
returned to the scene but in a much diminished position. Alongside the resistance groups
dominated by the communists, another anti-fascist group formed: il Partito d’Azione
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(Party of Action). This party shared the commitment to radical anti-fascism of the
resistance but wished to see progress come about in the formation of a new democracy
within the framework of capitalism adjusted to combat the striking inequalities existing in
Italy. Notably, they were also deeply committed to pursuing greater measures of regional
autonomy. Socialists were also present. Their movement had shrunk considerably since
the pre-fascist years. This shrinking occurred because unlike the communists the
socialists maintained a harder stance on the far left. Most of this positioning remained in
the place of theoretical discussion. Part of the reason for this diminished presence was the
fact that the socialists failed to maintain a similar amount of contacts within the working
class. Contact with the working class was mostly maintained by the communist presence.
Finally, the party that would come to dominate Italian politics over the next five decades,
Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats) was only just in formation.
These parties played very little role in the immediate fall of Fascism. Those that
existed were either driven underground or numerically weak under Fascism. When the
regime fell, the king and Badoglio took over the major roles of governing, effectively
outflanking the efforts of all the anti-fascist parties throughout the Forty-five days.
However, once the country began to split apart, these parties took on a much greater role.
They formed the National Committee of Liberation (CLN) in Rome on September 9th,
urging the Italian people to stand with them in the fight against the Nazi’s in the North.
Many clandestine CLNs were formed in German occupied territory with significant
governing responsibilities. In fact, the Milan committee took the name of the National
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Committee for the Liberation of Upper Italy (CLNAI) and became the ultimate head of
the Resistance movement.71
Because the Resistance was predominately composed of communists, they
experienced constant difficulties with the Allies and anti-fascists who also were anticommunist. As the number of partisan bands grew, most with deep communist ties, the
Allies became apprehensive. This apprehension was heightened with changes in the
international sphere. Not only was the Soviet Union growing stronger, communist
partisans under Josip Tito relentlessly pursued the establishment of a communist state
after they had received backing from the British. Not wanting the same thing to occur in
Greece, the British pursued military action when the truce between the Monarchists and
Communists fell into civil war. The British backed the Monarchists and by January, 1945
the Greek communists were forced into an armistice and were expelled from the capital.
Wishing to avoid both of these outcomes, the Allies watched the developments in Italy
closely. They needed the assistance of the Resistance fighters in the numerous protracted
conflicts with German squads but they were nervous about the prospect of a heavily
armed popular insurgency with a strong leftward bent—especially one that had such
direct ties to the CLN organs of government in the North.72
The Italians were highly aware of this delicate position they occupied. They were
placed between Nazi violence and Allied apprehension. Even though the resistance
fighters often engaged Nazi troops regardless, the enormity of Nazi reprisals encouraged
many within the labor movement, including parties within the CLNs, to argue in favor of
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a policy of more limited resistance while waiting for liberation at the hands of the Allies.
This policy of attendismo had its roots in a desire to limit bloodshed but resulted in
significant backlash, particularly from the militant communists.73 Attendismo came under
severe criticism because the Italians would only recover national dignity they lost during
the two decades of fascism if they fought against the Nazis. Furthermore, the events of
1943-1945, Nazi occupation, mass strikes, resistance networks, economic struggles, gave
rise to much collective action, especially amongst workers, and a myth of solidarity.
The Italians, especially the Communists, responded to Allied apprehension in a
much more active way than attendismo. The Italians pursued a strategy of national unity,
establishing democracy, and a lasting coalition of mass popular parties.74 One of the most
significant champions of this strategy was Palmiro Togliatti. Togliatti returned to Italy
from Moscow where he had taken refuge during the rise of Fascism eventually becoming
the Vice-Secretary of the Comintern. Along with Antonio Gramsci, he was one of the
founders of the Italian Communist Party (PCI) in 1921. When he returned in March 1944
he outlined, greeted by some degree of astonishment by many of the other Communists,
his plan for the Party. In this “Svolta di Salerno” (redirect of Salerno) as it became to be
called, the communists were to set aside for the moment their expressed hostility to the
monarchy and instead to persuade all of the anti-fascist forces to join the royal
government.75 The royal government, which by this point controlled all of Italy south of
Salerno, provided the opportunity achieve the most important objective following the fall
of Mussolini’s government: national unity against the Nazis and Fascists. They were also
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to set aside the goal of revolution for the same reason. Togliatti left little room for
interpretation on this issue when he wrote instructions for the party in June 1994:
Remember always that the insurrection that we want does not have the aim of
imposing social and political transformations in the socialist or communist sense.
Its aim is rather national liberation and the destruction of Fascism. All of the other
problems will be resolved by the people tomorrow, once Italy is liberated, by
means of a free popular vote and the election of a Constituent Assembly.76
Within this small segment of Togliatti’s views, his commitment to democratic institutions
shines through. Unlike Tito in Yugoslavia, he had no intention of making the resistance
or PCI the short term strategy to a dictatorship of the proletariat. But his goal was not
simply a reestablishment of the liberal parliamentary state that existed prior to fascism.
He advocated for something he called democrazia progressiva (progressive democracy).
The exact content of this vision remained deliberately vague but as Ginsborg elaborated it
was meant to convey a form of state that involved more direct popular participation than
traditional parliamentary democracy. The working class would become the predominant
political class and would carry through a number of social, political, and economic
reforms including the final destruction of Fascism, radical agrarian reform, and actions
against monopoly capitalism but not against all capitalism as such.77
In order to achieve “progressive democracy” or anything resembling it, politics,
communist or otherwise, needed to establish a broad coalition of social and political
forces. The era of mass parties had only just come into being as the liberal state
collapsed. If democracy was to succeed, it would need to be based in mass consensus.
The communists and socialists had been successful at developing consensus within
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various working class and factory movements. But the focus on economic revolution, as
we have seen, was severely limited. Mass consensus would have to come through
coalition building. Togliatti insisted that unity of anti-fascism should continue into
reconstruction. This grand coalition was to include not only the Socialists but the rapidly
emerging Christian Democrats. Deeply controversial, this desire to work with
Democrazia Cristiana would shape Communist strategy for the next few years. This
strategy, despite its tabling of traditional communist plans of revolution, is unsurprising
for two reasons. First, any rash move or proclamation of revolution would led to another
dark age of illegality for left-wing parties like the communists. The Allies, especially
considering British apprehensions and their previous actions in Greece, would have
crushed a militarized left-wing uprising. Second, these ideas about forming mass
consensus were not new to Italian communism. Gramsci had argued that in western
society a direct assault on the state was doomed to failure. Rather western communism
needed to permeate civil society in order to establish political and cultural hegemony.
Communism in the west would be based on the famous “bloco storico”, the historic bloc
of social forces that asserted themselves against those of the capitalist class.78
The “Italian road to socialism” was based on this “war of position” in civil society
and the building of alliances around the working class. Togliatti wished to continue this
program, especially with the focus on a bottom-up strategy as argued in Gramsci’s
“Prison Notebooks.” But Togliatti’s plan included the addition of political alliances from
the top downwards. He insisted on partnering with the Christian Democrats to expand the
mass base of progressive democracy. This partnership was instrumental in developing
78

Gramsci, Antonio, Quintin Hoare, and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith. 1971. Selections from the Prison
Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Pg 238

64

support for the new government in the immediate post war years as we will see in greater
detail when we discuss governance by the Christian Democrats. Partnership also had
immediate benefits. Togliatti’s decision to enter Badoglio’s government in the South
ended the political isolation of the anti-fascist forces of the CLN. In other words, it
brought legitimacy to the Resistance and recognition of clandestine government in the
North by what was effectively the Italian government at the time. His decision also made
sure that, politically, anti-fascism remained a key focus of regime in the South.
This policy of cooperation was not without setbacks however. One setback came
for communism as a whole. The debates about the strategy and direction of Italian
communism, particularly after Togliatti’s takeover are numerous and cannot be treated in
full here. However, Paul Ginsborg offers a convincing estimate of the predicament for
communism: “the two tiered strategy of liberation first, social and political reform
second, caused them to dissipate the strength of the Resistance and of worker and peasant
agitation. As a result, they were completely outflanked by the Allies and by the more
conservative forces in Italian society.”79 This is clearest in their decision to enter the
monarchist government. The decision confirmed on them legitimacy but it also let
legitimacy to their historical opponents. Democratic parties and communists both
contested the monarchist Kingdom of the South but became unreservedly accepted in the
name of national unity and anti-fascism. Many average members of the party accepted
these developments as a tactical move on Togliatti’s part to confer legitimacy on the
party. The hope was once the Allies left, revolution would become the focus once again.
This confusion of strategy and compromise, doppiezza (doublethink), helped solidify the
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program based on acceptance and partnership with more conservative elements.
Acceptance was the first stage in the conservation of state institutions and central
bureaucracy—entities that would prove to be major barriers to political, economic, and
social reform. This “continuity of the state” as it became known as now had an opening
for extension across the peninsula.80
These concessions helped prevent reforms from taking place across Italy and in
doing so helped insure the continuity of the state. The years between 1943 and 1945 were
marked by a great deal of social unrest. Military and political defeat coupled with
invasion from the North and the South dealt a large blow to the old ruling order in Italian
society. Rural poor began to demand an end to the oppressive system of land tenure and
agrarian contracts. Northern workers went on strikes that were both anti-fascist and a call
to change their material situation. But with the focus on national liberation, there was
little space for both revolution and reform. Furthermore, the presence of the Kingdom of
the South by and large insulated the southern regions from developments in the North and
contained a great deal of the agrarian protest. Furthermore, the government and the Allies
were more concerned with restoration than with reform. To help achieve that goal,
Badoglio and the King maintained the Fascist bureaucracy and other organs of the state.
Government changed in June 1944 with the liberation of Rome. The CLN forced
King Umberto, who had taken his father’s place at the head of the kingdom, to replace
Badoglio. Umberto replaced Badoglio with the president of the CLN, Ivanoe Bonomi an
aging anti-fascist liberal. Crucially, Bonomi, agreeing with the more conservative
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elements of the Kingdom of the South and the Allies, realized the necessity of
establishing the main organs of the new Italian state before the north was fully liberated
hence limiting the influence the Resistance could bring on the formation of the central
government. This meant maintaining the continuity of the state at the expense of reform.
Under Badoglio, the principle opposition to reform came from southern agrarian elites
hostile to changes in land tenure arrangements. Bonomi and the pressure to maintain the
continuity of the state meant reinstituting the cumbersome central administration without
changing its major arrangements or even purging fascist personnel. The problem of
political purging was less divisive than in other countries like France since much of the
central administration was built under Fascism hence involving a great deal of both
existing government personnel and the civil class socialized under the two decades of
rule. Also, civil servants were obligated to join the Fascist party. A policy of epurazione
(purging) was pursued but failed. Judicial councils pursued some cases, usually rank and
file members, but discharged as many cases as it could without raising suspicion, often on
suspect rationale.81 Debate was relegated to the institutional question of the time: the
choice between a republic or a monarchy. Since this question could only be resolved with
the end of the war and reunification, and the communists in entering the Bonomi
government with the policy of cooperation, meant that this reestablishment of the single
greatest opposition to reform occurred without a modicum of opposition.
Meanwhile the struggle in the north against the Nazis continued to intensify. By
November 1944, the Resistance was facing significant opposition and was in need of
reinforcements and supplies. A delegation from the CLNAI sought out assistance from
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the Allies in Rome. This meeting became of vital political importance culminating in the
Protocols of Rome. The Allies agreed to grant the Resistance a subsidy of 160 million lire
per month along with a commitment of “maximum assistance.” CLNAI was not formally
recognized but they were granted the responsibility of executing the orders of Supreme
Allied Command. In return, they were ordered to surrender “all authority and powers of
local government previously assumed “ to the Supreme Allied Commander-in-Chief at
the moment of liberation. They were also required to disband all partisan units and
consign all arms to the Allies when the conflict was over. Finally, military command was
given to a regular army officer.82
The opportunity to negotiate from a position of strength after liberation was lost
with the signing of the Protocols of Rome. The alternative government apparatus of the
CLNAI in the north was irrevocably lost when they were not recognized as a governing
entity and required to surrender any authority that they had produced through the
liberation campaigns. The CLNAI would take another blow shortly after when Bonomi
and its representative signed a clarifying document further limiting the governing
position of the CLNAI. Bonomi, like the Allies, did not recognize the CLNAI as the
government of the North. They were only the “organ of the anti-fascist parties in the
territory occupied by the enemy”.83 The potential alternative government contained in the
CLNAI was irrevocably lost with the refusal of both the Allies and the Italian
government to recognize its authority. The Resistance and the ideals it contained were
lost to the pressure to restore the central state.
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In the spring of 1945, the liberation of Italy was at hand. The Resistance pushed
ahead with plans for insurrections in the cities with the help of the Allies. They wished to
demonstrate the power of the movement. Massive armed uprisings occurred in major
northern Italian cities like Genoa, Turin, and Milan. All these major insurrections were
bloody but successful. The Resistance was handed another victory on April 27th when
they intercepted a German column fleeing the insurrection of Milan. Within it was
Mussolini disguised as a German solder. Ignoring the orders of the Allied commanders,
the Resistance leaders and the 52nd Garibaldi Brigade immediately ordered Mussolini to
be shot. His body, along with that of his mistress Claretta Petacci and other Fascist
leaders, were hung upside down in Piazza Loreto in Milan.84
These events brought the struggle for liberation to a dramatic conclusion. The
Resistance had acted with unprecedented autonomy and independence. The experience
was instrumental for a solidification of a social consciousness and an idealistic
patriotism. It would become a “founding myth” that penetrated more deeply than the
Risorgimento had ever done for the masses. There was also a great deal of revolutionary
energy at the conclusion of the conflict. Factories remained occupied and workers armed
during the ten days it took the Allies to arrive in the north. The conditions were strikingly
similar to those that led to the Fascist takeover with rampant unemployment and high
inflation. Only this time it looked like the revolution would be red, not black. In reality,
the communists were unprepared to risk a conflict, especially with the Allies. The
disarming outlined in the Protocols of Rome was accomplished quickly, especially as the
vast majority of Italians greeted the Allies with genuine gratitude. The CLNs were
84
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weakened by both the Italian government in the south and by the Allies. There was little
chance of them becoming the organs of government. The Allies also tried to defuse the
economic tensions that could have led to massive social unrest. The governments agreed
to a moratorium on firings and a guarantee for wages to be paid on time with one third
coming from the employer and the other two thirds coming from the government.85 This
combination of measures was an effective check any revolutionary activity brought on by
the events of liberation. The violence of war had come to an end across the peninsula.
Much of the old state had been preserved or reconstructed in such a way to limit the
radical influences of interests like the communists or the more locally based CLNs But
the political fight over the new state, of which we have already seen elements, was only
just beginning.

The Birth of Democrazia Cristiana and their Quest for Hegemony
The political compromises occurring during the final years of the war had the
consequence of condensing competing interests into mass parties. The reestablishment of
party politics helped to ensure the continuity of state institutions especially since the
reestablishment of these parties favored the more conservative interests. Party conflict
within a democratic structure was vastly superior to revolutionary conflict. Anti-fascism
proved to be a strong unifier as the call for democracy normalization helped establish
these mass parties. Within the span of only a few years, one party became the mass party
with whom other interests needed to work: the Christian Democrats. Once the party
achieved political power, it focused quite extensively on reform, agrarian reform in
particular. Although these reforms were designed to alleviate the plight of the Southern
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agricultural worker, they expanded the power of the party into new social areas. This
expansion was given legitimacy through Catholic associationalism. In pursuing these
reforms without the existence of other major political forces to check their activity, the
DC gained a system of alliances based on the party’s control of state resources.
Founded in Milan in September 1942 by steel magnate Enrico Falck, the Christian
Democrats became the new mass Catholic party after the previous one, Partito Populare,
collapsed in 1926 at the hands of Fascist repression and improved relations between the
Vatican and the Fascist government. DC was founded on an appeal to Christian values
with the assumption that those values alone could reconcile human conflict. This social
thinking and the fraternity that went along with it was manifested in a defense and strong
encouragement of small peasant property and small business. The focus on peasant
property gave the DC a great deal of support because the Coldiretti, the catholic
association of peasant property holders founded by Paolo Bonomi in 1944, convinced
many peasants that they had a material interest in the DC because the Communists would
likely nationalize all land.86 At the same time, the vision of the DC was articulated against
the excesses of landholder capitalism and its imperial ambitions; a stance that was often
seized upon by PCI and other left-wing forces as proof of the party’s progressive nature.
The party’s progressive nature found a powerful outlet in its first leader, Alcide
De Gasperi. De Gasperi, the last general secretary of Partito Populare, maintained a
strong commitment to parliamentary democracy particularly in the face of forces like the
rise of Fascism and Communism. His regular column in L’illustrazione Vaticana which
he wrote while he was employed in the Vatican library during the 1930s often considered
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the principle battle of the current times to be the opposition between Christianity and
Communism.87 He had to temper his anti-communism during the resistance; he too saw
the advantages of cooperation . But this collaboration was to be a temporary arrangement
rather than a lasting alliance, particularly as the DC rose in stature across the peninsula.
As the party’s stature rose, along with its veiled hostility towards communism, the
capitalist class began to look towards the party as an outlet for their interests. Slowly the
industrialists and other capitalists abandoned the struggling Liberal party, the traditional
outlet for their interests. The liberals failed, much as they did pre-fascism, to produce a
mass base of support beyond the bourgeoisie of Italy’s major cities. The Liberal’s focus
on a restricted group of elites could not guarantee electoral success whereas the DC’s
broad focus on property holding and Catholic values could. This growth of support
became especially pronounced as the Italian left maintained its ties to Stalinism despite
the outpouring of information surrounding his practices in the Soviet Union. It was not
by chance that the party chose to make libertas a key word of their political vocabulary,
not to mention emblazon it across the crusader’s shield at the center of their political
iconography.88
Communism and Christian Democracy, now the two dominant political forces in
the country clashed over the construction of a mass basis of consensus for their respective
programs. The Christian Democrats succeeded in forming an interclassism at the basis of
their conservative movement. Through organizations like the Coldiretti and others that
offered mutual services like insurance, the DC was able to make inroads with the
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peasants. Other organizations gave them similar access to Catholic workers. These
activities lent them the image that they were trying to establish direct relationships with
the individuals they governed,
Most significantly, they made an appeal to the urban ceti medi. The ceti medi
were, and still are, the middle class of Italian society characterized by artisans,
shopkeepers, white collar employees, small business owners, and artisans. Deeply
suspicious of Communism and Socialism, the ceti medi provided much of the support for
the Fascist regime. These groups were thrown into disarray with the fall of Fascism and
were left without an outlet for their views. Because the DC promised to both safeguard
property and reign in monopoly capitalism, the ceti medi found a natural home in this
party. When all of these forces came together, Catholic morality, democracy, anticommunism, capitalism, the Christian Democrats had a sizeable cohesive mass consensus
to lend legitimacy to their cause.
The Communists sought to do the same through producing a historic bloc of
interests. Progressive democracy was intended to provide for a wider swath of needs than
had been addressed under the previous liberal democracy. Progressive Democracy would
also destroy the possibility of a return to Fascism. The Communists continued to focus
on their natural sphere of influence, the working class movement but with the added
focus on social unity throughout the country. Even the ceti medi, themselves not far
separated from the working class, would support the goal of progressive democracy and
its focus on reform and criticism of the monopoly capitalist bourgeoisie.89
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These projects were sustained because between 1945 and 1947 the alliance
between the Christian Democrats and the Communists endured. The Communists were
forced to make concession after concession as the strength of the DC grew but Togliatti
was convinced that the progressive nature of the party remained. This strategy eventually
came under enormous criticism from many angles, not just Communist scholars and party
members, because the DC began to represent more and more forces within society to
which the concept of progressive democracy was anathema.90 Restraint was necessary for
the Communists to insure their intentions for both the Allies and the DC. Thus revolution
was exchanged for electoral gains because electoral gains signaled a shift in power.
Furthermore, the Communists failed to make inroads with the ceti medi. The defense of
private property offered by the Christian Democrats was far more convincing than the
abstract concept of progressive democracy despite its hostility to monopoly capitalism.
This strategy left the Communists with a dilemma that would follow them far past these
early days of the post-war era. As Ginsborg surmised: “either they diluted the socialist
content of their program and thus attracted the electoral support amongst shopkeepers,
small employers, etc.; or they refused to compromise and risked leaving the working
class in isolation and their alliance strategy in tatters.”91
Despite these weaknesses, the Italian left viewed the elections with optimism. In
the wake of fascism, the promise of progressive democracy would appeal to the masses.
The left’s confidence allowed them to make substantial concessions to the right to ensure
that the elections were not delayed. These concessions allowed De Gasperi and the DC to
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buy time to ensure the success of moderate forces throughout the country. The CLNs
became consultative in nature despite the protest of a few of the more radical
politicians.92 In December 1945, De Gasperi became the President of the council of
ministers in a governmental crisis precipitated by the liberals when they abandoned the
government. Togliatti was given Minister of Justice.
With De Gasperi in charge, the hope was that elections would come swiftly and
without any major political crisis. De Gasperi proved to be more controversial than the
left and the coalition in general anticipated. In order to conceal the divide between the
monarchist masses of the party and its republican leaders he insisted that the question of
whether Italy was to become a monarchy or a republic should be decided by referendum.
He also requested that the new Assembly only be responsible for drawing up the new
constitution rather than have full legislative powers. The left strongly objected to this
proposal to limit the scope of the new assembly because they figured the influence they
developed would help them control the majority even if De Gasperi controlled the largest
single party.93 De Gasperi insisted, and with the added pressures like possible Allied
intervention, the left backed down.
If the left expressed little resistance to De Gasperi’s political moves, they
expressed even less resistance to the institutional conservatism that occurred at the same
time. The CLNs, once seen as a potential alternative government, were scrapped along
with the more localized representation they controlled, with little protest. Much like
under Ivanoe Bonomi, the state bureaucracy continued to be expanded. For them, these
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state institutions were mostly neutral. The real concern was the factory floor and securing
enough electoral representation to push the cause of progressive democracy. The lack of
opposition meant not only did the central administration increase in size, but also none of
its apparatuses were questioned. The administration that existed since Fascism became
the primary organs of the state. Bureaucratic elements, including the ubiquitous semiindependent special agencies, were not a central electoral issue and thus received little
attention from the parties, particularly on the left, vying for attention during this time
period.94 This strategy would become even more pronounced as the elections approached.
The crisis of legitimacy of liberalism and the establishment of Fascism had
destroyed Italy’s liberal democracy established at the end of the Risorgimento, yet liberal
democracy was still considered a model for the new government. The experience of two
decades under Mussolini ensured that any governmental model would avoid allowing for
one aspect to gain too much power. But despite these fears, the country still had to
decide between a republic and a monarchy. At the urging of De Gasperi, this issue was
the subject of a referendum held at the same time the people were to elect members to the
Constituent Assembly. On June 2, 1946, the Italians held their first free elections in over
two decades. The election was momentous because of the issues and the fact that women
voted for the first time. Italy voted in favor of a republic.95 This was not a token victory;
the king had possessed absolute control over foreign and military affairs. In the other
aspect of the election, the DC received strong backing in the rural areas and became the
leading party. This came as a shock to the Communists who had anticipated becoming
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the leading party. The loss of rural votes, as well as divisions on the left accompanied by
a stronger than expected showing by the Socialists, ensured the Communists’ failure.
The new Assembly was charged with formulating the new constitution. The
proportional representation system—a system that would not change until the referendum
of 1993—was designed to be extremely representative. The concerns of excess power
brought on by Fascism persuaded the delegates to pursue this “pure” representative
system. Parties with as low as two percent of the votes were able to secure representatives
in the Chamber of Deputies. This system safeguarded the interests of minorities and
reflected public opinion but it had the disadvantage of encouraging a dispersion of votes
across competing interests and made weak coalitions almost inevitable. The Senate
experiences less of these issues because it was elected via a combination of proportional
representation and single member constituencies. The new political system, in its desire
to limit power, created an arrangement that encouraged political deal making and
trasformismo.
Trasformismo, once again, became a central feature of Italian governance to
balance interests and govern from the center. Competing interests made this style of
politics necessary. These competing interests, in the short term, proved to be too much
for the young government. De Gasperi maintained the partnership with the left but it was
increasingly obvious that this was an unnatural state of affairs for the young government.
The Communists continued to recruit members for their cause, especially as worker
agitation in the north and agricultural agitation in the center and south picked up once
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again.96 This increased social agitation put the DC and other more conservative elements
in Italy on edge. Togliatti welcomed the agitation but so long as it did not seriously
jeopardize the alliance with the DC. Stalling was common but it was obvious that the
government needed to respond to this increased agitation, particularly the agricultural
agitation. De Gasperi stipulated that landlords contribute a sizeable portion of the year’s
income to repairing damage done during the war coupled with an additional contribution
for land improvements. But he also banned the consigli di fattoria, the farm councils,
mostly found in central Italy, that were run by the farmers to supervise the sharing of land
and resources.97 In doing so, De Gasperi used the landowners in the short term to diffuse
social tension while simultaneously significantly weakening the agricultural movement
across Italy.
This diffusion of social agitation marked the beginning of the end for the alliance
between the left and the DC. The social agitation convinced De Gasperi that the new
government needed to be reformulated without the influence of the Communists.
Excluding the communists was a serious political gamble. If they were forced into pure
opposition, the country risked civil war, a daunting prospect considering the buildup of
support for the Communists and anti-communists alike. The moment for governmental
reformulation came when on May 1, in the province of Palermo, fifteen hundred people
gathered to celebrate Labor Day. As the celebration was beginning, gunfire fell on the
crowd. Eleven people were killed and sixty-five were wounded. The attack was organized
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by the local Mafia to remind the peasants of the real power holders in the province,
regardless of the new elections.98
Mostly talk resulted in the houses of government. But on May 13, De Gasperi
resigned. As stipulated by the new constitution, the President of the Republic had the task
of selecting someone to form a parliamentary majority. This task fell to the anti-fascist
Francesco Nitti. After Nitti failed to form a parliamentary majority around his candidacy,
De Gasperi returned with the announcement that he would form a centrist government,
reliant on the support of all right-wing parties. The vote of confidence, passed 274 to 231
and confirmed the end of the anti-fascist coalition that had existed since the final days of
the war.99
This new political arrangement was shortly thereafter subjected to the test of a
national election. De Gasperi and the DC needed to perform well at the polls in order to
secure a dominant position within the government. The vote of confidence that swept
them into power could easily be undone with a new set of hostile representatives. The DC
had the fortune of being aligned politically with the objectives of American foreign
policy. The ousting of the Communists only furthered this view in the eyes of the
Americans, especially as the cold war was beginning to heat up. The US played an
invaluable role in that they provided a great deal of foreign aid to Italy; aid that was
desperately needed to repair a war-torn nation. With the aid came the preaching of
America’s virtues. James Dunn, the US ambassador, turned the distribution of money and
goods into political events all across the country in which he would speak in the name of
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America and the free world, which by extension meant the Christian Democrats. To be
even more explicit, George Marshall warned that help to Italy would immediately cease
in the event of a Communist victory.100 The Christian Democrats used this influx of
funding to speak about the political skill of De Gasperi and the party in general. They
maintained their influence with farmers and workers by speaking of reform and asserting
their Catholic values.
The DC swept the election. They secured 305 out of the 574 seats in the chamber
of deputies. Even more significantly, they were able to secure victory at the expense of
parties on both the left and the right. They gained heavily in northern working class
regions while simultaneously picking up the residual Monarchist and other right-wing
faction votes in the south. The Communists, despite the defeat, actually gained seats
moving from 106 in 1946 to 140 in 1948. The gains came at the expense of the Socialists
because they and the Communists decided not to run on separate lists but instead asked
voters to indicate their preferences. The Socialists went from controlling 115 seats to 41.
101

The Christian Democrats were now solidly in control. The policies and practices that

they would pursue after this election shaped Italian politics in profound ways and set the
course for state-society relations over the coming decades.
The DC had established its grip on electoral politics by emerging as the largest
and most significant mass party in Italy. The Communists were a close second but, due to
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politics over the country’s abstract citizens. The Christian Democrat influence in Italian
political life can be broken into two categories: administrative and agrarian.
Administrative changes are significant because they mark the expansion of the
bureaucracy in the form represented by the continuità dello stato discussed earlier.
Agrarian changes are significant because they represent the reforms that were
instrumental in creating the voting bloc that helped propel the DC to electoral victory.
Both will be explored in detail.
Part of what made the DC so successful in 1948 was their articulated commitment
to reform. This reform particularly targeted the social inequalities in the agrarian regions
of Italy. Reform in these regions had been a major issue for Italian politics for decades.
The Communists and other leftist parties consistently insisted for structural reforms of
progressive democracy in the productive sectors of Italian society. For them, structural
reforms were the only way that the government could address the excesses of monopoly
capitalism.102 The Christian Democrats pursued a different strategy. They saw themselves
as a spiritual and socially just Catholic party and argued for sweeping welfare reforms to
address inequality. Structural reform was viewed with suspicion as it often smacked of
revolution, something barely tolerable for the conservative party within which some of
the more conservative members expressed hostility to reform, let alone revolution.103 The
Christian Democrat solution to social problems was piecemeal rather than radical.
De Gasperi and others within the DC, rather than pursue structural changes,
favored the creation of a stratum of independent peasant proprietors which could help
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stall the spread of Communism.104 This strategy was difficult for the DC to pursue
because it would mean engaging in land reclamation and the land magnates, most of them
Southern, were well represented within the DC. It would not be easy to infringe on their
property rights. This particular roadblock was substantially mitigated because of
developments in the peasant movement. In the summer and fall of 1949 there were
numerous instances of armed peasant bands marching on the large estates. The peasants
would typically occupy the land or estate buildings in order to win small concessions of
land for themselves.
One such occupation brought the plight of the southern peasantry to the attention
of the entire nation. Over the course of 1946 and 1947 the peasants of a medium-sized
Calabrian village, Mellisa, had occupied a large estate half of which had been assigned to
their village by pre-Risorgimento Napoleonic legislation. Over time however the local
landowner usurped the entire estate. As the movement took over the land the landholding
family offered one third of the land in recognition of their claim. The peasants refused.
Local representatives, growing tired of the ceaseless occupation, called for state
intervention. Police arrived to the village on October 28th and in the morning of the 29th
tried to force the occupiers off the land. The villagers and other occupiers refused to be
intimidated by the authorities. The police proceeded to open fire. Three people were
killed, fifteen wounded, and six were arrested. Journalists rushed to the South to report on
the events and conditions of the peasants in general. Within the South, after Melissa,
peasant agitation spread far beyond Calabria. Occupations became more and more
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common over the course of the next few months.105 Over these months nine more
peasants would die, countless wounded, and thousands arrested.
It was obvious that the government needed to intervene in the situation, at least in
a manner that was different from sending armed force to break up occupations. The
events at Mellissa and the outrage produced by the consistent use of deadly force—
especially after a similar event occurred in Modena leaving six dead at a workers’
demonstration—ended the procrastination of the DC.106 Even so, the landed interests in
the party forced the DC to adopt a practice that would be repeated numerous times over
the coming decades: “temporary” measures with the promise of “real” reform. In May
1950, they passed the first provisions of the Sila law. Shortly after a draft of the legge
stralcio, literally “extract” from the agrarian law, was narrowly approved at the end of
July. These laws provided for the expropriation of sections of the largest landed estates
and the redistribution amongst the peasantry. The largest estates were targeted while the
most productive were safeguarded. Land was to be distributed in two forms, small farms,
poderi, for the families who had no land to their name and quote which were mean to
supplement peasants with smallholdings. The peasants were meant to pay for the land
through thirty annual payments after which it would become theirs. Compensation for the
previous landholders was given in the form of government bonds.107
The reforms themselves were far less effective than hoped. Much of the land was
arid and constructing adequate irrigation systems was prohibitively costly. Also, the
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amount of land that came under the authority of the laws was far too small to adequately
meet the needs of the sheer number of peasant families. The liquidation of land, coupled
with the large landowners bringing more land to the market due to fears of greater
expropriations, also caused the prices of usable land to rise sharply.108 This put strain on
the peasants and the systems of credit set up for them. The plight of the Southern agrarian
class was lessened with these reforms but the pressure of too many people and not
enough good land meant that suffering would continue. In fact, immigration, both
internal and external, would prove to be a solution of sorts for the problems of southern
productive life.
The laws left one important legacy for Italian politics. The laws also set up reform
boards that divided the land amongst the peasant families. These boards were also to
assist in the construction of housing and irrigation systems as well as provide credit and
technical advice. From the outset however it was clear that these boards were enclaves of
DC power. Often there were no peasant representatives on them and Southern land
magnates often found ways to get their people into positions of power. These boards
often became powerful bureaucracies. Overstaffed and costly, these boards consumed
much of the funds made available for the land programs. The most notorious example
was the Sicilian board which employed close to 3000 people, 2000 of whom worked in
the new eight story headquarters based in the city of Palermo.109 Not surprisingly this
system was costly, consuming about a third of its budget on administrative costs alone.
This coupled with the fact that most of these boards were not democratic and relied on
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the principles of bureaucratic decision-making meant that they exercised a great deal of
power over the peasants.
This power fundamentally changed the experience of the agrarian classes. The
efforts of the Communists to build agrarian blocs around the energy of the uprisings
quickly crumbled. Mutual cooperation, present mostly in the form of agitation, was
substituted for dependence on the state apparatus of the reform boards. Peasant life thus
began to revolve around the prerogative of the reform board. This dependence amplified
the power of the boards and thus the DC. In turn the DC became reliant on the peasants
because the landowners, traditionally a bastion of support for the moderate conservative
catholic party, defected. Most turned further to the right. This was not a loss for the DC
because in losing the landowners and their traditional domination of the peasants they
gained a system of alliances based on the party’s control of state resources.110 When these
social alliances were combined with the efforts of Paolo Bonomi and the Coldiretti to
establish networks of Catholic associationalism through the control of resources like farm
equipment, supplies, and eventually pensions and health insurance, the DC and its values
became a central feature in the lives of the southern agrarian class hence lending electoral
strength to the party.111 This exercise of power through the apparatus was by no means
unique to the agricultural sector.
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Bureaucratic Power
Power through bureaucratic apparatuses became a central theme of Christian Democrat
governance throughout the 1950s. As the decade passed, the party built a state system on
top of the state inherited from fascism and earlier. Over these years the party continued
the theme of centralization that had existed since the Risorgimento. All decisions, even
minor deviations, were required to be made in Rome. Most authority was located in three
ministries: Internal Affairs, Finance, and Justice. At the local level, the prefects exercised
authority over the elected municipal councils. These decisions were legalistic in the sense
they were based on administrative law. This legalism meant that most activities of the
Italian bureaucracy can be summed up as a history of minute regulations of
administrative activity through the promulgation of laws, statutes, circulars, and
directives. This legalism was intended to protect the citizen from the arbitrary power of
the bureaucracy or its bureaucrats. In reality, it resulted in to what can only be called
administrative chaos. There were an estimated 100,000 laws and directives governing the
administrator’s activity. When this sheer number of regulations was coupled with a
strictly hierarchical civil service what resulted was thousands of lower level bureaucrats
unwilling to take initiatives or move outside the confine of the regulations.112 Inefficiency
and unrepresentativeness were inevitable. Furthermore, despite these regulations, the
bureaucracy became a breeding ground for clientelistic practices. Political fidelity could
be traded for jobs, favors, expediting tasks, and anything that fell under the purview of
the agency. Rather than operate on an impartial execution of tasks within clear time limits
demanded by the Rechtsstaat principles of bureaucratic legalism, the Italian bureaucracy
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exercised discretionary power. A citizen’s experience with the bureaucracy depended on
the extent of the pressures the citizen could exert on the administrator.
The Italian administration was omnipresent because of what came to be known as
the phenomenon of parallel bureaucracies. From the early years of the 20th century,
special agencies were founded which were not part of the traditional ministerial system.
These enti pubblici started as state agencies that controlled railway, telephone, and postal
services, as well as state monopolies like salt and tobacco. This administrative
arrangement quickly expanded into a whole series of autonomous institutions, each with
their own internal bureaucracy. These agencies were consistently in competition with
each other over purviews and the pressure to establish enclaves of power within the state.
Much of this growth occurred during fascism but these agencies were reincorporated into
the republican state. These public bodies, which had both administrative and financial
independence even though they were under state supervision, became the parastato, the
second state of the service agencies. In addition to this parastato there were numerous
other small agencies for services which quickly took on the pejorative name, enti inutili,
or the useless agencies.113
Controlling these agencies was a way to achieve party political ends. Ginsborg
provides a brief sketch of how control, mostly through the distribution of funding, flowed
through these agencies. At the highest level, spending was on major public works
initiatives, the contracts for which were in the gift of the local council. In the middle,
control was exercised through banks and the assigning of credit. At the lowest level,
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government funds could be used to create an excess of menial government jobs.114 The
discretionary power mentioned above included areas like licensing—building permits
were particularly notorious—processing paperwork, and acting on directives.
As the state administration grew, it took on a particular character. The
administration of the first liberal state was dominated by northerners, particularly
individuals from Piedmont. As the north industrialized and new job prospects became
available for educated citizens, the civil service increasingly became staffed with
educated Southerners. Because industrialization stagnated in the south, these educated
citizens faced poor job prospects but could seek security in the civil service. Southern
universities turned out thousands of law graduates who had little other option than to
work for the state. By 1954 over 50 percent of the administrative workforce was southern
despite the fact the southern population was only about 37 percent of the national total.115
The bureaucratic arrangement, mostly inherited from fascism, operated on a
deformed relationship between state and citizen. The discretionary power of the
bureaucratic elements, coupled with the rampant inefficiencies, ensured that many
citizens did not receive the services they required in a timely manner. This was only
possible for those who controlled contacts or other clientelistic means to exert pressure
on administrators. Furthermore, this particular arrangement served politics better than it
served people. The necessity of political fidelity insured that the interests of faction and
coalition were better represented in the bureaucratic entities than the needs of citizens.
This factionalism stemmed from the nature of Italian elections. When presented with an
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electoral list, Italian citizens express their preference not just for a particular party but for
a specific candidate in the list proposed by that party. This system encouraged rampant
infighting within the party as well as insuring the necessity of a cult of personality
surrounding a candidate. Patronage was the most effective way of developing that cult
through the politicians’ individual and party means or through contact with
administrators. In exercising significant power, mostly through their sheer ubiquity,
these agencies circumvented the elected bodies of the republic, especially on the local
level.
The political history of the Italian republic following the fall of fascism is a
history of rapidly intensifying factionalism coupled with an effort to engineer the
consensus of the Italian people. The immediate post-war years, although rife with
conflict, benefited from a strong anti-fascist consensus. The Resistance helped provide a
new political education for thousands. But the Resistance was a northern phenomenon.
The benefits of bloc formation provided by the Resistance and the myth it later became
did not span the peninsula. The peasant agitation in the south was briefly sought as an
equivalent by some of the more far-sighted communists. But agrarian reform, engineered
to suit the plans and preferences of the DC, helped preserve the individualism and
competition that the militants and their allies so desperately wanted to overcome. At the
level of party politics, anti-fascism brought two antithetical parties together, the DC and
PCI, to establish a new democracy. They were successful but internal and external
pressures, coupled with the hyper-representative nature of Italian parliamentary rule
would insure that the alliance would not last. It did not, leaving the Christian Democrats
as the dominant political entity.
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As these great ideological battles raged, profound developments in the Italian
state structure were occurring. The state was becoming embedded in the lives of the
Italian citizens. But it was not any closer to their needs. The bureaucratic apparatus of the
Italian state with its sheer volume of agencies, both utile and inutile, served the interests
of party factionalism and private prerogative notwithstanding the crippling legalism of
the entire apparatus. The state was no closer to the people it was designed to represent.
With a central government based in Rome, these agencies were typically the only
interaction with political structures for the average citizen. Despite this distance, many
Italians found themselves dependent on the state in some fashion. The resources the state
controlled, as well as the employment prospects it offered for many, insured that aspiring
politicians could trade promises and patronage for votes. Bureaucrats of all types,
themselves reliant on the system, were constrained by the regulations flowing from above
them.
This arrangement, so fundamental to the operation of the Italian political system,
profoundly shaped the lives of the Italian citizens it was designed to serve. It would touch
even more lives and produce an even greater array of effects as it was expanded into
other aspects of the public sector and the private sector alike. It is these developments
that we must turn to next.
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Chapter 3: The State Expands

This chapter provides a brief sketch of the primary way the Italian state and its peculiar
distance from the people it was designed to represent expanded further into the public and
private sector. As we saw, reforms and the growth of the bureaucratic apparatus helped
expand the state’s reach. However, often through the guise of reform or bureaucratic
linkages, the state expanded beyond these traditional parameters. Public works projects
and state-private sector partnerships are the principle protagonists of this story. These
entities became major fixtures in the lives of every-day Italians and like the other entities
that touched peoples’ lives carried within them the dominant power-relations of the postwar state. And in doing so, expand the bureaucratic power of the abstract state in such a
way that it permeates the socio-economic relationship of its subjects. This becomes
particularly problematic due to the reach of the parties. Segments of the economy and the
population became integrated into an administrative framework in which the political
parties and their power relationships were dominant.
These developments were accompanied by major changes in the social structure
of the Italian peninsula. More specifically, developments in Italy’s economy coupled with
unchanging realities in the southern regions lead to massive waves of internal and
external immigration. Although these waves of people were not a direct consequence of
the expansions of the state we have and are continuing to deal with, their story is crucial
for understanding the environment of contemporary Italy and the issues facing it.
Immigration from the south, particularly the immigration that occurred internally, forever
changed the face of the country socially, politically, and economically.
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The State and the Public Sector: The Case of the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno

As with agrarian reform, the major areas of expansion occurred in the growth of Southern
reform spending. The major outlet for this increased spending was a massive public
works project known as La Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. La cassa, or the Fund for the
South, can be thought of in the modern terms of a “development project” with its
principal purpose neatly captured by a vision of “catching-up” the south. The Cassa was
significant because as two external commentators put it a few years after the
promulgation of the law, “The whole area of the South had not been viewed as a unit for
public works purposes until the Cassa per il Mezzogiomo was established.”116 The fund
was established in 1950 through Law 646 with the expressed purpose to plan, finance,
and carry out a program of "extraordinary" public works in the South in the public
interest.117
Despite extraordinary plans to speed up development in the south, Christian
Democrats chose not to focus on rapid industrialization, but rather on public works in the
rural south. The law targeted irrigation, land reclamation, road construction, aqueducts,
dams, drains, and public infrastructure to support agrarian production. The principal
problem with the fund’s approach was that it focused too heavily on these agrarian
aspects of production. For one, much of the South, arid and mountainous, was not suited
for large developments in agriculture. This fact would have been obvious to anyone who
looked to unsustainability of the agrarian ventures supported by rapidly tightening public
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credit offered by the agrarian reform boards. Nonetheless, the Cassa development fund
focused primarily on areas with less than 200,000 inhabitants and between 1950 and 1960
a meager 12 percent of spending was dedicated to industrial projects.118 Again, this
decision was motivated by interests outside of the south. A large focus on infrastructure
projects suited the interests of northern industry for two reasons. First, the lack of
industry in the south protected their historical monopoly of the Italian market. Second,
they were able to provide the heavy machinery and other resources for these projects.
Two major consequences resulted from this arrangement. First, the focus on these
agricultural and infrastructural projects froze the southern productive classes in place.
The public works program provided a staggering amount of jobs especially for a region
that chronically suffered from inflated unemployment. But these jobs were temporary at
best. Typically, laborers would be called on by the state to support construction projects
and other temporary laboring positions. The Cassa provided relief from unemployment,
but it was only temporary.
This temporary relief was at best augmented by the developments in the
agricultural sector. These years, and the 1950s in particular, saw a significant fracturing
of property holding across the south. Reclamation and access to credit was instrumental
in this process as well as a shifting of elite interests towards booming industries in the
north. Sharecropping declined sharply and landowners found that their profit margins and
traditional authority were being eroded. Furthermore, the liquidity of the land market
encouraged property selling. This selling, supported by the state-provided mortgages,
allowed the historical sharecroppers to purchase land for themselves and fulfill the
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southern peasant’s historical pipe-dream of land ownership. The flood of funds to the
south encouraged this fragmentation because if a landowner was well positioned
geographically on fertile soil and structurally with access to real public assistance from
reform boards, developed or developing infrastructure, and development funds property
ownership presented a path to crop specialization and a foot in the agricultural goods
market. This path was very much encouraged by the Cassa plans to augment agricultural
production. But for the majority of the southern productive classes, trapped in the arid hill
and mountain regions, these prospects were non-existent. They had property and often
could survive on subsistence farming. If geographic or structural barriers precluded them
from this agriculture, they could sometimes survive off of temporary work. Prosperity,
the golden horizon of the Italian dream of land ownership was traded for simple survival.
And for many millions of rural southerners, there was not even the consolation of these
small plots of land.119
This Cassa spending created another significant political effect which Paul
Ginsborg, echoing the words of Gabriella Gribaudi, has called the rise of “the
mediators.”120 These people were the local Christian Democrat party bosses, the
bureaucrats, the building speculators, lawyers, and other specialists who were in receipt
of development funds from the central government and who mediated between the state
and the local communities. They often juggled public prerogative and private patronage.
Crucially, these mediators gradually replaced the old agrarian elite. Power thus flowed
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from the faction leaders who controlled the flows of Cassa funds, down to the special
agencies of the state and the mediators, then to the local government, and finally down to
the community members. Much like with the bureaucracy, these relationships existed to
sustain themselves, rather than serve the interests of the population.
The intervention of Cassa funds transformed the south. Between 1961 and 1965,
the Cassa’s funding for industry increased to 30 billion lire, keeping its total industry
spending steady around 12 percent of its budget. But by 1973 this spending had increased
to 230 billion lire annually, a shift that inflated industry spending to roughly 30 percent of
the budget.121 Throughout the South, new factories, petro-chemical plants, and steelworks
sprung up. Unfortunately, these developments were capital intensive rather than labor
intensive. They solved unemployment in a similar temporary way as the agricultural
development projects. Also, distant ownership helped ensure that these new dramatic
symbols of economic growth had very little effect on the local economies that surrounded
them.
Part of the reason for this limited effect was the way the fund targeted specific
priority areas. These areas were divided into two categories based on size and
importance. The larger zones, the poli di sviluppo, were major cities like Salerno and
Cagliari. Smaller areas, the nuclei di industrializzazione, were of less importance but still
received aid money. For both types of zones, the state offered an attractive package for
would-be investors. 20 percent of the initial investment was made available in the form of
a non-repayable grant while 70 percent of the investment cost could be obtained in a loan
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repayable over 15 years with interest set at four percent.122 This development augmented
the previous decision, made in 1957, that required IRI, the special agency responsible for
industrial reconstruction, to concentrate 40 percent of its total investments and 60 percent
of investments in industrial plants in southern regions.123 The combined effect of all these
measures insured that a great deal of money flowed into the South with the expressed
purpose of development.
The capital intensive nature of these investments did not leave much room for
sustained job growth. This lack of growth was augmented by the dispersed nature of the
investments. These zones often drew labor from the hinterlands of the regions as many of
these developments were located on the periphery of the urban centers. Rather than
concentrating a new industrial proletariat in the areas in which these plants were located,
diffusion occurred as cities grew in unplanned sprawls propped up by building
speculation coupled with the collusion of municipal governments.124
To conclude the discussion on the Cassa, it should be noted that the arrangements
it took reflected serious political needs at the time. Overall, there was little confidence in
the ability of the Italian economy to expand significantly during the early 1950s. Italy
was still in the process of reconstruction from its disastrous participation in the war. As
Percy Allum surmised:
In view of limited resources, the choice lay between either leaving Northern
industry to expand as best it could on its own, or creating industry in the South
with the spur, but also the risk, of competition. Moreover, in view of the fact that
the government majority was founded on the reconstruction of the Southern
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system, the only politically acceptable choice was to abandon the idea of
industrializing the South. This left a social welfare program as the only
alternative.125
The possibility of competition with the expanding Northern industry precluded a focus on
industrialization. Even when a program of industrialization was adopted, it was designed
to give existing entities, both private and, in the case of the IRI, public, the advantage.
Furthermore, the provision of funds for industry provided a prime opportunity for the
clientelism practices that typically accompanied Italian provisions of funds. In this case,
clientelism was most explicitly present in building speculation and construction in the
peripheries of major cities where most of the industrial projects were located.

Power and Growth: The Political Consequences of the Boom Economico
Economic developments were not limited to the state’s efforts to boost economic
performance of the southern regions. In fact, the growth occurring in the north was
arguably more significant for the country as a whole. Before the boom economico, postwar Italy looked much as it did during Fascism and even before. The industrial sector
could claim some advanced elements in the production of steel, fibers, electricity, and
automobiles. These areas were limited both geographically, confined mostly to the northwest regions and their overall weight in the Italian economy. The majority of breadwinning Italians made their livings in the traditional sectors of the Italian economy:
small, labor-intensive firms, in public administration, small artisanal enterprises and
shops, and agriculture. This was to change drastically for Italy
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International trade drove growth for the country between 1950 and 1970.126 Italy
had ended its traditional economic protectionism—protectionism, particularly in the steel
and energy sectors, that had reached astronomical heights under Fascist rule—especially
after its integration into the European Common Market in 1957. By the time of
integration, Italy’s industrial sector had achieved sufficient level of technological
development and diversification across products to respond positively to integration.
Competition would occur but it would not squeeze Italy out of the market. This
diversification, coupled with the development adoption of Fordist modes of production
ensured a competitive place in the market for Italian firms. Fiat invested heavily in mass
production lines leading to a veritable sea of new Fiat 500s. Fierce competition in Italy’s
energy and petrochemical sectors led to great advances in chemicals and other products,
most significant of which were the development of new fertilizers for agriculture.
Furthermore, economic risk for these endeavors was significantly mitigated because all of
this economic activity was supported with Marshall Aid and its influx of American
machinery and liquid funds.127 Furthermore, Italy’s ability to compete was greatly aided
by the discovery of new sources of energy—Fascist dreams of rapid industrialization
hinged on German coal—and developments in the steel industry. Hence, energy and steel
were available to Italian firms relatively cheap. Also, because of high unemployment and
the weakening of leftist forces we explored in the last chapter, labor was cheap relative to
other European countries and other international markets.
Italy’s growth was initially driven by an uptick in domestic consumption but
quickly shifted to an export driven economy. Exports increased at an average of 14.5
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percent per year during the boom years. This was driven mostly by integration into the
European Common Market. The percentage of Italian goods flowing to EEC countries
rose steadily during this time. The rate started at 23 percent in 1955 and rose to 29.8
percent in 1960 and by 1965 it had reached 40.2 percent.128 The higher purchasing power
of northern European countries matched perfectly with the volume of inexpensively
produced consumer goods flowing out of the Italian north. The growth propelled by the
production of consumer goods was augmented by other industrial production.
Petrochemicals became a large sector as did Fiat’s automobile production. In fact,
Castronovo estimates that by 1964 approximately 20 percent of total investment in Italy
derived from production choices made by Fiat through smaller firms which supplied
components and tools, rubber production, steel, petroleum products, and other goods
related to automobiles.129
New factories and plants clustered outside the city. This scattered the industrial
proletariat, diffusing the potential worker agitation. The new centers of population
located around these new islands of production that sprung up outside of the major cities
became concentrations of people who shared similar perspectives in that they often
identified the transformation of their fortunes with the fortunes of the firm. This
transformation was driven by the rapid increase of consumer goods which encouraged
individual or familial roads to prosperity while jettisoning collective and public responses
to various everyday needs.130 This change was mirrored in an emphasis on private
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consumer goods throughout this time period coupled with a severe lack in a
corresponding development in public consumption. Goods of utmost importance like
schools, hospitals, public transportation infrastructure, low-cost housing, and other public
goods lagged behind private consumer goods.
This expansion was accompanied by an expansion of industry outside of the
traditional industrial triangle made up of the cities of Genoa, Turin, and Milan. The
historical regions of Lombardy and Piedmont remained the epicenter of growth but
industrialization moved southward towards major Emilian cities like Bologna and
eastward toward port cities on the Adriatic Sea like Ravenna. Outside of the statesupported endeavors that came towards the end of the economic boom years,
industrialization left the south predominately untouched. The South did not possess the
capital, despite the best efforts of the government to provide it to support rapid
industrialization. Also because the north had a historical head start in industrialization,
the northern regions possessed more technical expertise. Many southerners did not look
to industrial jobs or training that would provide for the necessary technical expertise
because the civil service offered more stability. Higher education thus focused on turning
out southern law degrees in the thousands rather than engineers.131 Finally, because most
of the production was occurring in these northern regions, the export companies chose to
remain nearby to keep costs lower. This was feasible because Genoa was one of the
largest ports in the Mediterranean Sea, northern rail infrastructure was more developed,
and eastward expansion opened new shipping opportunities on the Adriatic side. There
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was no real need to expand Southward because all of the key resources had been
concentrated there.
This picture could overstate the permeation of industry into Italian economic life.
These sectors were incredibly dynamic. They grew by using technology and diversifying
product development. They were highly productive regardless of their size. But at the
same time, the Italian economy maintained the traditional sectors of production. These
traditional sectors were labor intensive and compared to their industrial peers, lacked
productivity. The economic boom, in growing a set of industries, accentuated the dualism
present in the economy between the productive sectors and labor intensive and less
productive sectors. Again, this dualism was spread geographically.132
Economic growth created another opportunity for the central state to permeate
society. Much like the provision of social services explored earlier, sectors of the
economy were made into instruments of clientelism. This expansion occurred underneath
the open struggle between the DC and private business on one hand and the PCI and trade
unions on the other. This expansion occurred through a growth in what during the 1970s
became known as the “borghesia dello stato.” This state bourgeoisie is the actors of
private sector or the business groups that ran public entities that nonetheless attached
themselves to the state and its political power in order to increase their economic gain or
manipulate competition.133 Patrick McCarthy, echoes this formulation when he describes
the growth of the 1960s on as the “publicization” of the economy as the improper
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invasion of these actors and their tactics into the economy.134 This permeation occurred
through networks of control, often traceable along party lines, over finance and debates
over which industries should be public.
These debates were most notable surrounding the electrical industry and can help
illuminate how the state managed to pursue its own interests as the boom occurred. By
1960 much of Europe’s electricity was provided through public utilities companies. Italy
had one such company, ENEL, it played a relatively minor role compared to capitalist
giants like Edison. Edison was one of the pre-war capitalist giants and as the boom
progressed, spent millions upon millions of dollars to avoid being nationalized within
Italy. The motivation for nationalization was clear. Government control of the industry
would allow it to make prices uniform and make power resources equally available on a
national scale, most notably through targeting investments where they were most needed.
Edison was far from the only company providing electricity, but by the mid-1960s it was
clear that a major merger was going to occur between Edison and the major
petrochemical giant Montecatini, which was also experiencing “publicization” issues
with the major holdings company ENI diversifying into chemical production.
These inroads between giants were an attempt to change competition in this
sector. The Italian petrochemical sector grew mostly at the bottom rather than the
specialized, technology driven top. In other words, the Italian petrochemical sector grew
through converting oil into simple petrochemicals like gasoline. This model was not labor
intensive, nor did it require much investment around technological innovation. These
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firms already possessed the technological resources to produce simple hydrocarbons. To
grow, firms only needed to increase output. This output was increased through
constructing more processing plants. Thus the growth model for Italian petrochemical
companies was one of capital investment in production centers rather than diversification
in product line. This model was further encouraged by the development grants to the
south. Companies leaped at the incentive and mobilized cheap, available capital resulting
in a rapid proliferation of oil processing plants along the southern coasts.
This proliferation insured that the Italian market was inundated with simple
petrochemical products. Competition was fierce between the various firms engaging in
their production. For many, it was clear that there was a significant profit to be made in
diversification into more forms of complex petrochemicals. This diversification provided
the principle motivator for the Edison-Montecatini merger. At the time, Montecatini was
experiencing financial trouble but also had the technological expertise. Edison brought
sheer liquid funds to the table. The result was Montedison, a petrochemical giant that
controlled 80 percent of the Italian chemical market.135 In December 1965, a capitalist
giant was born. But the history of Montedison offers far more insights than a lesson in
diversification and monopoly capitalism. Montedison can show how the state proliferated
the private sphere to produce a hybrid public/private system that benefited competing
interests while insuring a mutual reliance on each other. Montedison is a powerful
example of the proliferation of the “borghesia dello stato.”
Montedison, through the leadership of Enrico Cuccia was intended to be a
bulwark of private capitalism in the face of increasing government intervention into the
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economy. This was not to be the case. A major check on the government’s ability to take
of a sector or a business was its profitability. Montedison failed to develop this check.
Across from Montedison in the petrochemicals game was the Ente Nazionale Idrocarburi
or ENI. ENI, as a public conglomerate like the equally massive IRI discussed earlier, had
access to public money, particularly through the spending schemes intended for
development. The ability to mobilize funds when it needed to increase its holdings put
ENI at a competitive advantage relative Montedison. Eugenio Cefis, the head of ENI set
his eyes to Montedison. Shortly after its formation, Cefis began to buy shares in
Montedison. By 1968 he controlled a block of shares in Montedison that was sizeable
enough to exercise authority in decisions there. At the same time, Cefis slowly sold off
parts of ENI’s chemical sector to Montedison. Due to his rapidly increasing influence
within Montedison circles, he moved over to become the conglomerate’s president in
1971. It made no sense to compete with Montedison when he had the resources, both
financial and technological, to take the company over.136
Cuccia supported Cefis’s moves because they seemed to maintain the enterprise
as a private entity despite the fact that they were backed with public money.137 For this
illusion, there was another development in Italian capitalism to thank. Nationalization of
major trusts had political motivations. Nationalization of the electrical industry would, it
was hoped, break the conservative on Italian capitalism. The electrical trusts controlled,
either directly or through their holdings, a disproportionate amount of influence in
Confindustria. Confindustria, the agglomeration of industrial interests, was frequently at
odds with not only the centrist government but with elements of Italian capitalism not
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represented by its ranks. Breaking up the trusts through nationalization would end the
influence of the trusts and free the government from its most powerful opponent.
These struggles benefited ENI. Because ENI was engaged in public holdings,
many activities needed the blessing of the government. As ENI’s moves were occurring,
the DC’s struggle against entrenched conservative, capitalist interests brought them into
conflict with lay organizations, most notably the northern financial bloc Bastogi. This
skirmish became a struggle for the provision of capital. Through Bastogi, Cefis saw an
opportunity to increase his autonomy from the politicians. Bastogi owned a sizeable
portion of Montedison shares. Cefis planned to take control of those shares as a package,
essentially a smaller cloned company of Montedison, and merge them with another
company, Italpi. Itapi typified the system of interlocked ownership present in Italy at the
time. Italpi was owned by Montedison, but itself owned a block of Montedison shares.
By fusing more shares into Italpi, Cefis could form a new company, Italpi-Bastogi. In
owning Italpi-Bastogi, Cefis could control himself through a private company supported
by public capital.138 The government did not protest because Cefis’s moves weakened
Bastogi’s position as a provider of capital and the Cefis’s moves into Montedison brought
petrochemicals and electricity closer within the domains of the state.
With this fusion of private and public enterprise came a very particular pathology
as the economy cooled with the completion of major public works projects, the principal
driver of growth for Italy’s public enterprises. The remainder of the growth in Italy
outside of exported manufactured goods was largely self-generated through public
projects. ENI achieved modest growth until 1969 after which it transitioned into the red
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with less massive projects like highway construction being pursued.139 ENI was the most
successful; many other state enterprises showed heavy losses. With heavy losses came
serious job losses that were augmented by the fact that much of the growth was capital
and not labor intensive. Unemployment improved, mostly through jobs in the
manufacturing sector, but not in a way that was commensurate with the levels of growth
experienced. These state/private enterprises responded to unemployment with the spoils
system known as Lottizzazione (loosely, allotment). Lottizzazione, at least initially, was
the practice of dividing among the governing parties the command posts of the public
sector. With the growth in the number and influence of employees in the state/private
sector, many of them appointed even in the lower levels of control, came a massive
growth of hiring on the principle of Lottizzazione. At the top of the leadership pyramid
was a new generation of individuals like Cefis who were linked to the dominant political
parties on both the left and the right and who used their management skills and
entrepreneurial talents to wield power and divert public funds into private channels.140
Although there existed many entities that did not ascribe to this pattern of
development, most notably a small business sector that profited from a lack of attention
by the state, Italian capitalism developed in such a way that competing power interests
became intertwined and dependent on each other. Business and the state grew in sync but
resulted in unique problems like a heavy focus on capital intensive growth rather than
labor intensive growth. Labor intensive production remained confined to the more
traditional sectors of the economy, like agriculture, that remained comparatively stagnant.
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Employment in the public/private sphere, especially as growth constricted, was managed
through personality means, most notably lottizzazione. But all these drawbacks were not
enough to hold back one of the most powerful forces of change to sweep the Italian
peninsula.

The South Moves North

How did these developments in the Italian economy change the country? These
developments created a perfect environment for migration. A lack of systematic changes
in the south coupled with a booming north virtually assured that the social pressures
present in less developed regions of Italy, mostly the south but also the rural east, would
be released through the pressure valve of migration. Crucially for our purposes, a great
deal of this migration was internal with thousands upon thousands of Southerners fleeing
their plight in search of new opportunities in the North. This migration has implications
for later developments because these migrants tended to concentrate in areas around
employment hence surrounding the islands of industrialization.
Italy’s population underwent a revolution. Migration occurred in two phases split
by a small lull in the mid 1960s. In total, between 1955-1971, over 9 million Italians
migrated to a new region. For one, internal migration was a rural exodus. These changes
had the most significant effect on the South. In order to switch professions from
agriculture, Southerners had to leave the Mezzogiorno.141 These migrants were typically
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from the poorest agricultural regions, the hill and mountain regions that precluded
agricultural development. Initially, many of these migrants went to the provincial
capitals. There was job growth there with the development of the capital intensive
industry. But many could not resist the pull of the Northern industrial cities for long.
Those brightly colored Fiats pouring out of Turin were not only a source of national
pride; they were a beacon of hope.142
The prospect of a regular wage that was significantly higher than what they were
earning in agriculture if they had a job and regular hours was a major pull for many of the
migrants who fled from the South. These prospects were especially convincing for young
people as they watched the prospect of wealth through land ownership dry up with spread
of unproductive small-holdings mortgaged on increasingly tightening credit. As grain
markets became gradually less restrictive during the 1950s and on, small agricultural
ventures became even less viable. At the same time, the demand for labor was being
restricted as Cassa funds were used to purchase machinery from the North. The North
and the prospects it held for a better life were not only aspirational, they became
increasingly necessary.
New people flooded into the major industrial cities and their peripheries. New
people also flocked to the more provincial cities of the north. Cities like Verona, Padua,
Bergamo, and Varese swelled with the influx of new people looking for work. At first,
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Southern workers found employment through cooperatives. These “cooperatives” were
run by organizers or bosses, typically also of southern origin, who used their contacts to
provide labor to factories and other labor intensive industries. This model was extremely
lucrative for the bosses and cost-effective for the employers. The worker would pay a fee
to join the cooperative. When they began work, usually without a contract and the
benefits associated with contracted work, the firm would pay the cooperative a sum per
worker. A worker was lucky if half of this sum made it to their pocket after all other
hands had an opportunity to take a piece.143 These cooperatives were extremely helpful
for the employers for another reason: they divided the labor force. Workers found their
collective bargaining power undermined by the southern “terroni” (a slur, still popular
today, for southern Italians suggesting they are only useful for working the land) who
would perform the labor for a fraction of the typical salary. Cooperatives numbered in the
hundreds and managed thousands of workers. In October 1960, after widespread protest
by trade unions and immigrants, they were declared illegal.144
To conclude these changes mark a concentration of forces within Italian society.
With the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, Democrazia Christiana continued its push to
establish hegemony within Italian society. The provision of funds, and even more
importantly the mechanisms of their provision, helped the party extend its reach into
society. Future governments, particularly the center-left coalitions, allowed left wing
forces like the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) to mirror this governing practice. But for these
boom years, DC is the prime protagonist. And their development of the mediatori class is
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of prime importance for understanding how political power was wielded over the Italian
people in the post-war period.
DC’s concentration of influence through these methods is significant for another
reason: it shows the way in which the government approached policy problems. The
Cassa project was no minor commitment. Its initial earmark was an expenditure of more
than two billion dollars over a twelve-year period.145 With a commitment this large,
especially considering those figures are not adjusted for inflation, the Cassa arguably was
the Italian government’s attempt to reform the conditions of the south and do away with
the dualistic development problem, the questione meridionale. But the centralization of
the state and its apparatuses precluded a meaningful reform. The south made advances
where agriculture was feasible and industrialization occurred but many contracts
stagnated for political reasons, money flowed for clientelistic purposes, and successful
projects simply effectively mobilized capital resulting in new production centers for
distant companies. Gains in employment were sacrificed for other interests.
These practices only intensified as the state attempted to move into other sectors
of the economy. Even when massive capitalist entities boomed, the interests of the state
permeated them through the intertwining of interests. The brief outline of the battle
between Montedison and ENI illustrates the intertwining of public and private interests in
a way that allowed both to benefit. And when challenges to growth occurred those
interests were not to be challenged too. Practices such as lottizzazione insured that those
interests remained insulated. State power was allowed to concentrate alongside economic
power in major firms as well as in the public sector.
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A positive consequence of the intertwining of the state and private industry was
that certain sectors like small business and artisanal operations were left alone and were
allowed to concentrate into a clearly defined sector, especially in the North and Central
regions. Also, when this relative lack of attention is coupled with the fact the DC
attempted to court the ceti medi who made up these industries, meant that these areas
were allowed to flourish. This flourishing, created an even more powerful consciousness
of autonomy amongst the ceti medi concentrated in Northern half of the country. Their
mutual feeling of “I made it despite the presence of the state,” especially when combined
with the importance of small and medium sized towns for economic and cultural activity,
is crucial for their political project. Arguably, the boom economico resulted in far more
than a concentration and intensification in the production of exportable manufactured
goods.
The final area of concentration that resulted from the developments of the boom
years was internal migration and the concentration of a new demographic, Southerners, in
Northern industrial cities. Turin’s periphery grew by over 80 percent between 1961 and
1967, a change so great that it became known as the third largest “Southern” city after
Naples and Palermo.146 With changes as large as these social tensions were bound to
occur. These were intensified because they were truly outsiders despite the fact they came
from within Italy. Many Southerners only spoke the local dialect of their home region or
village. These differences made Southerners easily identifiable and thus led to
discrimination. We already saw how discrimination divided the labor force. Housing was
another problem area. Most cities were woefully underprepared to handle the large influx
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of new residents. Overcrowding was rampant and many landlords refused to rent their
flats to Southerners. Gradually, cities, often with the help of private firms, constructed
large brutalist housing projects in the periphery for the new populations.147 These projects
eased the plight of the southerners but in the process concentrated them geographically
and democratically. Only time and sharing the mutual space of the city and the workplace
would ease these divides. But anti-Southernism would remain a problem, perennially
supported by stereotypes based on real economic differences between the North and the
South and differences in custom and culture across population centers. This was not only
a problem during the 1960s and 70s;these differences provide material and the conditions
for contemporary anti-Southernism and informed what it meant to be a specific “people”
in Italy
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Chapter 4: The State in Crisis
How did the state respond to the new socio-economic changes brought on by the boom
years? During these years the coalition system had remained a defining feature of Italian
politics. The government during these years was made up of stable coalitions dominated
by the Christian Democrats. The question thus becomes: was the political system able to
meet the challenges of responding to the developments within Italian society, many of
which stemmed from Italy’s rapid and piecemeal modernization? This chapter reveals
that the Italian government responded to political, economic, and social developments
with its own brand of internal politics. The interests of party politics, a level of
trasformismo not seen since the Giolitti years, checked reformism. The concern over
party politics made Italy’s governments remarkably stable considering the developments
occurring in Italy over the final two and a half decades of the First Republic. The political
system was able to weather recessions, student and worker agitation, and terrorism
without being forced into reforming its structure. The practices of institutional
government continued despite a myriad of pressures. In fact, such tendencies only
strengthened. The final years, dominated by the Socialist Bettino Craxi, exemplified the
practices of state preservation. If you can’t beat them, join them. It was only a complete
crisis of the system which revealed an uneven power structure in which corruption,
clientelist, and transformist administrative practices defined much of the Italian social
experience, that instituted major structural changes in Italian politics.
Transformist party politics was not the be all end all of the regime’s practices.
Alongside the blatant political brokering existed clientelistic government. The
centralization of the state incentivized the use of public funds for political needs. This
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charge would become a central feature of Italian politics as the corruption investigations,
known as Mani Pulite or Clean Hands, swept the nation at the beginning of the 1990s.
Many of Craxi’s socialists became implicated in the scandals that started in Milan but
rapidly swept the nation. As the firestorm spread, the politicians implicated became more
prominent and of diverse political backgrounds. Complicity in clientelistic behavior was
very much a shared phenomenon. This chapter illustrates how the state continued to
preserve its own interests, but in doing so to such a high degree, effectively wrote its
own obituary.

Opening the DC to the Left
During this time, the DC was dominated by Amintore Fanfani, a former university
professor with, like so many in Italy’s political establishment, a Fascist past. Fanfani had
taken over as party secretary of the DC well before the boom years but during the
elections of 1958 he took the mantle of President of the Council of Ministers and Foreign
Affairs while maintaining his role as party secretary. His dominance within the DC and
the government as a whole allowed him to push for fundamental shifts in governmental
political alliances.
Fanfani wanted to strengthen the ideological influence of the DC. The
governments of the 50s had been weak centrist coalitions. They took little initiative to
lead the country or address major issues developing in Italy. As Ginsborg points out:
“from the time of the DC’s national council at Vallombrosa in July 1957, Fanfani argued
that the DC should ‘open to the left’ and include the socialists in the government.”148 The
political reasoning was simple. With Fanfani in charge, a DC-PSI coalition could serve as
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the basis for social planning. The government could pursue moderate reforms and further
intervention in the economy, reducing the influence of major trusts and firms. A DC-PSI
partnership would provide another benefit: isolating the communists.
Before Fanfani could put his plans in motion, push back from within the DC
erupted. It is not surprising these lofty ambitions coupled with Fanfani’s personal control
of them would create resistance, even from within his own faction. But it was another
faction that would halt the opening to the left in these early years. The faction was the
Dorotei. Named for the convent of San Dorotea where they first formed the coalition, the
Dorotei were composed of DC politicians that felt the time was not yet ripe for the
socialists to enter government. Much of this sentiment came from the influence of church
hierarchy. The Dorotei attracted many followers and by the time the DC’s seventh
congress was held in Florence in October 1959, the DC was bitterly divided.149 The
central question of the congress was party leadership. After bitter disagreement, the
Dotorei and their backers emerged victorious.
One of the largest names in Italian political history emerged as the party secretary,
Aldo Moro. Moro, a southern law professor, was devoutly catholic, reserved, and
courteous. He was also extremely ambitious. He did not abandon the opening to the left;
he simply delayed it as long as necessary. Unfortunately for his plan to stall, party
politics would make the opening to the left a necessity.
The congress left many DC politicians bitter about the party’s direction.
Factionalism led to stalling. In the spring of 1960, recognizing the need for real
governance, the President of the Republic, Giovanni Gronci invited a junior member of
the congress, Fernando Tambroni, to form a new government. Tambroni was liked by
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many in the major parties, not just the DC. But factionalism prevailed once again. He was
only able to secure a vote of confidence with the support of the Italian far right,
dominated by the Monarchists and the neofasc ist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI).150
The government had only been in power for a few months when the MSI
announced it was going to hold a national congress at Genoa. The party leadership
wished to bring the MSI more into the mainstream Italian right, perhaps with an alliance
with the Monarchists. Leadership wanted to address the party’s marginalization at the
hands its fascist street gang supporters and those who were nostalgic for il Duce. Also,
becoming a mainstream party would allow the MSI to participate in the spoils system
further strengthening their southern base. The problem came from their selection of
Genoa. Genoa, as we explored in the section on the Resistance, had a vibrant antifascist
tradition. The MSI made matters worse with their announcement that Carlo Emanuele
Basile would speak at the congress. Basile was the last prefect of Genoa during the
Republic of Salò, the Fascist puppet government, who was responsible for the deaths and
deportations of many Genoese workers and anti-fascists.151
The reaction was immediate. On June 30 a massive demonstration of tens of
thousands of Genoese workers, students, Resistance veterans, and others broke out all
united under the banner of anti-fascism. The police intervened and widespread violence
broke out. With the tensions running high, the prefect of Genoa, in consultation with
Tambroni, insisted the MSI congress had to be postponed. Celebration swept the city.
Tambroni reacted to the demonstration in a disastrous fashion. He attempted to
assert his authority at all costs. Police were given the authority to use deadly force in
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“emergency situations”. Shortly after, the police intervened in a demonstration in Sicily,
killing one and wounding five more. Two days later, in Reggio Emilia five demonstrators
were killed and nineteen wounded. For many, the combination of events looked like the
run-up to the fascist regime. CGIL, the national labor union, proclaimed a national
general strike which gained massive support. The police intervened in this demonstration
as well resulting in more deaths, mostly in the South.152
The government was forced to respond. They responded by trying to replace
Tambroni as quickly as possible. He resigned on July 22 and Fanfani returned to form an
interim government. The need for a new government revealed the profound effects the
Tambroni affair had on politics and the opening to the left. For one, anti-fascism
remained an ideological underpinning, especially in the northern cities with a historical
referent to the Resistance. Second, any government could not hope to exist with the
support of MSI and the Monarchists. The Italian far right had too many Fascist
tendencies to be broadly acceptable for the country. Coalition partnership with the right
was not possible. Only the opening to the left remained.
On the left, there existed apprehensions about entering government with the DC.
Many on the left had watched prized reforms, the agricultural reforms being a notable
example, be undertaken with less than pleasing results. But the socialists did have a
notable group of members that supported participation in government. These were led by
Pietro Nenni. At least since 1955 and the Turin congress of PSI did major elements of the
party look to cooperation with the Christian Democrats. Then Nenni had argued:
We must face and try to resolve in a new way, and as well as we can, the problem
of our relations with the Catholic masses, with their party and their organizations.
Since the DC has announced a program of political and social reform, it must now
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have the courage to do what it says. If it takes this first step on the road to
committed planning, the PSI will support the proposed reforms and take its share
of the responsibilities involved.153
Debate over this issue occupied the socialists during all the years of the economic boom.
Politics at the time however had kept the opening to the left from being a real possibility.
But by the 1960s, the opportunity was a real one. The socialists were keenly aware of that
fact as well. By the 34th Congress of the PSI, held in Milan in March 1961, the socialists
had to decide if government participation was a path they wished to pursue. Nenni and
his “Autonomous” faction of the PSI gained a significant victory in Milan when 55
percent of the votes backed him.154 At the time the PSI remained radical. For example
Tullio Vecchietti, who led the left elements of the party, continued to insist that the
Soviet Union was “the country with the highest wellbeing at the individual and collective
level.”155 For these leftists, DC coalition would not lead to structural changes, but an
integration of the PSI into the existing corrupt, capitalistic political system. Nenni had
similar apprehensions but did not go so far. He clearly did not have any intention for the
PSI to denounce its Marxism for some abstract conception of Social Democracy. He
distinguished the PSI’s plan from Social Democracy because “it does not obscure the
sense of diversity between bourgeois democracy and socialist democracy; because it does
not postulate an insurrection into bourgeois society, but is designed to create the civic
instruments for the conquest of the state for democracy, and the conquest of democracy
for socialism.”156
This perspective, coming from the party congress, provoked unease in the centerright politicians looking to make an alliance. But Nenni and his autonomists was the most
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moderate faction within the party. Many others, including the chief theoretician Riccardo
Lombardi, spoke of conquering the state from the inside.157 The Christian Democrats had
no intention of allowing the PSI to pull them any further away from the center that they
willing but at the same time, they needed the electoral support of the socialists. And for
some, there was common ground on reforms, particularly economic ones. For many in
the DC, the economic disequilibrium between the North and the South meant greater
social and political disequilibrium. And if the DC could have a hand in achieving that
stability, it may lead to more electoral stability. Thus both the DC and PSI spoke of state
intervention, but for different reasons.
These areas of common ground proved useful for another reason: the DC
leadership wanted to partner with the PSI in order to divide the left. If the Socialists could
be pulled away from their comrades in the PCI, then the PCI would be in total political
isolation. Considering the fact that PCI consistently polled at a high number but not high
enough to win a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, this political isolation would put
them in an almost guaranteed opposition role for some time. A division between the PSI
and the PCI would also have repercussions for left-wing cooperation in other areas like
within labor unions. If done correctly, the opening to the left could further solidify the
influence of the DC within politics in general.
At the 8th Congress of the DC held in Naples in January 1962, party secretary
Moro delivered a six-hour speech in which he laid out the prospect of the center-left
coalition. Deeply ambiguous, Moro’s speech spoke of building relationships with the
social forces in Italian society in order to govern effectively. Moro, with the memory of
the recent social unrest surrounding the Tambroni affair still fresh, insisted that the DC
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was not a class based party but a party “of people fielded not with the few but with the
many.”158 These appeals were very effective. The Dotorei were reassured with Moro in
charge and 80 percent of the delegates at the congress backed the list, “the friends of
Moro and Fanfani.”159
With the making of the opening to the left a distinct possibility, the issue of
reform took center stage. Ginsborg outlines three major categories through which we can
think about the attitude toward reforms both pursued and not pursued in Italy during this
time. There was the corrective attitude, the structural attitude, and the minimalist attitude.
The corrective reforms were the reforms of the reformers, people who felt capitalism was
to be supported but steps had to be taken to remedy the deformations and imbalances
specific to the Italian model development. The structural attitude, supported by all major
figures of the PSI and PCI, held that each reform was a stepping stone on the Italian road
to socialism. Efficacy was to be judged on the reform’s influence on anti-capitalist
consciousness and its role in preparing the proletariat to be the dominant class. The
minimalist attitude rhetorically supported corrective reform but was not prepared to let
reformism weaken the unity of the DC or its role in the state. Every governing act was
subordinate to the needs of the party.160
These perspectives are instructive for our understanding of state power in postwar Italy. The corrective attitude represented a keen awareness of the problems of Italian
socioeconomic development. Corrective reforms addressed the perennial problems
present in Italian society. These included the persistent poverty of the south as well as
imbalances between private and social consumption. Many reformers looked to the
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bureaucracy as a prime offender. Corrective reforms would target the inefficiency and
corruption present in the central bureaucracy. Decentralization, a goal of reformers since
the Risorgimento, was a prime example of corrective reform. Decentralizing the
government and giving more control to the regional and local governments would help
with the new needs arising from rapid urbanization and economic development. Other
corrective reforms included modernizing the education system and building the national
health service.
Structural reforms remained hypothetical because the tenuous relationship
between various political entities precluded major, rapid changes. The structural reforms
were as Lombardi put it “revolutionary reformism,” a process that “continually destroys
the equilibrium of the system and creates a series of counter powers.”161 This idea was
not completely utopian due to the system of interlocking powers present in Italy. The
principle opponents to structural reforms were the great monopolies, the electrical trusts
and their linkages to high finance being a prime example. These entities opposed reform,
even when it was not structural, because reformism smacked of nationalization. At the
same time, these monopolies and trusts were at odds with corporations like FIAT,
Olivetti, and Pirelli. Thus the possibility of a utopianism alliance between the leftist
structural reformers and progressive capital existed because industrial capital opposed the
trusts and monopolies who were corrupting and stagnating capitalism. Any reform would
be for capitalism’s sake, not socialism’s. These plans fit more squarely into corrective
reforms because any effort to extend beyond the necessary would be met with hostility.
As for the minimalist view, to say nothing of structural reforms, corrective
reforms were a secondary objective. These reforms could expect tacit support so long as
161
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they did not conflict with party needs. The center left plan was not to transform Italy, but
transform the PSI into an element of the government and in so doing strengthen the
hegemony of the ruling parties.
These were the competing interests that provided the backdrop to the first centerleft coalitions. In March 1962, Fanfani formed the first center-left coalition government.
It was made up of the Christian Democrats, Social Democrats, and Republicans. The PSI,
despite the changed conditions stemming from the Tambroni debacle, were not yet
invited to join the government. However, the PSI, at Nenni’s insistence, did not vote
against the government and support for the government would continue so long as three
major areas of reform were pursued. These were the nationalization of the electricity
trusts, the institution of a single form of middle school, and the formation of the regional
governments. Fanfani agreed and added a few more areas to the list of proposed reforms
including more agrarian reform, national economic planning, and reform to state
institutions.
Before any major effort could be undertaken, the new government faced a
political challenge that would require real cooperation. Gronchi’s term as President was
about to expire and the Chamber of Deputies needed to elect his successor. The choices
came down to Antonio Segni who was to the right of many within the DC and Guiseppe
Saragat, the leader of the minor socialist party Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano
(PSDI). Saragat had wide support from the left and Fanfani’s faction. Moro and the
Dotorei however, preferred Segni. Moro threatened a governmental crisis if Fanfani and
his faction did not tow the party line. They agreed and Segni, someone who was not only
lacked commitment to reform but doubted the idea of a center-left coalition itself, was
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elected. To make matters worse, his election required the votes of the DC as well as the
Monarchists and MSI.162
Despite these initial challenges, Fanfani’s government went about pursuing
reforms. The electrical trusts were nationalized. It also succeeded in establishing
compulsorily secondary schooling until the age of 14. These were remarkable
achievements for the new government but by the end of 1962 the reform energy had all
but been exhausted. The government faced opposition from the structural reformers. The
PCI and PSI had pursued constructive opposition, often pushing demands to extend
reform efforts beyond where the DC wanted to go. A notable example came from the
compensation paid for the abolition of the electrical trusts. The structural reformers, led
by Lombardi, wanted compensation payed to the tens of thousands of former
shareholders as opposed to the trusts. The structural reformers effectively wanted to
abolish the trusts completely. After significant opposition, which was brought to an end
after Guido Carli, the president of the Bank of Italy, threatened to resign, compensation
was payed to the trusts but with the hope of reinvestment.163
Beyond this productive opposition, many on the left were skeptical about the
direction reform was taking. The experience of the electrical trusts, with the
compensation battle effectively ensuring a continuity of the status quo, helped convince
them that real changes continued to remain unfulfilled. This pushback was most notable
in any area that involved labor relations. The PCI and the left wing of the PSI were
deeply skeptical of the reforms that were promised in exchange for wage restraint. When
these demands were coupled with the fact that by 1962 demand for labor was exceeding

162
163

For the Segni, Gronchi, Saragat conflict see Ginsborg, 1990, ibid, pg. 268-271
Scalfari & Turani, ibid pg. 14-15

123

the supply for the first time, wages rose sharply. Many of the larger firms could absorb
the increased costs, but many of the smaller firms of the ceti medi could not and were
quick to blame their misfortune on the “pro-labor” government. These wage increases
were passed onto prices resulting in rapid inflation.164 This inflation was coupled with an
uptick in financial uncertainty brought on by ex-electricity trust interests that had
maintained their influence in financial circles, especially after the payment of
compensation.
These poor economic conditions put reform efforts to a halt and helped propel
Moro to the head of the government. Inflation and financial uncertainty hit the small and
medium producers and savers of the ceti medi the hardest. These individuals had
traditionally been the primary supporters of the DC. Faced with the prospect of losing a
wide basis of their support, the DC leadership chose to placate their interests. Reforms
like regional governments and urban planning were put on hold. The DC was in a weak
position as the elections approached and when they did arrive on the 28th of April 1963,
the DC dipped below 40 percent for the first time in its history. The Liberal party picked
up most of what the DC lost. The Monarchists also declined to just below two percent but
their loss was MSI’s gain. The Socialists dipped slightly. The largest gains were made by
the Communists who jumped to over 25 percent their best showing in years.165
Segni invited Moro to form the next government. By this time, the socialists had
to be formally included in the government because they were no longer prepared to offer
external support following Moro’s indefinite postponing of various reforms a few months
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earlier. Moro made inroads with the socialists and appeared to have succeeded at forming
a center-left government by mid-June 1963. Then what would go down as the Night of
Saint Gregorio happened on of June 16. That night the Lombardi faction of the PSI
vetoed Moro’s proposals, most notably his ambiguous town planning reform package.
Nenni’s faction quickly became a minority, leaving the government without a vote of
confidence.
An interim government was formed while the socialists sorted out their internal
disagreements. At the party congress that October, Nenni and Lombardi settled their
differences and a motion was passed in favor of Socialist participation in the government.
That December, the Socialists joined the government. Moro, his party still in the
majority, took President of the Council. Nenni took the Deputy position. Lombardi chose
not head any ministerial position.
Moro quickly placed reform at the center of the discussion, the establishment of
regional governments being a primary task. But the push for structural reforms suffered a
serious blow from the outset. For many Socialists, entry into Moro’s government was
deeply controversial. Many on the left wings of the party refused to vote confidence for
the coalition. They broke from PSI in order to form PSIUP, the Partito Socialista di
Unita Proletaria, the borrowed name from the Socialists in the 1940s. Lelio Basso led the
charge, insisting they could not “sacrifice the autonomy of the worker movement” and
subordinating its political choices to the “organic design of the dominant classes.”166
PSIUP divided the left—30 percent of PSI joined PSIUP and even more defected to labor
organizations like CGIL.167
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The economic problems continued to undercut reform. Inflation gave the Moro
government more reason to stall. To curb inflation, officials at the Bank of Italy, Guido
Carli and Emilio Colombo, introduced full-scale deflationary measures.168 The results
were predictable. Unemployment rose, small firms closed or were bought up by larger
ones, consumption reduced, and labor lost significant bargaining power, especially over
wages. The political consequences were equally significant. Moro insisted reform could
not proceed until the economy was restored to health. Nenni could not protest this stalling
of reforms because the government had just been formed and to resign in protest would
lend legitimacy to the claims of the secessionists in PSIUP. Moro’s logic won out over
the interests of reform. Moro would pursue similar logic over the course of his next three
governments that lasted between 1963 and 1968.
Over the course of these years politics became the dominant focus of the state.
Throughout the 1960s, reform was a central topic but consistently took a back seat to
either interests of the parties or the economic interests. This would change with the
worker and student agitation of 1968 and the “hot autumn” of 1969. Through the decade,
there had been no fiscal reform and the state bureaucracy was not touched. Even the
establishment of regional government, a popular reform on both sides, was delayed.
Why?
For one, the support for radical structural reforms no longer existed. The
Socialists could not be a locus for this reform because they lacked the support of PCI and
later PSUIP necessary to form a significant reform coalition. But corrective reform also
proved elusive. The DC was unprepared to pursue these changes despite the powerful
presence of Fanfani and his followers on the party’s left. Economic problems precluded
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the DC from delivering structural changes to the economy because the economic
problems hit the small business and administrative ceti medi the hardest. The DC was not
prepared to sacrifice the political power this group brought to table. This was clearest in
the ceti medi’s domination of Confindustria at the time. This influence was coupled with
the interests of the electrical trusts and the financial sectors that they controlled. These
capital interests formed a grouping that was significant to counter reform, especially as
they could always worsen the economic situation through flights of capital and
investment strikes.
These developments halted reform efforts throughout the 1960s. The government
was not compelled to respond to societal problems in a way that went beyond providing
lip service to reform. There were reformers on both the left and right but they saw their
efforts checked by these impediments. But delaying reform only prolonged the inevitable.
Throughout Italian society pressure was building. In the final years of the 1960s that
pressure would break through in a profound way: the student movements of 1968 and the
worker movements of the “Hot Autumn” that followed in 1969 and played out through
the early years of the 1970s.
The conjuncturual moment, an era of collective action, serves our investigation in
two ways. For one, it reveals that there were real grievances beneath the veneer of
political and economic brokering that took a central role in the 1960s. Second, this
moment sets up another significant moment in Italian political history: the Historic
Compromise between the DC, PCI, and PSI.
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From Collective Action to Violence
The educational legislation of the 1960s opened university education to an even wider
section of Italian society. Many of these new students came from the ranks of the ceti
medi and lower classes. When they entered the university system, they encountered a
system unprepared for the rapid influx of new students. Overcrowded and poorly staffed,
the university system, due to the economic situation, was not able to guarantee jobs to
those who did manage to complete their studies. Dissatisfaction was rampant. This
coupled with the fact many students were reading radical Catholic and Marxist thought
fueled a desire for revolt.169 As the agitation developed, many participants looked to the
earlier social protests of the trade unionists as a model thus took on a “workerist”
mentality. 170 Unflinchingly radical, the student movement attracted a peculiar response
in Italian society. The older members of the ceti medi rejected the uprising within their
midst. The students called into question the values of individualism and personal success
learned from the economic boom years. But the conservative elements were not the only
ones to question the student movement. Many on the left questioned the merits of what
was essentially a middle class rebellion, especially since it was dividing society. Pier
Paolo Pasolini published an inflammatory poem in L’Espresso on June 16th 1968, Vi
Odio, Cari Studenti (Dear Students, I hate you). A few excerpts show quite clearly the
problem the student movement:
You are late, children…
Now the journalists of all the world (including those on the television)
Are licking your asses (as, I believe, one says in the lingo of the university)
169
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Me No, friends
You have the faces of spoiled children
Good race does not care
You have the same bad eyes
You are afraid, uncertain, and desperate…
When, yesterday at Valle Giulia you fought
With police
I was with the police
Because the police are the sons of the poor
They come from the peripheries, in the cities and countryside…
At Valle Giulia, yesterday, if like this, it was a fragment of class struggle
And you, friends (although the side of reason) were the rich
While the police (who were on the side of the wrong)
Were the poor…171
Despite these criticisms, the student movement represented a seminal moment in which a
substantial element of the ceti medi broke with its dominant values inherent from the
economic boom. Also by focusing on the working classes, they also helped usher in the
next major wave of social protest spearheaded by the workers themselves.
The Hot Autumn swept across Italy in 1969. Themes we have already
investigated, the rigidity of the labor market, worker alienation and discrimination, and
southern immigration all contributed to the social discontent. Jobs were still scarce and
the development of Fordist production techniques resulted in a mechanization of
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production. This acceleration of piece-rate working exaggerated differences between
workers and foremen.172 This declining influence of workers coupled with worsening
conditions sparked a push for increased representation.
As workers began to protest, a remarkable number of left-wing factions sprung up
across the country. These factions differed across ideological lines but many held that the
revolution was at hand. Many of them espoused Maoist tendencies or at least tried to
update Leninist vanguardism to the material realities of Italian society. Taken together,
they were the largest new left in Europe. Throughout the period of 1968-76, they
mobilized thousands of militants in an attempt to develop an anti-capitalist and
revolutionary consciousness. Despite their prominence, the movement was bound to fail
because the factions remained divided and lacked applicability in Italian society. For one,
they focused on ideology, often igniting conflict between groups over issues of theory.
They also were modeled on the political parties and their hierarchies. This left little room
for innovation. They also adopted a casual attitude toward violence. They had adopted
South American and Asian liberation movements as their model. And when this was
coupled with an unsupported confidence in the imminence of revolution in the West, led
to dangerous urgency within the movements.173 And Italian politics moved with anything
but urgency.
As these groups increased their militancy, the state had to respond. Both the DC
and PSI who made up the ruling coalition were unwilling to ignore the social protest.
DCs interests needed normalization but also reform. For the PSI, inaction was effectively
political suicide with PSIUP always available to take away party members. Reform
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legislation was undertaken, most notably the establishment of regional government. The
right to referendum was also established during this time. But once again, the state did
not pursue structural reforms. This is clearest in the establishment of regional
governments. There was a wide difference in funds and personnel available to the
regions. Furthermore, as Robert Putnam showed, they were instituted in isolation,
unaccompanied by any wider attempt to reform state institutions and political
practices.174
These reforms and the efforts of the revolutionaries encountered roadblocks. The
private sector fought these developments. Wage increases were passed on to prices and
capital flights spiked. The mini economic boom during the early years of conflict initially
absorbed tensions but traditional interests soon took hold. Politics also intervened. The
term of left wing Guiseppe Saragat came to an end in 1971. The DC sponsored Fanfani as
their official candidate. The Socialists and the Communists supported Francesco De
Martino who stood further to the left than Saragat. The parties were unable to reach a
majority agreement on these candidates leaving the DC to drop Fanfani for the
compromise candidate Giovanni Leone. Leone won but only with the support of MSI.175
Leone shortly after and with the agreement of the parties decided to call elections
in 1972. This was the first time in history that the Parliament had not lasted its full five
year term. Both the left and right had hoped that the revolutionary vigor would energize
the electorate. The Communists maintained their position but PSIUP lost significant
electoral support. The party dissolved, most members joining PCI. The DC maintained its
position as well but the far right saw significant gains. MSI had absorbed the Monarchist
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party becoming MSI-DN (Destra Nazionale) and rose to take nearly nine percent of the
votes. The clear right wing mandate allowed them to form the first center-right
government in years. Giulio Andreotti presided over the new government. His
government did not last long. A resurgence in worker militancy forced the center-right
onto the defensive, and because of internal divisions, moved again toward a center-left
partnership. By June 1973, a new center-left coalition had taken hold. Political stagnation
would usher in new forces trying to upend the political status quo. Their methods would
differ—one preached compromise, the other condoned violence—but both would shape
the last 15 years of the First Republic.
The Communists witnessed the decade of the center-left from an outsider’s
perspective. The Cold War precluded any major action on the part of the Communist left.
A government majority presided over by the Communists would have been met with
skepticism if not outright hostility from most NATO members, even after the
Communists promised not to withdraw Italy from NATO if elected into the majority.
Recognizing these barriers, many on the left once again looked toward making a
compromise with the other major parties. This plan came to be known as the “Historic
Compromise.” Plans for the Historic Compromise began in 1972 when Enrico Berlinguer
became the secretary of PCI. Using the overthrow of the socialist and democratically
elected government in Chile, Berlinguer insisted that similar divides existed in Italy.
Every action of left wing militancy was countered by a mobilization of the extreme right.
These tensions, argued Berlinguer would open a path for authoritarian government.176
The “Historic Compromise” was put forward to counter these tendencies. The grand
alliance was supposed to be like the coalition of anti-fascist forces of 1943-1947. The
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Compromise would help dispel the social tension and the escalating political violence
occurring across the country by tying the principle political entities into an alliance with
each other. One area where this intertwining was most important was the social level. The
Compromise, if done correctly, would be a masterpiece of trasformismo in that it would
tie the working class and the ceti medi together in such a way that revolutionary and
reactionary appeals would be curbed if not outright eliminated.
The Historic Compromise was offered at the end of most of the revolutionary
activity in Italy. In order to continue the fight many on the left felt like compromise was
the only option left open to them. By 1973 most of the agitation in the schools and
factories was coming to a close. Some reform, particularly in wages, had been
accomplished but overall the system remained as it was. There was not going to be the
mass breakthrough in revolutionary politics many had seen as implicit in the student and
worker agitation a few years earlier. Many of the revolutionary groups accepted this fact
and either disappeared or folded themselves into more mainstream Communist circles.
But not all. For a small number of militants, even these groups, which often defied
mainstream left decisions, were not enough anymore. These militants decided to fight the
capitalist system on their own terms. The Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades) crystalized into
an organized movement. They called themselves “autonomous workers’ organizations”
but in reality their goal was to accelerate the course of history through replacing political
action with political violence. Using the Latin American guerrilla movements as a model,
the Red Brigades initially concentrated their efforts on elements of capitalist power.
Bosses and foremen were attacked or kidnapped. Property was damaged and other
symbolic actions, like firebombing bosses’ cars, were common. But after 1974, their

133

actions changed to target the state. The Brigades achieved national notoriety that April
when they kidnapped a Genoese judge, Mario Sossi.177 Sossi was released unharmed but
the event marked a turning point. The police began to target their activities leading to an
escalation of violence and increased concentration within the Brigades.
In light of this violence, Fanfani presented the DC as the party to restore order.
They were able to point to new public order legislation to back up their claims. At the
same time, the Communists presented themselves as beyond the corruption of
governmental institutions. They contrasted their positive local governments with the
clientelism of the regions under the DC’s control.178 At the regional level this message
resonated and led to most major cities falling into left wing control. The DC maintained a
slim majority in national government however. The DC needed to recognize this growth
in the power of the left. They opened dialogue with the PCI over the Historic
Compromise. Berlinguer seized the opportunity to try to make inroads with the DC.
Meanwhile, the PSI had replaced the left-wing De Martino with the more right-wing
Bettino Craxi. Craxi, who was to become a major figure in Italian politics, decided that
the PSI had to assert its autonomy vis-à-vis the Communists. Recognizing that the
Socialists already had made inroads into the, the PSI was nevertheless left isolated during
this period. Craxi, in making this move, was playing the long game. He recognized that a
new center-left coalition would have a better chance of survival under his Socialists than
under a “hegemonic” project coming from the Communists.179
Andreotti formed the new government in August 1976. He did not include the
Communists or the Socialists in the government but both parties voted non sfiducia (not
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no-confidence). Their abstention maintained the government by not bringing it down.
This government lasted until January 1978 after which Andreotti formed a new
government with the Communists included but not receiving any ministries. As an
opposition party, they were to gradually acquire the benefits of state participation through
trasformismo. Any revolutionary move was countered by the threat of an authoritarian,
law and order crackdown. This is precisely what happened. The Communists embraced
lottizzazione particularly within the banks, like Monte dei Paschi di Siena, of the central
regions where they had exercised influence and in the state television sector, RAI.180
Furthermore, Communist participation in government changed economic interventions
making them more neocorporatist. The major labor unions, private industry, and the
government got together to solve economic and labor issues. CGIL and the Communists
were prepared to offer wage restraint in favor for decreased unemployment and a greater
attention to problems in the South. Both of these demands ran up against the usual
structural barriers to reform leading to little real change on the demands of the left.
This neocorporatist strategy and Communist absorption into the state outraged
many on the militant left. The Red Brigades stepped up their activities to make up for
what they saw as a half-hearted attempt at reform, let alone revolution. This
dissatisfaction was particularly potent in that rather than championing civil rights, the
PCI championed the law and order measures put in place by the government. By trying
to prevent violence and shed the illegality from their party, the Communists were creating
more incentives for militant violence. By 1978 the Red Brigades adopted a “strategy of
annihilation.” The strategy was to target whole sections of the political and economic
elite, in addition to their supporters. The ensuing chaos would make the system unable to
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function thus leading to its collapse.181 They decided to take the most radical action of
their illustrious career on March 16, 1978. Andreotti was due to present the new
government with the Communists in the area of the government for the first time. On the
way to Parliament, Aldo Moro’s car and police escort were ambushed in Via Fana. The
police and Moro’s driver were killed and Moro was thrown into a waiting car, which
promptly disappeared in traffic. Moro’s kidnapping shocked the country. But the country
had to entertain a gruesome question: should the government negotiate with the Brigades
to save Moro’s life or should it remain firm in its commitment to not negotiate with the
terrorists?
Craxi, the Socialists, and many others advocated compromise. The humanitarian
exchange of prisoners would strengthen democracy. The Communists disagreed.
Compromise would legitimize the terrorists, incentivizing more kidnappings. The DC
was divided. Many feared letting the Communists be the only party that stood firm
against the terrorists, but many also felt humanitarian concern for Moro. After much
internal debate, the DC announced its refusal to compromise with the Red Brigades.
Aldo Moro was murdered on May 9, 1978 and in a deeply symbolic gesture, his
killers took his body to Via Caetani, the street equidistant from the DC and PCI party
headquarters.
Moro’s killing revolted the nation. This disgust was amplified as the killings
continued throughout the final years of the 1970s. These were not victories for the
Brigades however. Italian democracy solidified in the wake of their actions. The
Brigades lost members as the state cracked down on their activities and incentivized
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defectors with lighter prison sentences. Slowly the terrorist groups were dismantled and
the Anni di Piombo (the years of lead) came to an end. The effect of terrorism on
collective action was immediate. Violence closed off many of the spaces for social
protest leaving the status quo dominant. But on the other hand, appeals to revolutionary
violence lost the luster they carried throughout all of the student and worker protest only
a few years earlier.
This resurgence of the status quo forced the PCI to change strategy. The violence
had caused a hemorrhaging of support for the party during the national elections of 1979.
To make up for the loss of support, Berlinguer dropped the call for a historic compromise
and moved the party into the opposition wing. With the help of PSI, the goal was to take
power from the DC. It is with this combination of status quo and political ambition, that
Italy entered the 1980s.

Change the Leader, Maintain the System
Politics in the 1980s represents the apex the of the transformist and clientelistic
continuities of Italian politics that have dominated the narrative up to this point. The
government reverted to the alliance between the DC and the PSI, which had dominated
for two decades. Much like in the early 1960s, the government appeared stable. This
stability was particularly salient this time because the government was made of the
pentapartio, the five party alliance of the Social Democrats, Republicans, Socialists, and
Christian Democrats. As was usually the case, the Socialists and Christian Democrats
dominated this alliance. The transformist partnership between these two parties was
anything but calm however. Craxi and the lead Christian Democrat, Ciriaco De Mita
were often in open conflict with each other. This conflict was significant in that it would
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open the space for alternative leadership within the Chamber of Deputies for the first time
in decades.
After the Christian Democrat Giovanni Leone was forced to resign due to
allegations made in the USA over the Lockheed Corporation bribing a number of highprofile politicians purchase its products, Craxi insisted that Leone’s successor came from
the Socialist party.182 The government elected Sandro Pertini as its next president. Pertini
was extremely popular because of his advocacy of democratic values, his constant
references to his anti-Fascist past, and his outreach to the Italian public. Most
significantly, Pertini broke with the past and insisted on autonomy from the parties in his
choice of possible prime ministers. In 1981, he invited Giovanni Spadolini to form the
government. This was the first time since Ferruccio Parri in 1945 that the country was led
by someone from outside the DC. This appointment led to significant developments
within the DC. De Mita sought to reform the party to update the “cultural and ideological
mediation” it pursued.183 Mita’s quest was more rhetorical than material. His reformism
based on a new “rationality” in politics left many wanting. Craxi pounced on the divided
party. In 1983, he pulled his and the PSI’s support from the government, forcing national
election a year ahead of schedule. De Mita responded with a campaign based on the same
elements of his reformism. What was the result? A crushing hemorrhaging of support.
The DC fell from just over 38 percent of the vote to just under 33, the worst defeat in the
history of the party.184
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De Mita’s fall marked the beginning of the rise of Craxi. Due to his stature, and
the Socialist Pertini, Craxi was set to be the first Socialist prime minister in the history of
the Republic. Craxi ushered in period of longevity in Italian politics. His two
governments lasted from August 1983 until April 1987. Craxi was a deeply anticommunist. Stung from the marginalization during the years of the Historic Compromise,
he sought to transform the Italian left into a broader Socialist movement. His plans would
receive significant support from the slow crumbling of the Soviet Union and the crisis of
international Communism. Craxi was also attuned to the developments occurring in
Italian society around consumption and individualism. He celebrated these developments,
often taking a realist position to them. This innovative approach certainly differentiated
him from the austere calls and social critiques emanating from the PCI and its leader
Berlinguer.
Reflecting this realist take, Craxi personalized politics and attempted to demystify
political dealings. When taken together, these attempts amplified the cult of personality
within the government. This growth, fueled by the spread of the television in Italy, was
extended to other politicians as well. These appeals were made in the language of
“governability,” echoing a century of similar concerns. But in reality little was
accomplished in the way of major reforms. No major attempt was made to reform the
public administration. In fact, the excess of this sector only grew. The per-capita income
of the public administration rose almost 30 percent between 1985 and 1987.185
Craxi’s hold over the status quo was aided by the withering of Italian
communism. An electoral pact with the PSI was out of the question. The very policies of
the PCI precluded an alternative to Craxismo. As we saw above, the PCI of the 1950s and
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1960s put a great deal of focus on structural reforms, each inherently anti-capitalist, that
would be steps on the Italian path to socialism. This plan never took root on its own terms
and the Historic Compromise of the 1970s pushed that plan to the side. Nothing of much
substance replaced the Historic Compromise after it was suspended and Italian
communism was dealt a serious blow with the sudden death of Enrico Berlinguer in
1984. And after the fall of the Soviet Union and international Communism, the PCI
unaffectionatly became La Cosa (The Thing) until it was renamed the Partito
Democratico della Sinistra (PDS) in 1991.
Interestingly, as the PCI was busy imploding, the other parties of the pentapartito
began to consolidate into a stranglehold around Craxi and the PSI. Craxi and the PSI had
earned an unfortunate reputation surrounding their moves around commercial television.
In the mid-1970s the Constitutional Court had created regulations on television
transmission. National broadcasting had to be public but local transmissions could be
privatized provided there were enough frequencies available to prevent the formation of
monopolies or oligopolies. Silvio Berlusconi, a close friend of Craxi, built his media
empire by buying up these channels. Regulators looked to Berlusconi’s three national
television channels as flagrant violations of the provisions of the Constitutional Court. In
response, they ordered a partial blackout of his television channels in October, 1984.
Popular outcry was considerable and Craxi’s intervened with a decree law ordering the
return of national commercial transmissions. The law was declared unconstitutional but
Craxi intervened again with new temporary legislation. When it expired, the ruling
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parties dropped the issue. It would take five years for the issue to be taken up again to
produce any comprehensive legislation on commercial television.186
This brazen use of political power coupled with the political stalling that typified
Italian post-war politics, created dissatisfaction within the other members of the
pentapartito. By 1987, these elements were better prepared to compete with the PSI.
Elections were held in June and the DC reemerged with De Mita at its head winning 34
percent. The PCI remained remarkably strong at 27 percent. The Socialists captured 14
percent. And a relatively unknown organization, the Lombard League, managed to elect a
senator, Umberto Bossi and his close friend Giuseppe Leoni as a deputy.187 De Mita
formed a short-lived government. When he was appointed prime minister, he did not
relinquish his post as party secretary. This consolidation of power made many within the
DC uneasy. In-fighting torpedoed the 18th Congress. The right faction formed to defeat
De Mita won a narrow victory and replaced De Mita with Arnaldo Forlani. Forlani
partnered with Craxi to replace De Mita and shortly after Giulio Andreotti formed his
sixth government in July 1989. This partnership, the CAF (Craxi, Andreotti, Forlani)
alliance, the last of the First Republic, lasted three years falling in April 1992.

Corruption and Clean Hands: The Fall of the First Republic
April 1992 was not a simple falling of the government in which one government was
replaced with another only to perpetuate the same state of affairs. April 1992 marked the
end of an era. First, the government faced an external crisis—the dissolution of the Soviet
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Union—which allowed scandalous information about terrorist acts and other anticommunist activity to enter the public consciousness. This occurred through revelations
about Italy’s participation in militarized anti-communist operations known as Operation
Gladio.
Gladio was a complex operation designed as a firewall in the event that the Cold
War escalated. A document was discovered in the secret service archives detailing an
agreement between the CIA and SIFAR (the Italian military secret service) to create a
“Stay-Behind” network of clandestine groups which could be activated in the event of a
foreign invasion. Training grounds were designated along with 139 arms and explosive
caches hidden across the country. Training and direction would be provided by the
CIA.188 The discovery alarmed the Italian populace, the memory of factional violence
still fresh in their memories. Andreotti and other prominent politicians downplayed the
developments arguing it was a NATO structure only to be used in the event of a war in
which Italy was invaded.189 This line was severely undermined by another document
depicting a meeting with the CIA delegate in Rome, Howard “Rocky” Stone and his
Gladio counterparts. The Stone warned that “there could occur an extraordinary
insurrectionary situation in the South, as a result of which certain pockets of territory
could in effect be controlled by forces contrary to the government” and in such a situation
Gladio would operate “exactly the same way” that the CIA had operated in Vietnam.190
Gladio was dissolved by Andreotti at the end of 1990 but its effect on the public lived on.
When coupled with geopolitical changes, the strong anti-communist sentiment that had
helped guarantee a DC-PSI majority had all but disappeared or at least disappeared to
188

Ginsborg, 200, op cit. pg. 171
Bellu, Giovanni Maria., “Gladio, Ora Andreotti ‘Dimezza’ il Segreto” La Repubblica, 26 July 1991
190
Quoted in Ginsborg, 2003, op cit. pg. 172
189

142

enough of an extent that the government could not rely on it to bolster their support or
justify their agenda. First Republic trasformismo had lost a major tool of consensus
construction.
The second crisis was internal to the system. Following closely on the heels of the
famous maxiprocesso anti-mafia trials, Italy was treated to a fresh batch of political
scandals. These were Tangentopoli (loosely, “Kickback City”) corruption scandals and
the Mani Pulite (Clean Hands) investigations that occurred after it. This legitimation
crisis would have catastrophic effects on the legitimacy of coalition government. The
Tangentopoli scandal and Mani Pulite investigations that followed revealed a system of
clientelist corruption that spread throughout the central government and all across Italy.
Prominent politicians, particularly in Craxi’s PSI, were accused of using clientelist
structures to secure votes, particularly in the South. After this came to light, these party’s
share of the vote dropped dramatically and most of their leaders were ousted from the
positions of power they had held in the organs of the state, parliament and the local
authorities.
The Mani Pulite investigations began on February 17, 1992 when Mario Chiesa, a
PSI official and director of a retirement home, was arrested. Chiesa had earned a
reputation for bullying and demanding 10 percent for contract work done at the
retirement home. Eventually, business leaders got fed up with his activities and informed
Antonio Di Pietro, one of the principle magistrates in the Mani Pulite investigations. One
such businessman went to pay his tangente with a wire and the Carabinieri on standby.
Chiesa was caught in the act, desperately trying to flush the 30 million lira kickback

143

down the toilet.191 Chiesa was outcast from the party and referred to as a rogue by Craxi
during the national elections.192 Chiesa eventually turned states-evidence and recounted
the full details of the system of tangenti occurring in Milan.
Chiesa’s arrest proved to be much more than an isolated incident. But before the
investigations could unfold, the political system had to be weakened. April 1992 was that
weakening. The elections of April 1992 were plagued with the Gladio scandal, mafia
violence, and tightening economic conditions. Chiesa’s arrest only added fuel to the fire
that was burning away at ruling party hegemony. The DC fell from just over 34 percent
to just under 30. The greatest losses were in the North. These losses were absorbed as
wins by Lega Nord. Overall, the party jumped from .5 percent in the previous election to
8.7 percent in 1992.193 This weakening of the political class opened the door to the Milan
magistrates’ investigations.
The chief prosecutor of Milan Francesco Saverio Borrelli formed a pool of
magistrates, il Dipartimento, dedicated entirely to investigating the linkages of corruption
in Milan. The populist junior prosecutor Di Pietro, known for his humble background,
innovative investigation techniques, and pragmatism, quickly became a national figure.
The Dipartimento was awash with information. Chiesa collaborated as did other Milanese
businessmen in naming increasingly powerful political figures. Borrelli did not hesitate to
include them in the investigation. This inclusion in investigation had its own peculiar
effect. Under the Code for Penal Procedure passed in 1989, anytime someone was placed
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under investigation he or she had to be informed by the magistrates.194 This Notice of
Guarantee took on an aura of accusation in the scandalous atmosphere. Prominent
politicians, on both the left and the right, received these notices effectively accusing them
of illegally financing their activities.
As these investigations were occurring, the office of the President of the Republic
opened. The President could exert control over the magistrates thus it became of central
importance for the ruling parties to elect someone who could control the crisis. As the
majority party, the DC fielded the first candidate. They chose Forlani who was
reluctantly backed by Craxi and the PSI. Forlani failed to reach a quorum of votes and the
nomination passed to the PSI. Their candidate Giuliano Vassalli also failed to reach a
quorum.195 It looked as if the back and forth over the next President was to continue.
The back and forth would have continued were it not for an escalation brought on
by tragedy. The Maxiprocesso Mafia trials had progressed far further than anyone had
expected. The life sentences handed out to many prominent Mafia members had been
upheld after numerous appeals. The Mafia was not about to let these developments go
unpunished. The Mafia had retaliated by assassinating Salvatore “Salvo” Lima, the DC
politician and former mayor of Palermo on March 12, 1992. Giovanni Falcone a key antimafia prosecutor was targeted next. On May 23, as he was driving home from Palermo’s
airport with his wife, bodyguards, and police escort, the Mafia detonated over 650 pounds
of explosives hidden in a drain pipe underneath the highway. The three policemen in the
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lead car were killed instantly and Falcone and his wife died in the hospital shortly
after.196
In the aftermath of Falcone’s killing, the government called a joint session to elect
a President. They settled on Oscar Luigi Scalfaro who had been Minister of the Interior
under Craxi’s governments but nonetheless was distant from the business class of the
1980s. He had a reputation for supporting the autonomy of the magistrates and in his
acceptance speech took a clear position on Tangentopoli. He said, “the abuse of public
money is a very grave thing… nothing is more dangerous, for democracy, than the turbid
interlacing between politics and business.”197 Scalfaro insisted that Craxi nominate
someone to lead the government other than himself. If he did not, Scalfaro hinted that he
would ask someone from the Christian Democrats.198 Craxi had little choice to accept and
offered a list of names. Scalfaro chose Giuliano Amato, the former treasury minister.
Amato was close to Craxi but there was no evidence he was part of the tangenti
networks.
Meanwhile, the mani pulite investigations began to spread beyond the confines of
Milan. All across Italy, prosecutors like Borrelli’s Dipartimento began to investigate
clientelistic linkages. Over the course of his several months in power, seven of Amato’s
deputies were forced to resign over issues relating to mani pulite. And on December 15th,
1992 Bettino Craxi received his first of several informazione di garanzia informing him
that he was under investigation for corruption, including violation of the law on the
public financing of political parties.199 Shortly after, Craxi fled to his villa in Tunisia
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To those in government, it seemed as if the investigations would never end. A
notice alone was an accusation. Amato decided that something needed to be done. He,
along with Giovanni Conso, the new Minister of Justice announced four decree laws and
three bills to address the escalating situation. The most significant, and the one that
created the most outrage, was the immediate depenalization for the illegal financing of
political parties.200 Prominent Italians, including Eugenio Scalfari, the author of the term
borghesia dello stato, accused Amato and Conso of blatantly lying to the public.201 The
public was outraged that the political class would attempt to let themselves off in such a
manner. Scalfaro insisted he would not sign the decree law on constitutional grounds.
The political situation only grew worse. On March 28th Andreotti received a Notice from
the prosecutors in Palermo notifying him that he was under investigation for association
with the Mafia.202
Once prosecutors reached the level of Andreotti, it was clear that the First
Republic needed to be replaced. On April 19 a series of referenda, including a
referendum to reform the electoral system and one to address the public financing of
parties, was passed with an overwhelming margin.203 The political system had to confront
itself. Amato was pushed out and Scalfaro formed an interim “president’s government”
which was to last until new national elections in March 1994. The investigations
continued but without the fever that had preceded. During this time, the DC's last
secretary, Mino Martinazzoli decided to change the name of the party to the Italian
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Peoples’ Party with Berlusconi’s center right Forza Italia eventually absorbing most of
the party in 1994.204 The socialists officially disbanded on November 13, 1994 but they
had been losing members well before that date. Most of their members and voters shifted
over to PDS the reformed Communist party. As 1994 approached, the First Italian
Republic came to an end.
The final quarter-century of the First Republic present a story defined by tension
and conflict. This fact is not controversial. The conflict was on display for the world to
see. What is far more significant, is the fact that many of these episodes were either
precipitated or enhanced by the state itself. Whether it was the inability of the state to
accomplish reforms at the hands of trasformismo politics or direct political corruption,
the state served as a powerful perpetrator of its own demise. One way of approaching this
issue is to say a few brief words about clientelistic politics in Italy in general.
Many accounts of clientelism in Italy treated it as an issue of cultural path
dependence. Perhaps the most famous example of this approach is Edward C. Banfield’s
book The Moral Basis of Backward Society. Written in 1958, Banfield based his analysis
on a paternalistic analysis of a good Northern society and a bad Southern one. Banfield
above all wanted to show a causal connection between economic development and a
people’s propensity to engage in social associations and engage in collective projects for
the common good. He argued that poverty and “backwardness” could be explained
largely by the inability of villagers to act together and transcend the immediate interest of
the nuclear family. Banfield called this behavior “amoral familism”. Amoral familism
was above all, an ethos that rose out of the economic and social situation found
throughout the South defined by a high mortality, land tenure conditions, and the absence
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of extended family.205 Robert Putnam’s regional government performance analysis took a
similar outlook. He focused even more heavily on the role of social associations in
shaping government performance across a variety of measures. Finding that the Northern
regions outperformed the Southern ones in their ability to enact and implement policy
Putnam explained this differentiation in terms of a “civic tradition” present in the North
but absent in the South. This structure in the South, largely a legacy of the Spanish
Hapsburgs and the Bourbons, destroyed horizontal ties of solidarity in order to “maintain
the vertical ties of dependence and exploitation.”206 Whereas the North saw government
as means of expressing citizenship through mutual cooperation, the South’s government
maintained the people as subjects through rigid hierarchies. Because of this uneven
power structure, corruption and clientelist administrative practices defined much of the
Italian social experience.
Mani Pulite calls all of this into question. For one, it began in Milan, Italy’s
supposedly most modern city. But more than that, Mani Pulite revealed that clientelism
was the core of the Italian state. There is little doubt that had the DC-PSI coalition won a
decisive victory in the 1992 elections, the investigation would have been blocked, like
many before it. This blockage would have been aided by the splintering of the
magistrates themselves into the political factions omnipresent in Italian political history.
The magistrates, especially the proactive ones, took action because the political class was
weak and divided. Also, any blockage of judicial inquiry would have created an uproar.
The deaths of Lima and Falcone were endemic to the problem of corruption. Falcone was
not to be the last victim related to the Mafia trials. On Sunday July 19 1992, Paolo
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Borsellino, another popular and prominent anti-Mafia prosecutor, went to visit his mother
at her apartment in Via D’Amelio, Palermo. He was accompanied to the gate of the
apartment block with five heavily armed bodyguards. As they reached the gate, there was
a powerful explosion, which killed all six of them instantly.207 When all of this violence
was combined with the accusations of political corruption spreading throughout the
country, the country developed a desire for justice. Any political blocking to the pursuit
of that justice, as was evident with the backlash against Amato and Conso, was met with
uproar.
A second element that places clientelism into the domain of the state rather than
society alone is the fact that the corruption investigations spread furiously across Italy.
The investigations started as small inquiries into small to medium sized bribery payments
to government personnel and exploded into a full-blown investigations into the most
powerful politicians in Italy. Milan broke the firewall that protected the political class
from being held accountable for their actions. Furthermore, the actions of the Socialists—
who, as they made clear in their opposition to Communists from Togliatti to Berlinguer,
were hostile to using the state for political purposes—shows that the state could be a tool
to reduce opposition. The spoils system that the state provided to those that were included
in it helped maintain the state itself. It was only actions from the outside, structural
reform had consistently fallen on deaf ears, that changed the system. And it remains an
open question to what extent the fall of the First Republic produced change for the Italian
Republic.
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Chapter 5: Populism Emerges and Responds
In 1992, voters signaled what the Corriere della Sera called the earthquake elections.208
The Italians had held a protest vote even if at this point it was not for anything or anyone
in particular. As the scandals unraveled the political system, it became clear that they had
voted for an alternative—any alternative. Even before the elections occurred, this push
for an alternative asserted itself through the electoral rise of the Lega Nord. The crisis of
legitimacy in Italy provoked structural changes and opened space for new political actors.
This space benefitted Lega and its brand of populism because extreme right parties do not
support the political system, either with unconventional participation or direct action.
Piero Ignazi argued their anti-system connotation pushes them to delegitimize the
'fundamentals' of representative democracy.209 A deepening of the crisis—which would
occur in Italy as the investigations progressed—fuels the anti-system parties rather than
the 'reformist' ones.
Evidence of this claim comes from the fact that the crisis boosted populist, antiestablishment parties like Lega Nord who saw a surge in popularity amid demands for
legality and democratic renewal. Lega capitalized on the crisis of the centralized
government by offering a populist program and regional federalism as an alternative to
the decades of misrule. They mobilized around one of their most recognized slogans,
Roma Ladrona (Thieving Rome), and secured representation through alliances with
Silvio Berlusconi’s newly formed Forza Italia party and MSI, which had reformed itself
as the far-right Alleanza Nazionale. This alliance would mark a reestablishment of
208

Gianfranco, Piazzesi., “L’Italia Protesta, Elezioni Terremoto” Corriere della Sera 7 April, 1992
Ignazi, Piero,. 1996. "The Crisis of Parties and the Rise of New Political Parties." Party Politics 2
(4):549-66.
209

151

coalition governments that defines Italian national politics to the present day. The end of
the First Republic marked the beginning of the Second, which was defined by a fresh
array of political actors.
The rise of this populism in Italy is marked by the references to the past political
history that we have explored up to this point. Going forward, it is essential that we focus
on how Lega and right-wing populism in general fits into this political history. Since
Lega was the principle party espousing these populist discontents, this investigation will
focus on its activities primarily. This final investigation will trace out how these political
actors asserted themselves in a post-crisis political landscape. Rather than proceed in the
historical manner of the previous chapters, this chapter takes a more theoretical approach
to investigate how Lega constructs itself ideologically vis-à-vis the developments in
Italian political history that confirm its worldview.

The Ideologies of Lega Nord
Lega cannot be seen as simply a right-wing or radical right-wing party. Lega represents a
major rebirth of the politics of populism in Italy. Populism is a slippery concept in
politics. It has been used to describe everything from Fascism to calls for direct
democracy. The reason for this broad use of the term comes from its base referent.
Ionescu and Gellner argue that all forms of populism are “characterized by an ideological
referent to the ‘people’ as a homogenous entity with exclusive positive and permanent
values.”210 Lega’s efforts can be described as populist in this respect. For example, in its
early years Lega built support through rudimentary tactics like leafleting football (soccer)
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matches and addressing relatively apolitical civil society associations in the north as a
way of tapping into the people. But populism meant something different for Lega. Lega
employed a more concrete form of populism based on contextual factors like regionalism.
Roberto Biorcio used the term regional populism, which has since caught on, to describe
Lega. His conceptualization was a fusion of both regionalism and populism that created a
mutually reinforcing dialectic between the two terms. He included regionalism in the
definition of populism because Lega arose in a specific political and socio-economic
environment in which it could develop its themes with reference to the territorial context
of its heartland areas. Furthermore, it was created as a fusion of regional groups, thus
having an institutional history built on regional features.211 This regional populism is
formulated against the backdrop of the major political issues that flow through the
historical project of Italian politics.
Populism as an ideology, especially for right-wing parties, is more complicated.
This complexity is evident in how Lega’s regional populist identity emerged. Piero Ignazi
argued that new right-wing parties like Lega were either parties with historical links to
Fascism or a type of post-industrial extreme right defined by the fusion of antiestablishment values and neo-conservatism.212 Hans-George Betz and Paul Taggart
elaborated on Ignazi’s formulation by introducing populism into the fusion.213 For these
two scholars, populism meant mobilizing a people and resentments against the powers-
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that-be. The essence of Ignazi’s argument remained the same but now anti-establishment
stances were mobilized masses confronting the powers-that-be. Because these masses are
constituted through a regional space, Lega framed issues in terms of a “people” versus an
“outsider.” Specifically, Lega formed a discourse which pits a virtuous, homogenous
people against a set of self-serving “poteri forti” (powers-that-be).214 These poteri forti
are embodied by the state the problems that arise out of it based on its centralization.The
fusion of regionalism and populism creates an ambiguous form of populism that is
ultimately defined by regionalism and a regionalism that gets its rhetorical force from
anti-establishment populism.
This dualism has aided in their political project in ways that simultaneously rely
on and expand on identity. Specifically, the geographical location of “North” allows them
to create a pseudo-nation, which they have named Padania in reference to the Po river
valley that all of the northern regions share. When their populism is combined with this
“nation” the party constructs an identity based on an imagined nationhood. Cas Muddle
argues that this construction allows right-wing parties like the Lega Nord to expound
“Nativist Nationalism.” He argues that this construction is an ideology that holds states
should be inhabited by members of the native group (the “nation”) and that nonnative
elements like people and “foreign” ideas are fundamentally threatening to the
homogenous nation-state.215 This formulation allows for the regionalist-populism to take
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on a dimension of nationalism. For Lega this nationalism stems from their construction of
Padania. Lega’s Padania becomes an anchor point for their ideology and a convenient
reference point for constructing political debates in insider/outsider terms.
By rooting their demands in regional-populist manner, Lega stands against
anything that threatens the cultural and regional identity of the Italians in the areas in
which they are active. Specifically, this stand often manifests itself in calls for radical
action ranging from secession from Italy or enhanced autonomous regional federalism to
a general xenophobia of outside “others” like immigrants, the EU, and other forces of
globalization.216 Furthermore, this positioning allows Lega to practice various forms of
exclusion and it allows them to incorporate other forms of exclusion quite easily.217 This
ability lends Lega a degree of ideological flexibility. For example, the party originally
“othered” Southern Italians in order to oppose the social and economic support that the
South received at the expense of the North. These rhetorical techniques did not fall on
deaf ears considering the amount of Southern immigration that the north absorbed
following the economic boom. Furthermore, the grievances over access to work and other
economic strains introduced by the Southern immigrant resurfaced in this discourse
focusing on the South as primarily parasitic in nature. During its peak years, Southern
immigration was constructed as something that befell the North. It was not much of a
stretch to expand this to development programs and the “Southernized” government,
defined by corruption and inefficiency, itself as something that befell the North.
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As globalization expanded, Lega shifted its discourse to attack immigrants, the
EU, and other forces of globalization that they felt threatened their unique way of life.218
Southern Italy no longer was the central focus although remnants of anti-southernism
remained. This dexterity can be illuminated by critically analyzing perceptions of Lega.
Observers of the Lega Nord comment that this xenophobia often manifests itself in
directly racist or quasi-racist rhetoric. This perspective certainly has merit particularly
surrounding their views on migrants but is often complicated by their populist character.
Anna Cento Bull argues that the racism Lega employs rhetorically arises from a tightly
communitarian society and economy.219 Lega emphasized its regional ethnicity rather
than a generic Italian ethnicity. Lega employs an "othering" and xenophobia based on
cultural rather than biological differentiation. She cites the political program for 1992
when Lega would have espoused the most intense regionalism because it had yet to enter
political power. The xenophobia is presented in cultural terms. The program states:
Our party’s strongly critical attitude towards migratory policies stems from our
specific concept of mankind. A human person is not simply an economic agent:
he or she is made up of affections, cultural values and identities which can find
their best expressions in separate historical and environmental communities.
Immigrations, having a purely economic value, break up this equilibrium which
forms a vital part of human nature.220
This stance allows them to direct the xenophobia towards whichever group suits their
political and community needs. They can target groups related to issues they are
combating to frame issues in relation to their territorial community and “people”. The
threat itself is unimportant, so long as whatever it is can be formulated as an outsider.
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Lega’s views of Southern Italians illustrate this process of “people” definition.
The most prevalent way in which xenophobia is articulated in what Lega terms the
‘cultural’ differences between the North and South of Italy.221 According to Lega, the
economic differences between North and South are ascribed to the alleged contrasts in
culture, mentality and attitude on the part of the majority of people in the South of Italy.
The South is consistently portrayed by Lega as an area in which the people have no real
desire to work and are only interested in claiming state benefits, whereas the North of
Italy, Lega argues, has a strong work ethic, which explains the dynamism of the
economy. When they do work, Southerners are characterized as economically backward
because of the agricultural nature of their work. In addition to these views about
agricultural work, Lega’s grievances against the state translate into an attack on southern
Italians. The bureaucratic structure was mostly staffed with southern law graduates that
looked to the state to provide employment and economic stability.
These sentiments create a powerful divide in Italian society, which Lega exploited
rhetorically. For them, only the Northern regions were socially and economically healthy.
Everything south of Rome suffered from a parasitic illness of crime, inefficiency, and
backwardness. These conditions were intensified by the bloated public sector that relied
on northern tax dollars to fund failed public works projects in the South. History suggests
that this is not an inaccurate criticism. In fact, this ideological point transformed into one
of the most recognized slogans of Lega Nord: Roma Ladrona or thieving Rome. For
Lega, the solution was to stop the spread of the illness by cutting off the malfeasance
before it spread. This message had deep salience for the Northern Lega supporters as they
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watched the northern regions become embroiled in corruption scandals. Corruption was
typically seen as a Southern phenomenon exerted by the interlocking of elites in the
government and agricultural sectors. The flow of money to the South through
development projects, projects that often languished in inefficiency and excess, only
helped to confirm this viewpoint. When corruption broke through the northern power
bloc, starting with Craxi’s Milanese Socialists, it appeared as if the whole system had
been infiltrated by the corrupt governance structures of Rome. Because the illness was
embedded in the culture of the South, the only way to stop the spread was a complete
separation. Thus, Lega began to advocate for the independence of their nation of Padania.
When this dualism of North versus South was created, or rather reasserted, Lega could
support it through employing its regionalist populism of “our people” versus an outsider
to sustain momentum. This momentum coupled with the ability to define new enemies of
Padania and its people, allows the Lega Nord to occupy a unique position in Italian
politics.
This xenophobic rhetoric, espoused in culturalist terms, also allows Lega to
occupy a theoretical space outside of mainstream politics. This anti-establishment
populism allows for Lega to wield enormous political dexterity so long as the issue can
be framed in an “us versus outsider” manner. A prominent example is their ambiguous
anti-establishment stance expressed when the “other” is the Italian government itself.
Lega rejects the centralized government, feeling that it simply drains their region of tax
revenue and stifles their regional uniqueness. These vital resources are stolen from
Padania. Furthermore, they coupled this slogan with their xenophobic views on Southern
Italians to create a threat to their regional wellbeing around which they mobilized their
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supporters. Lega’s longevity derives from its combination of regionalism and populism
which, respectively, give the party a unique identity in the northern Italian electoral
market and the flexibility to adapt quickly to changing opportunity structures.222 Without
the ideological dexterity afforded by their nativist regional-populism, Lega would not be
able to tap into political opportunities and construct their principle demand: a demand for
regional autonomy guaranteed by federalism.
Especially in its early years, strong calls for federalism and autonomy defined
Lega’s political program. These calls came from all party leadership but the strongest call
for federalism came from Gianfranco Miglio, the individual responsible for lending an
academic voice to the demands of the movement and party. Miglio argued that the strong
dissatisfaction of the Italian people with their government came from a “widespread
revolt against the nation-state.”223 This revolt arose from the way the nation-state was
constituted. He argued that the political project of the modern nation-state, particularly
one constructed in the manner of the Risorgimento, pursued a program of internal
homogeneity. This internal homogeneity could only come through the construction of a
national myth that was used to guarantee internal cohesion. As we have seen, this myth
took various forms historically. During the Risorgimento, it was the myth of the nation
itself. A unified Italy that transcended Italy as a geographic unit was the end goal. The
problem with this myth construction was that it was intrinsically opposed to the
particularisms over which it was trying to operate. This fact is striking in that the
architects of the Risorgimento pursued centralized rule to help bring together these
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particularisms. For them, these particularisms were not thought of in terms of specific
identities but divisions. And divisions were antithetical to a strong nation state that could
compete on the international state. The particular languages, cultures, cults, and customs
that constitute a people’s concrete social composition could not exist within this nationstate. Furthermore, as the nation-state became associated with modernity, all of these
particularities were at worst dismissed as “backward” or at best considered “folklore”.
This approach created dissatisfaction within the people because it engendered a
fundamental contradiction into a state’s nationalist project. These myths of national unity
are meaningful abstractions for only a limited set of individuals, usually the creators of
the myths. Fascism only intensified this push toward unity and homogeneity.
Miglio and the populists pushed for the exact opposite. Rather than create national
abstractions, government should occupy itself with a focus on local particularities. For
Miglio and the political project of Lega, authentic bonds are cultural and are only
powerful at the micro-level. The central government had spent too much time and
resources trying to forge something that only arises naturally through a process of
localized community formation. Only through this “microculturalism” could an authentic
sense of belonging arise. This focus on the micro also applied to the socio-economic
background of the Lega electorate. The people that came out en masse for Lega were
from the deeply Catholic Northern provinces dominated by small and medium dynamic
industries that had been expanding since the economic boom.224 This fusion of traditional
Catholic communities and economic dynamism fostered a strong sense of localism and
exclusiveness of the northern small-town Catholic Italy combined with a focus on
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networks built by those communities and the autonomous industries making up their
economic base. These people felt, and with some justification, that they existed outside
the realm of the state. Their projects were defined by independence rather than state
dependence especially when compared to the Southerners who, in their view, relied on
the state and other corrupt networks for subsistence. Their ethic of hard work, sacrifice,
and self-sufficiency contrasted drastically with the images of excess and corruption
emerging at the end of the First Republic.
For Miglio and other Lega Nord members, this microculturalism provided the
cultural support for their calls for federalism. Miglio argued a federal constitution is
meant to preserve and manage particularisms.225 Only through this federal model – which
was to be supplemented with the right of secession – could a functioning national Italian
government exist. The central model was far too divorced from the people it was
designed to serve. This fact coupled with the highly legalistic nature of the Italian
administration could only lead to the rampant inefficiencies and misbehavior that had
brought down the post-war Italian order. The federal system was meant to allow for the
functioning of differences between parts of the country that have differing cultures and
want to be governed differently. This federalism would be Italy-specific, a neofederalism, based on micro-regions that corresponded to local realities. This federalism
would entail the dismantling of the central state in favor of the localities and their
particularities. Crucially, Lega’s federalism was built on its program regional populism
that emphasized creating a new arrangement for politics in Italy. Paul Piccone points out
that responses to wasteful, unresponsive, inefficient, and unaccountable central
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governments typically call for a return to a mythical, pre-modern political organization
predicated on ethnicity, religion, race, language, and other specific characteristics.226
Even though Lega bases its political ideology on preserving these elements as culturally
important entities, their call for federalism represented the broader regional populism of
their other ideological components. Piccone argues that Lega’s self-reconfiguration from
a limited ethnic formation into a broader Northern League calling for the federated
regions encompassing relatively “organic socio-economic zones” represents an
alternative to the pre-modern idealism. Lega made its regional populism the starting point
to finding solutions to social problems rather than the ultimate solution itself. Only by
focusing on the local could government adequately address the social and economic
issues that faced the country.
One such example is Lega’s ability to advocate for its particular brand of
federalism to confront economic issues despite its constitution as a region-focused and
anti-establishment force. In fact, Zaslove argues that going beyond the cultural issues of
regional populism into the realm of economic grievances reveals a great deal about the
party.227 These issues are especially important to consider as they often changed quite
significantly in the context of electoral politics. Lega was one of the first political
movements in Italy to warn policymakers that the international political-economic system
was undergoing significant changes in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Lega made the
case that Italy, particularly with its bloated public sector and weak production sector, was
ill equipped to handle these changes.228 Rather, they argued Italy needed to decentralize
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its administration system while building support for the small and mediums sized firms
like the ones that dominated the landscape occupied by Lega. Lega maintained that the
traditional form of centralized and patron-client politics embodied by the ruling parties
like the Christian Democrats did not represent the needs of most Italians and northernItalians in particular. Rather than focusing on the small and medium sized firms that
developed alongside the massive firms dominating the boom economico, Lega argued
that the Rome and the central government was wasting valuable resources by supporting
the Italian South. This waste was particularly egregious in the use of public money to
build large conglomerates. In other words, the government was only contributing to
eccess and inefficiency in focusing on entities like ENI and Montedison, dominated by
the state bourgeoisie, rather than on the many small and medium firms dominated by the
ceti medi. Rather, Umberto Bossi, the party leader argued, the Christian Democrats
favored large public and private entities that built “cathedrals in the desert” at the expense
of local entities both public and private.229 This line was often used in Italy even before
the crisis to describe the massive public works projects funded by the Casa per il
Mezzogiorno. Bossi and other Lega politicians attacked high taxes, transfers of funds
from the North to the South, inefficient bureaucracy and state services, arguing that these
failings put the regions of Lega’s constituency at risk. This message was especially
powerful considering the low job growth that these investment schemes produced. We
have seen that the development investment was capital intensive in nature, particularly
when it was focused on developing natural resources or agriculture in the South. Thieving
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Rome was going to bankrupt the country and the small and medium producers which
Italy relied on already were going to end up footing the bill.
Crucially, Lega constructed this argument in a regionalist and populist manner.
The actions of the central government were those of an outsider taking from the areas of
Lega’s support. The response to this theft (Roma Ladrona) and other threats to their
“nation” created a distinct set of ideological characteristics, specifically its antiestablishment stance, based on perceived threats. Working off of the ethnographic study
of “radical right” voters conducted by Jörg Flecker, Zaslove argues that three economic
trends come together to produce an economic ideological profile of a populist right party
like the Lega Nord. In terms of economic issues, supporters demonstrate intensive
feelings of injustice from frustrations of legitimate expectations relating to various
aspects of work, employment, social status or standard of living; (2) there was a sense of
fear and anxiety that comes from a sense of powerlessness from economic decline,
precarious employment, or the devaluation of skills and qualifications; and finally (3)
there was a clear trend among those who had experienced ‘occupational advancement’
with a strong sense of attachment to the ‘company and its goals’.230 Outsiders create
uncertainties and threats, even abstract ones like abstract ones like economic changes,
which the populist nation mobilizes against.
These sources of uncertainty and perceived threats to their world at the hands of
existing socio-economic transformations and the seeming inability of existing
government to respond adequately to absolute and relative levels of economic decline
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allow Lega to assume an anti-establishment stance regardless of its position in the
government. Even when in power, federalism provided a universal answer. They could
always fall back on their federalist program of politics because they argued that the
problem itself arose from excessive centralization of the political system. The high levels
of bureaucracy and taxation coupled with the growing problems of public sector debt
created the problems in the economy. The federal model with its focus on particularities
and local solutions could solve the problems created by a distant and homogenizing
central government. This stance permitted Lega to incorporate autonomous constituencies
within its regional populist federal model so long as they broadly fit Lega’s conception of
“microculturalism.” Furthermore, this image of negligence and theft perpetuated by
Rome put them in the position of uncertainty outlined by Zaslove and facilitated their
turn inward towards regionalist populism. This turn is evident in that the same cultural
“othering” that occupies their social thought also occupies their economic ideology. The
fear and anger that Lega invokes at economic issues is made possible by this ability to
pinpoint injustices suffered by their “people” at the hands of an outsider even if that
outsider is Rome, the South, or later, the EU and migrants.
This shift to global issues marks an important turn for the Lega Nord. Before,
their focus was on the internal social problems caused by the bloated public sector and
high taxes. They also directed some attention toward migration but not on the scale they
would adopt as migration to Italy increased during the 1990s and 2000s. Lega began to
direct its vitriol towards the EU, migration and other forces of globalization particularly
as it began to win electoral successes in coalition partnerships with other right wing
parties. In its earlier years, Lega looked towards the European community with only a
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moderate skepticism. They were hesitant to support it because of the threat it could pose
to regional identities but for the most part their energy was directed at the failings of the
Italian state. Furthermore, during these early years, Lega supported European integration
to the extent that its leaders believed that the more the North was integrated into a
broader European economy, the more autonomy the region could have from the
government in Rome.
All of this changed in 1999 with the introduction of the Euro as the European
single currency. The adoption of the Euro in Italy was not an easy process. Many blamed
the euro for an increase in the cost of living. As merchants adjusted to the euro, they
increased their prices; in other European countries as well, the euro was blamed for
spiking inflation. As Italy’s position relative to the rest of the European Union worsened,
anti-globalization rhetoric increased. According to Lega leaders, especially the new
Federal Secretary Matteo Salvini, the EU was not serving as a barrier against the negative
effects of globalization. In fact it was accomplishing the exact opposite. By pushing for
low tariffs, welcoming Chinese entry into the WTO, and sanctioning member states that
hampered EU-wide competition the EU became a force of globalization and a threat to
localized Lega interests.231
The entry of these globalization forces put local, small and medium enterprises in
a position of weakness relative to the cheap goods that flowed in from oversees. Local
industries like textiles and other luxury goods declined in value because of this dual
economic force of a weakening currency and cheap goods. This weakness became a

231

Woods 2009 ibid and Woods, Dwayne 2010. "A Critical Analysis of the Northern League's
Ideographical Profiling." Journal of Political Ideologies 15 (2):189-219.

166

central point of Lega’s political program; the Lega Nord crystalized their attacks in antiWTO and anti-import language. For Lega, the WTO symbolized unfettered global trade
and the dumping of cheap products on to the Italian market. Woods reminds us that while
the Lega’s hostile attitude towards trade appears contradictory, since the movement is
based in a region of small and middle-sized enterprises that rely on trade, many of these
firms’ owners believed that trade with Eastern Europe and especially China threatened
their exports.232 International trade became a threat to the localized interests of Padanian
people even though their criticism fit into a much larger anti-globalization discourse.
Lega Nord’s constitution as a regional populist party allows it to construct a
discourse of “Us” versus “them” based on the particular set of political pressures
available. They were able to take a stand on corruption in the 1990s because they could
plausibly argue their people and their “nation” was being stolen from. They could just as
easily switch focus and attack the forces of globalization, much like their left-wing
adversaries, because of the negative effects of the Euro and the introduction of cheap
Chinese goods to the market. Both situations created the opportunity for the Lega Nord to
activate their regionalist populism rhetoric and mobilize to secure political representation.
The Lega’s populism allowed them to pull together small and medium industrialists as
well as the workers within those firms, shopkeepers, and a section of the white collar
working class all by focusing on issues of fiscal and political federalism often backed up
by a rhetorical technique that established a powerful us/them binary to inform politics.
These people, many of whom comprised the ceti medi who were historically either
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courted by the government or left to go about their business, found a powerful political
organization through which they could relate to the Italian political system.

Populism Exploits the Political System
Populism’s political prospects came to fruition during the 1990s period of scandals and
legitimation crises. However it seems pertinent to ask why Lega? Italy is known for
having many political parties and if the scandals truly opened up space for new players
why did Lega do so well? The answer to this puzzle comes from their unique ideological
construction of regionalism and most importantly populism. Lega was able to capitalize
on the legitimacy crisis through offering its fluid program of populism and federalism
discussed in the previous section.
Disgust and dissatisfaction with the central government was rampant during the
period of crisis. As valuable as this information is for understanding the political
opportunity structure at the time, it obscures the fact that dissatisfaction with the central
government did not emerge overnight with the revelation of a growing number of dirty
politicians and corrupt programs. Regular Eurobarometer surveys show a growing level
of discontent from 1972 to 1994. This dissatisfaction is hardly surprising considering the
uptick in conflict and visible corruption during this time period. In Italy, this discontent
reached a percentage of the population almost double that of other European countries.
The percentage of the population reporting of dissatisfaction never fell below 70 percent
and occasionally swelled to approach 90 percent.233 The investigations revealed that the
parties and other areas of public administration through their patron-client networks were
233
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directly responsible for the inefficiencies and separation of political elites and citizens.
When the scandals broke and revealed the extent and depth of corrupt networks in these
various areas of the public sector the underlying sentiments transformed into cries of
protest. These protests found a willing audience among populist political parties like
Lega which had long decried the inefficiencies and patron-client ties of the central
government.
These political opportunities, as fruitful as they were also presented a challenge
for Lega and its ideology. Lega’s ideology and rhetoric hinged on its anti-establishment
position. This anti-establishment populism presents a contradiction for parties wishing to
enter government. These parties risk losing supporters as they decide to participate in the
political system they decry.234 Their localized identities and needs face a threat of
subservience to national political needs. This fear was especially important for Lega
because of Italy’s increasing participation in globalizing entities like the EU. Initially,
Lega remained firm in its anti-authority and isolationist stance. Its populist voice was
powerful enough for it to win representation because Italy’s proportional representation
system allowed Lega take an independent stance. In the old system, as long as a party
received four percent of the electorate it could receive seats in parliament. Recognizing
their strong position, they refused to join the coalitions they saw as the embodiment of
the corrupt system they were decrying.
Lega used this outsider status to mobilize animosity against the government,
sufficient to win representation in the 1992 and 1996 elections. Yet in 1993 Italy began to
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reform its electoral system from proportional representation to a predominately
majoritarian system. These changes took effect at the regional level but by 1994 these
reforms had spread to the national level. This majoritarian system favored parties—unlike
Lega—willing to form coalitions. Lega could not sustain its strictly anti-establishment
stance because its electoral base could not compete with parties that formed coalitions.235
The risk of being left in the cold by its former supporters led to Lega’s decision to form
an alliance with Silvio Berlusconi and his Forza Italia party. This alliance led to electoral
success in the March 1994 general election but within months the alliance would fall
apart, bringing down the government. Lega would not see widespread electoral success in
general elections until 2001 when it struck a new alliance with Berlusconi and Forza
which lasted until 2006.
For regionalist populists like the Lega Nord, participation in coalitions at the
national level requires striking a delicate balance between being a party of government
and a movement of opposition. Albertazzi & McDonnell argue that this balance
characterizes the recent behavior of the Lega as it has pursued electoral politics,
particularly is participation in coalitions.236 These coalitions allow Lega to access
political power but still present a contradiction in that Lega maintained its regional
stance. It was able to marshal its populism to secure power but focusing on national
politics undermines its regional and nativist construction. Traditionally, autonomous and
regionalist parties have no organization at a higher territorial level and only seek to
mobilize electoral support at a national level in order to secure representation and self235
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determination for the “nation” that they claim to represent and defend. Autonomous
parties usually are only willing to cross this threshold when a significant opportunity, like
the ones in post-crisis Italy, arises. Once in government, parties come under pressure to
set a legislative agenda and focus on issues that can be achieved. In this situation, parties,
particularly autonomous ones, have two options. Elias and Tronconi argue they can rebrand themselves as credible mainstream political actors and responsible governing
partners capable of undertaking the duties of government effectively or they can play the
role of “opposition in government” in order to reassure their grassroots supporters that
they have not “sold out” to the establishment.237
Lega Nord falls between these two positions because, on one hand, it exists to
represent and fight for the self-determination of the Padanian people vis-a-vis the corrupt
dependency inducing federal government. On the other hand, Lega strives to achieve
legislative victories in its core issue areas. Lega’s ideological construction allows them to
walk the line between these two options. Analyzing the political issues championed by
Lega, namely anti-globalization and federalism, helps illuminate this positioning strategy.
Federalism, which became a greater focus as Lega shifted away from its secessionist
rhetoric, allowed the party to remain committed to the self-determination of Padania.
Federalism represented a way of giving more autonomy to regions but in a way, as
opposed to secession, that still occurred in the context of the state. Federalism can be a
concrete legislative goal particularly if presented in the rhetoric of reform but
international issues gave Lega even more options to make legislative demands.
Globalization “threats” allow Lega to latch on to concrete issues, like the flood of cheap
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textiles or increased clandestine immigration, and produce a legislative agenda. Lega
could oppose the state as it stood through calls for more Federalism while simultaneously
working towards legislative solutions to address problems facing the country.
Lega’s dualism, which it obtains from its fluid ideological construction, found
expression in the way Lega approached its role in government during the different times
and structural positions of its power. Not only did it make the various demands outlined
above it constantly negotiates its position within the coalition governments. When Lega
came to power with Forza in 1994 it did so with a reduction in its overall vote share to
levels below what it had achieved in the 1992 election.238 This development promoted
fears of a vote shift towards Forza. Growing fears within the Lega of a weakening of its
distinctive profile and the erosion of its electoral standing as a result of coalition
participation led to its withdrawal from the government. This decision was controversial.
An internal conflict ensued between those willing to exploit government office for policy
gains, and a hardline faction led by Umberto Bossi that was willing to sacrifice
government office in order to protect electoral standing. After intense internal strife, 62
of the 177 senators and about one-third of its deputies left the party, Bossi’s hard-liner
approach won out.239 Bossi’s strategy was ultimately successful in terms of electoral
results. In 1996 the Lega contested the election from the opposition, with a campaign that
emphasized its original regional populist goals, most notably a renewed focus on
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secession. Lega polled an impressive 10.1 percent of the electorate which remains the
best performance by the party to date.240
This strong showing by Lega positioned them to wield influence in the coalition
arena rather than simply apply their brand of politics. Government incumbency can be
both a positive or negative experience for anti-establishment and autonomous parties.
Elias and Tronconi argue this experience is shaped by two factors: the relationship of the
party to its potential coalition partners and the strength of the leadership.241 By
maintaining its distinctive ideological profile, the Lega Nord could maintain a hold on
distinct sections of the electorate. Having this ideological strength with the electorate
poses a threat to potential coalition partners. This strength gave the Lega Nord the ability
to fend off competition from Forza Italia.242 Their electoral strength also made them an
indispensable electoral ally, without which most of the northern regions would have
fallen into the hands of the center-left as in 1996 (and today) when there was no solid
center-right coalition.243 This positioning changed the way Lega would interact with
other parties. The new alliance represented a new pact with Forza Italia guaranteeing
Lega certain policy concessions and freedom to move within the center-right government.
This flexibility allowed Lega to continue to exercise its opposition stance thus pleasing
its electorate while at the same time having the legislative benefit of being part of the
ruling coalition.
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Government participation also weakened its outsider status. Because the 2001
coalition emphasized collaboration, Lega had to tone down its anti-establishment
program to avoid another failure of government like the one seen in 1994. Lega can only
play its ‘opposition within government’ role by publicly fighting with its fellow junior
coalition partners like Alleanza Nationale (National Alliance). Reflecting this internal
division, Lega thus often portrayed itself as the defender of Berlusconi against the
‘professional politicians’ of other parties, depicted as plotting with an eye to a postBerlusconi era in which they can reconstruct a ‘broad center’ along the lines of the
corrupt First Republic.
These developments suggest that Lega still draws strength from its capacity to
appear as a staunchly anti-establishment populist party. This role is certainly easier to
play in a political field in which Lega is not part of the ruling government. This dexterity
manifests in Lega’s most recent electoral strategy. Lega has begun to expand outside of
its traditional areas of influence in the north and has begun to go south to try to tap into
new electoral bodies. By focusing on globalization pressures like increased immigration,
the Lega Nord has begun to shift its policy agenda towards addressing these issues. The
new party secretary Matteo Salvini has even tried to rally support in the South for the
party.244 Arguing that the party represents the interests of Italy, the Lega Nord has shifted
its “othering” to represent the forces outside of Italy. This move represents a shift away
from its ideological construction as regionalist and moves it more towards nationalist.
Lega now fights for Italy in the war on globalization. Its focus has moved away from the
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powerful regionalist critique of the Italian government. Although this shift in the party’s
ideological composition is significant, Lega retains its populist character.
This development can obscure the reality that politics in Italy remains remarkably
spatial. Politics in Italy is built on regional differences in the electorate. These electoral
zones continue to play a powerful role in politics. Despite the massive upset to electoral
politics that occurred during the 1990s that fueled the rise of parties like Lega, these
electoral blocks continue to shape Italian politics. John Agnew’s work on the political
geography of recent Italian elections shows a continuing lack of electoral bipolarity
across geographical scales, such as the regional and the local. Italy remains politically a
‘geographical expression’ with little evidence of either emerging nationwide swings
between party groupings.245 Historically, this division was made clear by the electoral
patterns in Italy with votes nationalized around two major parties, the Christian
Democrats and the Italian Communist Party forming the opposition to CD hegemony.
These two primary ideologies, Catholicism and Communism, both formed and were
fueled by functional and territorial cleavages and have acted as territorial political
subcultures in several areas of the country. Following the lead of Italian scholars of this
spatial division, Passarelli and Tuorto argue this division creates a system of electoral
belts throughout the country.246 The “white-belt,” where the influence of the Christian
Democrats was dominant until the 1990s, contains the north-eastern regions of Italy
(Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, and Trentino-Alto Adige). The “red-belt,” where the
Communist party represented the prevailing political tradition, includes portions of the
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regions in central Italy (Tuscany, Marche, Umbria and often Emilia-Romagna.) The
presence of these two distinct territorial subcultures has allowed for long-lasting stability
with regard to voting preferences in a large number of the territories since the Post-war
period.
This electoral system became significantly stressed during the 1990s when the
corruption scandals ruptured the ideological and political hegemony of these two groups.
With the emergence of new political actors on both the right and the left, the relevance of
territorial subcultures appeared to be waning.247 Nevertheless, the presence and rise of
regional parties during the same time period, in addition to the rising visibility and
eventual electoral breakthrough of Lega in the early 1990s, dramatically indicated that
political subcultures were changing but had not vanished. This relevance of territorial
subcultures was heightened when Lega has radicalized its appeal and demanded a
transformation of the state along federal lines.248
This relevance of regionalism played out, and continues to play out in Lega’s
electoral politics. Not only is regionalism crucial for its ideological construction, but
regionalism also provides pockets of electoral support. Lega became stronger in the
territories where the former DC’s implantation was more evident, such as in the Veneto
region.249 But other scholars emphasize the fact Lega was initially successful in
peripheral areas in Veneto and only later, although quite rapidly, did the League colonize
the “heartlands” of the DC, namely the provinces of Vicenza and, more recently, Verona.
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However, after the political changes in the 1990s, a large portion of the electorate in the
“white zone” viewed the Lega Nord as a new political entrepreneur able to represent the
zone as a whole.250 It is for this reason that Forza Italia recognized Lega as potential
legislative partner and possible electoral threat. The regional populism of the Lega has
solidified in its political strategy as a mass party.

Towards a Conclusion on a Continually Changing Phenomenon
To conclude, the phenomenon of populism must be taken back to the theoretical level.
The investigation has treated Italian populism, mostly through analyzing one of its most
powerful practitioners, as a conjunctural phenomenon. The analysis shows that rightwing populism in Italy exists as a response to a “negative aggregation” of political,
social, and economic conjunctures systemic to Italian politics since its formation as a
republic in 1861. The reason for treating populism in this manner is to move beyond a
descriptive account of populist personalities in order to understand the factors animating
the populist phenomenon. It is clear that the Italian right wing populist attempts to create
a discourse that pits its chosen virtuous homeland and people against a threatening
outsider. This is why populism can be understood as a structural us/them binary. But
treating populism as a conjunctural phenomenon permits these categories of “us” and
“them” to take on analytical significance. In deploying the binary the populist responds to
a specific moment in time often to show how far some “ideal” has gone astray. But both
the referents – those exclusive positive and permanent values – and the “problems” they
confront are historical in nature. The “people” as well as what threatens them have a
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specific history and the populist often reaches for these histories to construct the binary
itself.
This construction allows the total project of the Italian right-wing populist to
assert itself as response to the “negative aggregation” that threatens harm to the
homogeneous heartland of the “people.” This is clear in each of the elements of the
negative aggregation. In the political element, Italian populism pushes back against the
centralized state’s attempt to base its political projects on the consent of abstract citizens.
Because the Italian state, since its formation in 1861, strove to create a national Italian
identity, all local particularities and regional differences became subsumed in an abstract
notion of nationalism. The regional populism analyzed here pushes back against this
abstraction through championing federal devolution. Only through this federal model –
which was to be supplemented with the right of secession – could a functioning national
Italian government exist. The centralized model was far too divorced from the people it
was designed to serve. In the post-fascist period, the legalistic nature of the Italian
administration led to rampant inefficiencies. At the local level, prefects exercised great
authority over the elected municipal councils.
Despite these regulations, the bureaucracy became a breeding ground for
clientelism. Throughout Italian political history, the interests of faction and coalition
were better represented in the bureaucratic entities than the needs of citizens. In the postfascist period, designed to be highly representative, this stemmed from the open nature of
Italian elections. When presented with an electoral list, Italian citizens express their
preference not just for a party but for a specific candidate on the party list. This system
encouraged infighting and often a cult of personality surrounding a candidate. Patronage
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was the most effective way of developing that cult. In exercising significant power,
mostly through their sheer ubiquity, these agencies circumvented the elected bodies of
the republic, especially on the local level. The result was political fidelity could be traded
for jobs, favors, expediting tasks, and anything that fell under the purview of the agency.
This cleintelistic behavior brought down the post-war Italian order and lent legitimacy to
the populist’s claims, especially since repeated corruption scandals showed how this
practice had been normalized. Rather than rely on central parties, the federal system was
meant to allow for the functioning of differences between parts of the country that have
differing cultures and want to be governed differently by protecting these regions from
the competing political interests of the central government. Thus federalism would be
Italy-specific, a neo-federalism, based on micro-regions that corresponded to local
realities. This federalism would entail the dismantling of the central state in favor of the
localities and their particularities.
The economic conjuncture is similar to the political conjuncture. For one, the state
itself grew through massive public works projects like the Casa per il Mezzogiorno. The
bureaucratic apparatuses necessary to administer these funds were the site of the power
relationships like those detailed in the growth of state political power. These
arrangements led to a growth in the mediatori, the party bosses, the bureaucrats, the
building speculators, lawyers, and other specialists who received development funds from
the central government and who mediated between the state and the local communities.
Under this scheme, local communities were forced to filter their needs through the state
apparatus which functioned through the mobilization of clientelistic fidelity. Thus the
calls for federalism also acquired a not-so-subtle air of fiscal federalism.
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These forms of state permeations were not relegated to traditional bureaucratic
apparatuses. Aided by access to easy capital under development funds, state expansion
occurred through a growth in what during the 1970s became known as the “borghesia
dello stato.” This state bourgeoisie was the actors of private sector or the business groups
that ran public entities that nonetheless attached themselves to the state and its political
power in order to increase their economic gain or manipulate competition. What this
meant was economic growth in Italy, outside of exported manufactured goods, was
largely self-generated through public projects. Italian capitalism developed in such a way
that competing power interests became intertwined and dependent on each other. The
entities that did not ascribe to this pattern of development, most notably a small business
sector that profited from a lack of attention by the state, became dominated by
conservative middle class, the ceti medi. These individuals found their political outlet in
the center-right Christian Democrats but when that party lost its legitimacy through the
political scandals, they shifted their allegiances to the right-wing populists, especially
when they began to focus on economic protectionism for the small scale production of
cultural goods.
The social conjuncture is both the most difficult and easiest piece of the negative
aggregation to discuss in relation to the structural binary of populism. Easy because the
us/them binary relies on xenophobia; difficult because it involves issues of cultural selfdeterminism. Historically, the xenophobia of the populist in Italy capitalizes on the antiSouthern sentiment that resulted from the southern development funding and the internal
migration that resulted from imbalances in modernization in the south. The focus on
agricultural and infrastructural projects froze the southern productive classes in place.
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The public works program provided a staggering amount of jobs especially for a region
that chronically suffered from inflated unemployment. But these jobs were temporary at
best. Typically, laborers would be called on by the state to support construction projects
and other temporary laboring positions. When this arrangement failed to resolve southern
economic imbalances, many people moved northward to find employment in the North’s
industrial zones. The increased competition for work, coupled with barriers to integration
like major linguistic differences led to a great deal of anti-southern sentiment. The
populist capitalized on this sentiment by linking the “corrupt” spending in the south and
other government waste in regions that were not their own to the anxieties of nonsoutherners. Rome was not only a thief; it was a thief that was redistributing the wealth to
the “backward” south to further its own political project.
This social element sustains the us/them binary in a sense of cultural selfdeterminism. The “us”, which is defined by virtuous and permanent values comes under
threat from an outsider and in so doing undermines those values. This is perhaps best
shown into the banalities of everyday existence. Knowing this, we can conclude this
discussion in an area many people associate with Italy: food culture. In January 2009, the
municipal government of Lucca, a medium-sized town in Tuscany known politically for
continually asserting center-right values in left wing Tuscany, announced a ban on new
kebab shops inside the city walls.251 The motion underwent passionate debate but
eventually passed with a large majority. The logic of the law was to “protect the culinary
tradition and the architectural, structural, cultural, historic and decorative characteristics”
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from “food and beverage establishments whose activity could be sourced to other ethnic
groups.”252 It also aimed to support the local culinary traditions of Lucca. The law
required “at least one dish from Lucca’s culinary tradition, prepared exclusively with
commonly recognized products of the region.” Supporters saw the law as a way of
holding on to their local culture while opponents decried it as a way of closing the city
off to diverse culture.
Unsurprisingly the Lega Nord was at the center of this debate. They supported the
ban with gusto. For them it was an opportunity to defend their local culture against the
invading outside other. They also supported the efforts of the local lawmakers to take
matters into their own hands and regulate the issues that affected their daily lives. If the
matter was left to the state, their fears would be realized and the historic centers would be
filled with kebab shops. The children would be coming home with greasy fingers from
Kebab rather than pizza. Many looked to these laws with alarm because Lucca’s law was
the first of a handful of similar laws across northern Italy. Yet many individuals favored
the law – unsurprising considering the never-ending battle to keep the older cultures
flourishing. The xenophobia at the heart of Lega’s and perhaps populism’s political
project in general informs these concerns, especially in the case of the cultural laws. The
outside “other” of this cultural product undermines the position of the traditional cultural
products easily recognizable, especially for Italy, in local cuisine. The populist rhetoric
sustains this binary by offering to protect the virtuous, permanent, and well-known values
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while closing them off to the outside other. And here we see the difficulty of cultural selfdeterminism: If one culture has the right to exist why can’t another?
When these conjunctures come together to provide the backdrop to the populist
political project, it is clear that the issues raised by history are difficult to ignore. Not
only do they inform the structural form of the populist project, the elements of the
negative aggregation make populism a conjunctural phenomenon. This is clear in how the
populist responds to history. Italy’s political history is littered with examples of how the
establishment of the state existed over and above the people it was designed to represent.
As the years passed and one system gave way to another, it was clear that this pattern was
not going to go away easily. In fact, as our investigation into post-war politics and
political economy reveals, not only did the pattern persist, but it intensified.
At the same time, populism is a living phenomenon. The terms of the us/them
binary are continually being redefined, even if along the same political tropes. Cultural
self-determinism is a powerful force even when it extends beyond electoral politics. And
electoral politics reminds us that populism continually adapts. Lega stumbled into the
position of the party crying out for an alternative to centralization. Yet Lega also fell into
the same pattern of trasformismo and coalition building, even if it did so to survive
politically. The system itself absorbs opposition and reformulates it into a force that
upholds the system of absorption itself. Only time will tell if the system will continue to
persist. Experience suggests it will.
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